МИНИСТЕРСТВО ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ И НАУКИ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

Федеральное государственное бюджетное образовательное учреждение высшего профессионального образования

«Нижегородский государственный лингвистический университет им. Н.А. Добролюбова»

Э.Н. Плеухина

Очерки по синтаксису современного английского языка (с хрестоматией и упражнениями)

Учебное пособие для студентов факультетов и отделений английского языка

Нижний Новгород
2015

Печатается по решению редакционно-издательского совета ФГБОУ ВПО «НГЛУ».

Направления подготовки: 45.03.02 – *Лингвистика*, 44.03.01 – *Педагогическое образование*.

Дисциплина: Теоретическая грамматика английского языка.

Учебное пособие по синтаксису английского языка предназначено для студентов факультетов и отделений английского языка (курс теоретической грамматики). Учебное пособие включает краткое изложение теоретического материала по пяти синтаксическим темам: (1) словосочетание, 2) предложение, 3) метод НС, 4) лингвистика текста, 5) прагматика); упражнения по темам и хрестоматию; к каждой теме прилагается список основных синтаксических терминов, используемых в работе, и список литературы.

Предлагаемое пособие может быть использовано при чтении лекций и проведении семинарских занятий по курсу теоретической грамматики (раздел «Синтаксис»), а также при чтении спецкурсов и дисциплин по выбору.

Составитель: Э.Н.Плеухина, канд. филол. наук, доцент

Рецензенты: В.Н. Бурчинский, канд. филол. наук, доцент
С.И. Жолобов, канд. филол. наук, доцент

Preface

The materials provided here include two parts: the surveys and readings.

The surveys contain the information on five syntactic topics: the phrase, the sentence, the IC analysis, text linguistics and pragmatics.

Exercises, assignments and tests are given in the surveys to help the students in mastering the material.

Each topic is followed by a list of reference books for further reading.

The second part consists of a number of texts extracted from books of English and Russian linguists on the themes mentioned.

Readings are intended to invite a critical participation of the students in the exploration of ideas put forward by linguists on different problems of syntax.

The surveys and readings may be used in teaching syntactic theory to the students of linguistic colleges and universities

1.11.2003   E. Pleukhina

An Outline of Modern English Syntax

Contents
Part I

V. Introduction to Pragmatics

Part II
Readings

I. Phrase

II. The Sentence

III. Immediate Constituents

PART I
I. Phrases

Outline

1. Definition and debatable points in the theory of phrases. The status of phrases in syntax
2. Views of grammarians abroad on the theory of phrases
3. Coordinate and subordinate phrases. Types of subordination: agreement, government, adjoinment
4. Noun phrases
5. Verb phrases
6. Exercises
7. Terminology List
8. Reference Books

Key-words: phrase, coordination, subordination, coordinate, subordinate, agreement, government, adjoinment, nexus, junction, cumulation, interdependence, hypotactic constructions, paratactic constructions, endocentric phrases, exocentric phrases, head of the phrase, adjunct, tagmeme.

1. Definition and debatable points in the theory of phrases. The status of phrases in syntax

There are two main levels which are traditionally distinguished in syntax: phrase level and sentence level. The two main units of syntax are correspondingly the phrase and the sentence.

There are different definitions of the phrase in linguistic literature. One of them runs as follows: a phrase is every combination of two or more words which is a grammatical unit but is not an analytical form of some word (B.A.Ilyish. The structure of Modern English, p. 171.).

According to some other scholars, the term "phrase" can be applied only to such groups of words which contain at least two notional words forming a grammatical unit. Thus, word-groups of the type "preposition + noun" (e.g. at school, in the lecture hall, etc.) remain outside the classification.

Another debatable problem arises in connection with predicative combinations of words. Some grammarians hold the view that "a phrase is a group of words which form a grammatical unit. A phrase does not contain a finite verb and does not have a subject-predicate structure" (Longman

Dictionary of Language Teaching and Applied Linguistics, p. 53). Subject-predicate structures are regarded, consequently, as sentences.

It is known that a sentence is a communicative unit whereas a phrase is a naming unit employed for naming things, actions, qualities and so on. Subject-predicate structures may happen to be identical with sentences in form (e.g. <u>They worked.</u> <u>They worked</u> hard.), but it is only sentences and not phrases which have intonation of their own. It is also important to notice that the formal coincidence of subject-predicate structures with sentences is not at all regular: cnf. She sells books vs* She sells; He bought a newspaper vs* He bought. The formal coincidence of subject-predicate structures and sentences is possible only with mono-valent verbs (such as to rain, to snow, to arrive, to sneeze, etc.).

The most remarkable points of difference between phrases and sentences are as follows: 1) Sentences function as units of communication and phrases are naming units of language just as separate words are (cnf. <u>Her sister</u> is an <u>English teacher</u>. vs <u>Mary</u> is <u>a teacher</u>); 2) Sentences are marked by intonation patterns of their own, whereas phrases are not; 3) All the positions in the sentence should be filled in which is required by the finite verb valencies.

2. <u>Views of grammarians abroad on the theory of phrases</u>

The theory of phrase, or word combination, in Russian and Western linguistics has a long tradition going back to the XVIIIth century. In the first scientific English grammar written by H.Sweet in 1891 the term "phrase" was rejected in favour of "word-group". H.Sweet investigates the meaning and structure of noun-phrases and verb-phrases, he was the first to make an attempt to find out what governs the order of arrangement of several components constituting an attributive group. He comes to the conclusion that it primarily depends on the meaning of attributive elements as "the one most closely connected with it (i.e. the head-word) in meaning comes next to it, as in "three wise men", where "wise men" is equivalent to the single word "sages". H.Sweet believes that "there is a gradation of increasing specialization from the beginning to the end of such a group" (H.Sweet. A New English Grammar. Logical and Historical).

When discussing verb-phrases H.Sweet emphasizes the cases when a modifier precedes its verb instead of following it as "I know where he is" (op. cit.). He also points out that "if several adverbs follow… the verb, time adverbs generally come first … but when one of two modifiers is a lengthy group, the shorter verb-modifier is often allowed to precede even if it would otherwise follow as in "he heard again the language of his nursery" ("he heard it again"), (op. cit).

There are many other fruitful remarks on the structure of word-groups made by H.Sweet in his Grammar.

During the first half of the XXth century many scientific grammars had

been issued. Of all the books published at that period of time Otto Jespersen's grammatical studies of phrase structure are of most interest and value.

Otto Jespersen introduced the theory of three ranks which is actually a basis for the notion of hierarchy of syntactic relations between elements of grammatical units. Analysing the example "terribly cold weather" O.Jespersen states that its constituents are "evidently not on the same footing"; it is evident that the word "weather" is "grammatically most important", while "cold' is subordinate to it, and "terribly" is subordinate to "cold". Further on he writes the following in his book "A Modern English Grammar on Historical Principles": "Weather is determined or defined by cold, and cold in its turn similarly determined or defined by terribly. We have thus three ranks: weather is primary, cold is secondary, and terribly tertiary in this combination." O.Jespersen points out that a distinction should be made between word-classes and ranks: the rank of the element does not depend on its morphological class but rather on its syntactic position and thus "in some combinations a substantive may be a secondary or tertiary, an adjective may be a primary, etc." (op. cit.).

O.Jespersen shows that substantives are often used as secondaries, e.g.: gold coin, stone wall, cannon ball. He gives examples in which adverbs, although comparatively rare, are used as secondaries: the above remark, the off side. According to O.Jespersen tertiaries can be expressed by substantives in such examples as "the sea went mountains".

He also makes a clear distinction between the rank of the group and the rank within the group which is illustrated by the examples: 1) "Sunday afternoon" with Sunday used as a secondary and afternoon used as a primary; 2) "Sunday afternoon was fine" where "Sunday afternoon" as a whole may be regarded as a primary; 3) "A Sunday afternoon concert" with "Sunday afternoon" functioning as a secondary; 4) "He slept all Sunday afternoon" with the same phrase being a tertiary (op. cit.).

O.Jespersen's theory of three ranks is of great value and plays an important role in indicating the existence of hierarchical relations hidden behind linear representation of elements in language structures.

O.Jespersen distinguishes two main types of syntactic connection by which a secondary is joined to a primary: "junction" and "nexus". He uses the terms "adjunct" and "adnex" to denote the secondaries of these two types of combinations.

Junction indicates attributive relations between words: a silly person, whereas nexus indicates predicative relations: the dogs bark. O.Jespersen is of the opinion that "a junction is like a picture, a nexus is like a drama or a process" (op. cit.).

According to O.Jespersen nexus falls into two subtypes: independent and dependent. This notion is based on grammatical (formal) and semantic criteria. A nexus is considered to be independent when it "forms a whole sentence, i.e. it gives a complete bit of information "as – the door is red and the dog barks". A

dependent nexus "does not give a complete piece of information" and is "found in clauses … and various other combinations" such as <u>I paint the door red</u> and <u>hear the dog bark</u>. (op. cit.). In the last two examples "dependent nexus" corresponds to what is called now as secondary predication.

To sum it up it should be said that O.Jespersen's theories contain not only many new and extremely valuable ideas, but also have some debatable points which will be discussed later on in the section including Reading materials.

E.Kruisinga's book "A Handbook of Present-Day English" (the 5th ed., Croningen, 1932) is another important contribution to linguistic analysis of the first half of the XXth century. E.Kruisinga, who uses the term "syntactic group" in reference to phrases, defines a syntactic group as "a combination of words that forms a distinct part of a sentence". He classifies syntactic groups into close and loose. His definition of close and loose syntactic groups is close to the definition of subordinate and coordinate phrases: "We speak of a close group when one of the members is syntactically the leading element of the group. We speak of a loose group when each element is comparatively independent of the other member" (op. cit.). E.Kruisinga illustrates close groups by such examples as <u>a country doctor</u> or <u>mild weather</u>, and loose groups by the phrase <u>men and women</u>. According to E.Kruisinga the separate words in a loose group are left unaffected by their membership of the group (op. cit.). He classifies close groups according to their leading member into verb-groups, noun-groups, adjective-groups, adverb-groups and preposition-groups. Pronoun-groups are included in the noun and adjective-groups (after H.Sweet's division of pronouns into noun-pronouns and adjective-pronouns).

The foundation for the theory of phrase in Western European and American linguistics was laid by Leonard Bloomfield, America's most prominent scholar who played an important role in the development of descriptive linguistics having published his remarkable book "Language" in 1933. He based his study of phrase structure partially on the results of his predecessors, "yet he was the first scholar to formulate a theory of phrase which was later developed in the works of American structuralists" (V.Burlakova. Contribution of English and American Linguists to the Theory of Phrase. Moscow. 1971).

L.Bloomfield defines a phrase as "a free form which consists of two or more lesser free forms, as, for instance, <u>poor John</u> or <u>John ran away</u> or <u>Yes, Sir</u>". (L. Bloomfield, op. cit.). The faults of the definition lie in a not altogether clear definition of a "free form" and a "lesser free form", as for the examples given, they sooner illustrate sentences (John ran away; Yes, Sir) than phrases.

L.Bloomfield introduced the distinction between two types of phrases: endocentric and exocentric (op. cit.).

Endocentric phrases are those which belong to the same form-class as one or more of their constituents (e.g. poor John, fresh milk), in exocentric constructions the phrase does not share the form-class of any of its constituents

(op. cit.) as, for instance in "beside John", "with me', "in the hurse", by running away".

In order to know whether the phrase is endocentric or exocentric it is necessary to examine how it functions in a larger structure, i.e. L.Bloomfield actually applies substitutional technique in revealing types of phrases (e.g. "poor John" is equal syntactically to John", cnf. "Poor John ran away" vs "John ran away", which shows that "poor John" is equal syntactically to "John").

Two kinds of endo-centric phrases are distinguished: 1) co-ordinate (or serial) and 2) subordinate (or attributive). In coordinate phrases the constituent elements are equal syntactically: students and teachers; warm and cold.

The components of subordinate endocentric constructions differ syntactically: one of them which can be used instead of the whole phrase is called the "head", the other component of the phrase is subordinated to the head and is used as its attribute (thus, in "poor John" the word "John" is the head of the phrase and "poor" is its attribute).

L.Bloomfield underlines that in its turn the attribute may be a subordinative phrase", for example, the phrase "very fresh milk" consists of the head "milk" and the attribute "very fresh"; the latter phrase, in turn, consists of the head <u>fresh</u> and the attribute <u>very</u>. In this way there can be several ranks of subordination: in <u>very fresh milk</u> there are three: (1) milk, (2) fresh, (3) very (op. cit.). In other words, L.Bloomfield underlines the hierarchy of constituents of subordinative constructions.

L.Bloomfield touched upon a number of other problems connected with phrase structure including that of word-order of attributive words in noun phrases.

He prepared the ground for their further discussion and exploration.

Two grammars published in the late fifties are very important for the study of phrases. These are: "Structural Essentials of English" by H.Whitehall (N.Y., 1956) and "Understanding English" by P.Roberts (N.Y., 1958).

H.Whitehall classifies phrases ("word-groups" in his terminology) according to their function and structure. Following L.Bloomfield's classification he distinguishes two main types of phrases: headed (endocentric) and non-headed (exocentric). H.Whitehall makes use of substitution technique to classify phrases. He writes: "It is possible to substitute the head for the group and the group for the head within the same grammatical frame" (op. cit.), for example, in <u>Fresh fruit is good</u> and <u>I like fresh fruit</u> it is possible to substitute <u>fruit</u> (the head of the phrase) for <u>fresh fruit</u> in both the cases.

Non-headed groups have grammatical functions quite distinct from those of any of their constituents, for instance, in "<u>I saw a book of poems</u> "neither <u>I</u> nor <u>saw</u> is substitutable for <u>I saw,</u> and neither <u>of</u> nor <u>poems</u> can replace <u>of poems</u> (op. cit.).

H.Whitehall introduces the terms "tail-head" and "head-tail"

constructions. Tail-head constructions in noun phrases are illustrated by <u>fresh fruit</u>, <u>all the very nice fresh fruit</u>, etc. And in verb phrases by trees <u>can yield good fruit</u>, etc. (op. cit.). As for head-tail phrases they are illustrated by noun phrases of the type: <u>a style impossible to excel</u>.

In discussing non-headed word-groups H.Whitehall comes to the conclusion that they fall into two types (1) <u>if poems</u>, (2) <u>I saw</u> (a "subject-predicate word-group" <u>Singing old songs</u> can often be fun (op. cit.).

To sum up this classification the diagram of H.Whitehall's classification of phrases may be given:

```
                          Word-group
                  /                       \
             headed                      non-headed
          /          \                  /            \
    tail-head      head-tail      prepositional    subject-predicate
     /     \        /     \           group            group
  noun    verb   modifier  verbal
  group   group   group    group
```

H.Whitehall applies the technique of IC (immediate constituents) analysis in his work pointing out that such analysis reveals the depth of the syntactic structures and helps to understand "the Chinese-puzzle intricacy of English utterances without confusing the various levels of grammatical structure" (op. cit.).

In 1958 A.Hill published his book "Introduction to Linguistic Structures" (N.Y., 1958). A.Hill distinguishes two types of phrases: free phrases and fixed phrases. The difference between them is that free phrases consist of words in normal sequence and can easily be constructed on the model of the given sequences "almost without limit, whether the speaker has ever heard the sequence before or not" (op. cit.). Thus <u>a very old man</u> is a free phrase, on the model of which other free phrases can be constructed: <u>a very young man</u>, <u>a very old woman</u> etc.

Fixed phrases are relatively fixed units, they differ from free phrases in accent and syntactic distribution, cnf. "New" England (a fixed phrase) and a new England (op. cit.).

Free phrases (noun-phrases, verb-phrases, modifying phrases) are described by A.Hill in detail. When describing noun-phrases A.Hill focuses his attention on the order of phrase constituents. It should be noted that according to A.Hill <u>want to go</u> and <u>have taken</u> are both verb phrases.

A.Hill's most important contribution to the theory of phrases is the

description of the order of succession of pre-adjuncts in noun-phrases.

Eugene Nida in his book "A Synopsis of English Syntax" (N.Y., 1960) distinguishes hypotactic and paratactic word-groups with the subdivision of hypotactic constructions into exocentric and endocentric, the latter being subdivided into coordinate and subordinate. E.Nida introduced a system of marking (or graphical representation) of different phrase types:

Hypotactic
    Exocentric |_____| e.g. in Chicago
    Endocentric
        Coordinate |_____| e.g. boys and girls

        Subordinate |_____| e.g. cold water
                (with the arrow pointing toward
                 the head constituent)

Paratactic |____||____| e.g. We the people

a) lovely   and   gracious   personality

                              (p. XVII, op. cit.)

b) We   the   people will decide.

                              (p. XXII, op. cit.)

The same marking of phrases was used later on by H.Gleason in his book "Linguistics and English Grammar" (N.Y., 1965).

In 1967 K.L.Pike's work "Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior" (the Hague: Mouton) was published with a new approach to the analysis of phrase structure. K.Pike originated a theory of language that was called tagmemics. In tagmemic analysis there are three hierarchies of systems: phonological, lexical and grammatical. In each of these systems there are a number of levels. For example, in the grammatical system, according to Pike, there are: the morpheme level, the word level, the phrase level, the clause level, the sentence level, the paragraph level. On each level of the grammatical system there are tagmemes displaying relationship between grammatical functions and classes of linguistic items which can fill these functions (fillers). Tagmeme is the basic unit of grammatical analysis in tagmemics. A Tagmeme (the term first introduced by L. Bloomfield) is a unit which expresses a relationship between the grammatical function, for instance the function of subject, object or predicate, and a class of fillers. For example, in

the sentence: <u>The dog bit the old man</u>, the subject tagmeme is filled by the <u>noun phrase</u>, the predicate tagmeme is filled by the transitive verb <u>bite</u> in its past tense form <u>bit</u> and the object tagmeme is filled by the noun phrase the <u>old man</u>.

When commenting on K.Pike's theory D.Crystal writes the following in his book "Linguistics" (England, 1990): "The tagmeme is a Janus-faced construct: it tries to combine into one conceptual unit two ideas which had previously been quite disassociated, the ideas of class and function … the sentence is analysed into a sequence of tagmemes, each of which simultaneously provides information about an item's function in a larger structure, and about the class to which it belongs that could also fulfil that function. A metaphor that is regularly used here is to talk of a structure as, a series of "slots" into which various types of "filler can go" (D.Crystal, op. cit., pp. 209-210).

Thus, in accord with K.Pike's theory phrases function as class fillers within a larger construction – the sentence.

In the early sixties the British linguist Michael Halliday worked out <u>scale</u> and <u>category</u> grammar (M.Halliday, A.Mcintosh, P.Streverse "The Linguistic Sciences and Language Teaching", Lnd., 1964). The categories comprised <u>class</u> (covering concepts such as "verb" and "noun"), <u>unit</u> (covering concepts such as "sentence" and "clause"), <u>structure</u> (covering concepts such as "subject" and "predicate"), and system (covering such concepts as the set of "personal pronouns" or "tenses"). <u>Scales</u> were regarded as constructs which related these categories to each other. For example, one scale was the means of relating the "units". The various units recognized (sentence, clause, group, word, and morpheme) were considered to be arranged hierarchically on a <u>rank</u> scale, and each unit was conceived of as consisting of one or more of the units below it – a sentence was considered as consisting of one or more clauses, a clause as consisting of one or more groups (M.Halliday uses "group" where most other linguists would talk of "phrases"), a group of one or more words, and a word as one or more morphemes. Thus the utterance <u>The girl will kick the ball</u> would be analysed as one sentence, consisting of one clause, which consists of three groups (<u>the girl, will kick, the ball</u>), each group consisting of two words and each word consisting of one morpheme.

So according to M.Halliday a phrase(or <u>a group</u> in his terminology) is a language unit which on a rank scale makes part of a clause or sentence (utterance). It should be noted that M.Halliday considers verb-forms including auxiliaries as phrases.

M.Halliday's approach towards phrase analysis is a step forward in comparison with phrase structure analysis put forward by a number of American post-Bloomfieldians (H.Whitehall, H.Gleason and others) who used ICs approach in reference to phrases.

3. <u>Coordinate and subordinate phrases. Types of subordination: agreement, government, adjoinment</u>

Coordination and subordination are the terms that are firmly established in syntax to indicate syntactic relations between phrase components. Hence there are two main structural types of phrases: coordinate phrases and subordinate phrases. Coordinate phrases consist of two or more constituents which are equal syntactically: men and women; write and read; span-new, fashionable, well-made, etc. Subordinate phrases include two components (both of which can be expanded or extended) which are unequal syntactically: one of them (the head) is the leading or main component of the phrase and the other (its adjunct) is grammatically subordinated to the head, e.g. cold water, very pure, exceedingly interesting books of the fifties, etc.

It is usual to distinguish syndetic (or linked) coordination and asyndetic (or unlinked) coordination. In syndetic coordination, the more usual form, the phrase components are linked by coordinating conjunctions (or coordinators) – and, or but, etc.: John and Mary went home; She sings but he doesn't.

In asyndetic coordination, coordinators are not present, but could be inserted: slowly, stealthily, he crept towards his victim.

Although syntactically equal phrase components of coordinate phrases are usually not interchangeable, which is conditioned by a number of reasons: semantically, phonologically, by etiquet, etc., e.g. in red and yellow the word red is used first because phonologically it is shorter in comparison with yellow (although this principle does not always work); my friend and me (etiquet); a nice old woman (meaning of adjectives).

Components of finite verb phrases are usually interchangeable because they indicate sequence of actions in time: he heard an explosion and phoned the police. There may be some other semantic relations between phrase units which makes their position fixed.

The number of phrase components in coordinate phrases can vary from two to n, their usual number being two or three, occasionally four or five.

Coordinate phrases fall morphologically into noun phrases, including prepositional phrases, verb phrases, adjective phrases, they are indicated symbolically as NP, VP, AP, Adv.P.

Syntactically coordinate phrases may function as subjects (Dana and Tim moved toward the windows); predicatives (He was attractive, intelligent, and charming); objects (The beautician showed him a tube of a bright lipstick and a jar of rouge); attributes (The assistant principal, Vera Kostoff, a harassed-looking, prematurely grey-haired woman in her fifties, was at her desk); adverbial modifiers (Passengers were streaming out, dressed in heavy woolen clothes, parkas, earmuffs, scarves and gloves).

Phrases linked by and may express combinatory and segregatory meaning. The distinction is clearest with noun phrases. When coordination is segregatory, we can paraphrase it by clause coordination: John and Mary know the answer. [= John knows the answer, and Mary knows the answer].

When it is combinatory we cannot do so, because the conjoins (the elements connected by coordination) function as a whole unit: <u>John and Mary</u> make a pleasant couple. [≠ *John makes a pleasant couple, and Mary makes a pleasant couple].

Many conjoint noun phrases are in fact ambiguous between the two interpretations: John and Mary won a prize. This may mean that they each won a prize or that the prize was awarded to them jointly.

<u>Subordinate phrases</u> fall into different subtypes. Thus according to the structure <u>simple phrases</u> including two main components (e.g. cold weather) are opposed to complex phrases the components of which are expanded or extended (e.g. extremely cold and nasty weather).

Morphologically, i.e. in accord with the way in which the head of the phrase is expressed by, subordinate phrases are subdivided into noun phrases (NP for short), verb phrases (VP), adjective phrases (AP), adverbial phrases (Adv.P), prepositional noun phrases (pNP).

Phrases may be also subdivided into continuous and discontinuous (broken), e.g. in a sitting room vs in what was called a sitting room.

The adjunct of subordinate phrases is grammatically subordinated to the head. There are three types of subordination: agreement (concord), government and adjoinment. <u>Agreement</u> indicates that the head of the phrase and its adjunct agree in certain grammatical categories, i.e. have some grammatical categories in common. Concord (agreement) may affect <u>case</u>, <u>gender</u>, <u>number</u>, and <u>person</u>. Cases of agreement are rare in Present-day English as it is analytical in its structure. They are actually limited by noun phrases with <u>this</u> and <u>that</u> used as noun determiners (this boy vs these boys, that girl vs those girls) and noun-verb phrases in which the finite verb functioning as the predicate agrees with the noun in number and person (I speak … vs He speaks…; I am … vs He is…; We are…, you are…). This kind of agreement is observed when verbs are used in present-tense forms.

<u>Government</u> is a type of grammatical relationship between the elements of subordinate phrases, in which the choice of one element causes the selection of a particular form of another element. In inflected languages the term government has typically been used to refer to the relationship between verbs and nouns or between prepositions and nouns. In Modern English it can be used in reference to noun phrases of the type <u>Ann's behaviour</u>, <u>my sister's friend</u> and verb phrases with personal pronouns in postposition such as <u>asked him</u>, <u>saw her</u>, <u>heard them</u>.

Cases of prepositional government strong or weak are sometimes mentioned in reference to subordinate noun, adjective and verb phrases of the kind: the answers of the students, rich in…, characteristic of…, depending on (upon) etc., in which the selection of different prepositions does not effect the grammatical forms of dependent words because of their invariability.

Alongside with agreement and government <u>adjoinment</u> (the translation-loan from Russian <u>примыкание</u>) is recognized in all those cases where

components of subordinate phrases are joined by means of their juxtaposition: e.g. iron bar fine weather, nice girls, run quickly, very good, etc… In cases of adjoinment subordinated elements of phrases are expressed by morphologically unchangeable words (adjectives, adverbs, particles, unchangeable noun forms).

Adjoinment prevails in subordinate phrases in comparison with agreement and government because Present-day English is an analytical language with quite a few inflections left.

Syntactical relations between the subject and the predicate represent a debatable problem: they may be regarded as relations of <u>subordination</u> with the subject being the leading element or relations of <u>interdependence</u> (V.V.Burlakova), in the latter case the subject and the predicate are treated as mutually dependent sentence parts (this view is disussed in detail by M.Y.Blokh in his book <u>A Course in Theoretical English Grammar</u>, M., 2000, ch.XX. Syntagmatic Connections of Words, § 5, pp. 225-226.

4. <u>Noun phrases</u>

<u>Noun phrases</u> and <u>verb phrases</u> play an extremely important role as they are used as immediate constituents of two-member sentences. Both noun and verb phrases fall into various structural types. The variety of structural types of phrases depends primarily on the valence of the leading component of the phrase. Thus, the combinability of common and proper nouns, concrete, abstract, material, countable and uncountable nouns is widely different (compare, for instance, the combinability of various subclasses of nouns with articles). There are some nouns in English which can never be used without modifying words, these are such nouns as "kind", "sort", "type", etc. which are nearly "empty" words semantically as they become semantically full only when defined by some attributive words, e.g. a new type of dictionary, all sorts of paper, etc. There are empty (open) positions to the right or to the left of these nouns which should be filled in to make the meanings of these nouns complete.

There are noun phrases with pre-posed adjuncts and noun phrases with post-posed adjuncts, both of which are characterized by a variety of structural patterns. The most frequent patterns of noun phrases with preposed adjuncts are as follows: <u>NN</u> (apple cart, stone wall), <u>N'sN</u> (John's friends, dog's tail), Det.N (a friend, my friend) and others. Noun phrases with postposed adjuncts include such phrase patterns as NpN (the roof of the house), NVinf. (the house to let, the book to read), NAclause (the house where he lives) etc.. Phrases of the pattern NN sometimes tend towards vocabulization: cnf. car engine vs car bed, heart disease vs heart throb, fat swine vs fat farm. NN pattern is very frequent in Modern English.

Noun phrases may be often shortened in English. There are two cases of ellipting in noun phrases: substitution and representation. In cases of substitution the prop word "one" is used as a substitute for nouns and noun phrases: "It was

probable that he was more often out of a job than in one"; "There weren't any houses near the one we were in"; "You're an animal: you walk like one, you act like one, you think like one – in terms of black and white". The word "one" functioning as a noun substitute acquires number distinctions.

In cases of representation head nouns of subordinate phrases may be ellipted in position after the adjuncts expressed by nouns in the Possessive Case, adjectives, participles, numerals, prepositions: "Her eyes rested just for a minute on the photograph of the very young man in the Air Force Uniform, with the wide grinning smile so like Tommy's"; "I've had two husbands and I'm on the look-out for a third"; "I like fresh candy better than stale"; "She wanted fried fish but they gave us boiled", "He likes his coffee with sugar and cream. I like mine without". Cases of noun representation are especially frequent in Spoken English.

5. Verb phrases

As for verb phrases their structure may be represented by two main patterns: NV and VN. Verb phrases of NV pattern are sometimes identified with sentences, this view is open to discussion (see B.Ilyish. The Structure of Modern English, pp. 173-174). Verb phrases of the type VN form several structural patterns: VN, VpN, VNN, VNpN, etc. which depend on the verb valency, according to wich verbs fall into monovalent, bivalent and polyvalent. Grammatical valencies of verbs are closely connected with their lexical meanings, for instance, verbs of physical (see, hear, feel …) and mental perception (know, understand …) are usually followed by objects, whereas verbs of motion (arrive, come, go …) are not.

Verb phrases are often shortened in Spoken English. There are two cases of verb phrase shortening: substitution and representation. In cases of substitution the prop word "do" is used as a substitute for verb phrases containing most often actional or dynamic verbs (go, tell, drink, speak, etc.) and also statal or stative verbs (know, like, mean, have, etc). Cases of verb-phrase substitution are frequent in simple and composite sentences: "I hate the war. – So do we all"; "She liked me. At least I think she did"; "He speaks Spanish as we do"; "I don't like lying any better than you do".

Representation is frequent in position after auxiliary and modal verbs: "I've fixed things up the best I could"; "I'm going to take care of you. If Diana won't, I will"; … "and if you ask me if I like it, I'll tell you frankly I don't"; "Tell her from me, will you, that I eat dirt."

Detailed peculiarities of phrase structure is a matter of further investigation.

1. Compare different definitions of phrases and point out the most adequate one. What is the status of phrases in syntax?

2. Comment on views of grammarians abroad on the theory of phrases.

3. What are universally distinguished types of phrases and kinds of syntactic relation between their constituents?

4. Comment on the structure of noun phrases and verb phrases. What debatable problems arise in connection with their structure?

5. Consider substitution and representation in noun- and verb-phrases.

6. <u>Exercises</u>

1. Read the text, divide every sentence into phrases and comment on their syntactical and morphological structure:

"In the cinema he could just see the fine edge of her features. He watched her, she watched the screen. Half an hour had passed before he put his arm around her shoulders. She made no more away, but still she did not look at him, yet he could feel the tremor of her body. The smell of her hair, freshly washed, and of her tweeds, was pleasant to him. They were seated in the back row, he had seen to that. Soon he put a hand under her chin and turned her gently toward him. He kissed her. The eagerness of her response communicated to him something of her excitement. "Darling", he said. Now she did draw apart from him, but let him keep her hand in his."

(P. Johnson. The Good Listener)

2. Using the same text point out exocentric and endocentric constructions and draw the schemes of them, illustrate the instances of junction and nexus, give examples of headed and non-headed phrases.

3. Explain the difference between the following noun phrases: dog food vs dog's food, cat food vs cat's food, tunnel mouth vs tunnel's mouth, family gathering vs family's gathering' rose garden vs garden rose.

4. Comment on the word order of noun premodifiers in the phrase underlined: That <u>tough brave little old fellow wells</u> had prophetic visions after all.

5. Arrange properly noun premodifiers given at random in the phrases given below and explain your choice:
       <u>decision</u>: last spring, Supreme Court, the U.S.;
       <u>eyes</u>: gray, large, intelligent;
       <u>the woman</u>: broadcasting in the middle of battle, impassioned, young, beautiful.

6. Are the given units combinations of words or compound nouns:
   safety chain, safety lock, safety zone, echo cardiography, echo chamber?

7. Define the obligatory valencies of the following verbs:

> to build, to stop, to fight, to sleep, to cough, to sneer, to smile, to dance, to sit, to move, to write, to read, to see, to hear, to listen, to walk, to buy, to sell, to give, to send, to watch, to blame, to bless, to cry, to go, to set, to put, to stare, to find, to learn, to study, to believe.

Construct phrases with these words and use them in sentences.

8. Define the following phrases:

a) <u>Coordination</u> (C) or <u>Subordination</u> (S):
1. peach of a girl; 2. outskirts of London; 3. King Alfred; 4. Sister Carrie; 5. stone wall; 6. cannon ball; 7. sisters or brothers; 8. towns and cities

b) <u>Agreement</u> (A), <u>Government</u> (G) or <u>Other Ways</u> (OW) of syntactical relation between phrase components:
1. these houses; 2. old houses; 3. asked him; 4. asked John; 5. poor John; 6. poor me; 7. I see…; 8. He saw…; 9. Looked at him; 10. Looked at Jim

c) Noun Phrases (NP), Verb Phrases (VP), Adjective Phrases (AP), Adverb Phrases (AdvP):
1. silver chain; 2. light blue; 3. ice cold; 4. sit in a chair; 5. perfectly well; 6. very nice; 7. rose garden; 8. emerald green.

7. <u>Terminology List</u>
adjoinment [qˈGOlnmqnt] *n* **16**
adjunct [ˈxGɅNꝅt] *n* **9,15**
agreement [qˈgrJmqnt] *n* **16**
hypotactic [ˌhəlpqˈtxꝅtlꝅ] *adj* **13**
paratactic [ˌpxrqˈtxꝅtlꝅ] *adj* **13**
coordinate [kqVˈꞭdlnqt] *adj* **15**
coordination [kqVˌꞭdlˈnɇlꞄqn] **14,15**
endocentric [ˌɇndqVˈsɇntrlꝅ] *adj* **10, 11, 13**
exocentris [ˌɇꝅsqVˈsɇntrlꝅ] *adj* **10, 11, 13**
government [ˈgɅvqnmqnt] *n* **16**
junction [ˈGɅNꝅꞄqn] *n* **9**
head [ˈhɇd] *n* **15**
(of the phrase)
nexus [ˈnqꝅsqꞅ] *n* **9**
phrase [ˈꞄrɇlz] *n* **7, 8**
subordinate [sqˈbꞭdlnqt] *adj* **15,16**
subordination [sqˌbꞭdlˈnɇlꞄqn] **14**
tagmeme [ˈtxgmJm] *n* **13, 14**
tagmemic [txgˈmJmiꝅ] *adj* **13**

tagmemics [tӕg'miːmɪks] *n* **13**

8. <u>Reference Books</u>

1. Бархударов Л.С. Структура простого предложения современного английского языка. М., 1966, с. 44-47.
2. Douglas Biber, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad, Edward Finegan. Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English. England, 2000.
3. Blokh M.Y. A Course in Theoretical English Grammar. M., 2000.
4. Burlakova V.V. Contribution of English and American Linguistic to the Theory of Phrase. 1971.
5. Бурлакова В.В. Основы структуры словосочетания в современном английском языке. Л., 1975.
6. Бурлакова В.В. Синтаксические структуры современного английского языка. М., Просвещение, 1984.
7. D.Crystal. Linguistics. Lnd., 1990.
8. S.Greenbaum, R.Quirk. A Student's Grammar of the English Language. Longman. England, 1998.
9. B.Ilyish. The Structure of Modern English. L., 1971.
10. L.L.Joffik, L.P.Chakhoyan, A.G.Pospelova. Readings in the Theory of English Grammar. L., 1981.
F.Palmer. Grammar. Lnd., 1971.

II. The Sentence

Outline

Key-words: sentence, utterance, subject, predicate, object, attribute, apposition, ellipsis, elliptical, substitution, representation, parenthesis, kernel sentence, composite sentence, compound sentence, complex sentence, semi-compound sentence, semi-complex sentence, inversion matrix sentence, subject, predicate, predicative, complement, object, attribute, adverbial modifier; functional sentence perspective, theme, rheme, focus.

1. <u>Definitions of the sentence</u>

Linguistic literature provides us with more than two hundred different definitions of the sentence. The most ancient of them (which antedates Priscian c. 500 A.D.) and most popular was the common school grammar definition: "A sentence is a group of words expressing a complete thought." This definition was criticized by a number of grammarians for want of the exact definition of a complete thought.

Much labour has thus, over a period of many years, been devoted to the problem of defining the sentence. John Ries, for example, subjected some 140 of different definitions to much sound and searching criticism and created a new definition: "A sentence is a grammatically constructed smallest unit of speech which expresses its content with respect to this content's relation to reality" (John Ries, Was ist ein Sats? Malburg, 1894.) This definition is a considerable step forward in comparison with the oldest one as it takes into consideration 1) the grammatical structure of the sentence and 2) its relation to reality.

O.Jespersen has framed his definition in this way: "A sentence is a relatively complete and independent human utterance – the completeness and independence being shown by its standing alone or its capability of standing alone, i.e. of being uttered by itself." (O.Jespersen. Philosophy of Grammar. New York. 1924, p. 307).

L.Bloomfield's definition is close to the one given by O.Jespersen: "Each sentence is an independent linguistic form, not included by virtue of any grammatical construction in any larger linguistic form." (L.Bloomfield. Language, 7, 1931, p.170).

L.Bloomfield's definition of the sentence has been extremely popular among linguists up to the time of the development of text linguistics when it became evident that there exist linguistic (syntactic) forms larger than sentences.

It should be noted, however, that even nowadays sentences are regarded as the largest units of grammatical organization. Thus, in Longman Dictionary of Language and Applied Linguistics (Jack C. Richards, John Platt, Heidi Platt, England, 1999) we meet the following definition of the sentence: "the sentence is the largest unit of grammatical organization within which parts of speech (e.g. nouns, verbs, adverbs) and grammatical classes (e.g. word, phrase, clause) are said to function. In English a sentence normally contains one independent clause with a finite verb. Units which are larger than the sentence (e.g. paragraph) are regarded as examples of discourse." (op. cit., p.330). In the opinion of many linguists, the problem of the definition of the sentence remains unsolved to this day.

A number of linguistic problems arise in connection with the definition of the sentence. One of them is whether the sentence should be regarded as a unit of language or speech. Taking into consideration the distinction between language and speech, which was first introduced by Ferdinand de Saussure in his book on general linguistics (F. de Saussure. Course de linguistique générale, Genéve, 1922) we should sooner regard the sentence as a unit of language and the utterance which represents its manifestations in speech should be correspondingly termed a unit of speech. In Longman Dictionary cited above (p. 395) the utterance is defined as what is said by any one person before or after another person begins to speak. For example, an utterance may consist of: a) one word, e.g. B's reply in: A: Have you done your homework? B: Yeah. b) one sentence, e.g. A's question and B's answer in: A: What's the time? B: It's half past five. c) more than one sentence, e.g. A's complaint in: A: Look, I'm really fed up. I've told you several times to wash your hands before a meal. Why don't you do as you're told? B: But Mum, listen.. (op. cit., p.395).

Ch.Fries in his book "The Structure of English" (Lnd., 1965) gives the following definition of the utterance: "The easiest unit in conversation to be marked with certainty was the talk of one person until he ceased, and another began. This unit was given the name "utterance" (op. cit., p. 23).

The other problem for debate is defining distinctive features of the sentence which include a certain grammatical organization of the sentence, predication, modality and special intonation contour.

Structurally, short one-member sentences which are used as greeting are disputable. Morning!, orders: Fire! Hands up!, newspaper headlines: Wedding

Bells for Student and Japaneze Bride, New Charge against Doctor; titles of works of fiction: In Chancery; notices: Book Shop, etc… B.A.Ilyish suggests that constructions of this kind should be referred to units of nomination, but not to units of communication (see: B.Ilyish. The Structure of Modern English, L., 1971, p.182).

Predication is a much more debatable problem. Most grammarians recognize predication and modality as distinctive features of the sentence, but their views on these two features differ widely.

1. Thus, there are some linguists who identify these two notions (see: О.С.Ахманова. Словарь лингвистических терминов, М., 1966, с. 346 и с.237);

2. There are grammarians who differentiate the notions of predication and modality regarding modality as an integral part of predication (see: А.И.Смирницкий. Синтаксис английского языка. М., 1957, с. 106). According to A.I.Smirnitsky, "modality is an integral part of predication, without it no predication is possible" (op. cit., p.106). A.I.Smirnitsky defines predication as the relation of the utterance to reality (op. cit., p.102) and according to his view it is intonation and modality which serve as universal means of predication (op. cit., pp. 105-106). The opinion of A.I.Smirnitsky on predication is that it finds its realization in the grammatical predicate and is identical in this way to the predicate of the proposition. (op. cit., p. 108).

3. We find a different approach to predication in the book "A Course in Theoretical English Grammar" by M.Y.Blokh, who believes that "the sentence, linguistically, is a predicative utterance-unit. It means that the sentence not only names some referents with the help of its word-constituents, but also, first, presents these referents as making up a certain situation, or, more specifically, a situational event, and second reflects the connection between the nominal denotation of the event, on the one hand, and objective reality, on the other, showing the time of the event, its being real or unreal, desirable or undesirable, necessary or unnecessary, etc… (M.Y.Blokh, op. cit., p. 230).

M.Y.Blokh underlines the point that there is another difference between the sentence and the word: it lies in the fact that the sentence does not exist in the system of language as a ready-made unit, with the exception of a limited number of utterances of phraseological creation, it is created by the speaker in the course of communication.

M.Y.Blokh regards predication as a grammatical category and modality as a general semantic category. Here is a quotation from his book which shows the connection between predication and modality: "The sentence is characterized by its specific category of predication which establishes the relation of the named phenomena to actual life. The general semantic category of modality is also defined by linguists as exposing the connection between the named objects and surrounding reality. However, modality as different from predication, is not specifically confined to the sentence; this is a broader category revealed both in

the grammatical elements of language, and its lexical, purely nominative elements. In this sense, every word expressing a definite correlation between the named substance and objective reality should be recognized as modal. Here belong such lexemes of full notional standing as "probability", "desirability", "necessity" and the like, together with all the derivationally relevant words making up the corresponding series of the lexical paradigm of nomination; here belong semi-functional words and phrases of probability and existential evaluation, such as perhaps, may be, by all means, etc… here belong, further, word-particles of specifying modal semantics, such as just, even, would-be, etc.; here belong, finally, modal verbs, expressing a broad range of modal meanings which are actually turned into elements of predicative semantics in concrete, contextually–bound utterances". (M.Y.Blokh, op.cit., pp. 231-232).

It is worth mentioning that the view of M.Y.Blokh on modality is close to the view put forward by D.Biber … in "Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English" where much is said about stance (stance markers and stance devices) and different ways of its expression. Stance is defined in the following way: "In addition to communicating propositional content, speakers and writers commonly express personal feelings, attitudes, value judgements, or assessments; that is, they express a "stance". Stance meanings can be expressed in many ways, including grammatical devices, word choice, and paralinguistic devices (body position, gestures). Two common devices are adverbials (nervously, angrily, severely, flatly, disappointedly, obviously, unfortunately, really, etc.) and complement clauses with verbs and adjectives (I really doubt that the check is there; they are very nice, cats are; Susie really will be surprised when she sees him, etc.) op. cit., pp. 965-967.

Other means of expressing modality are modal words (certainly, perhaps, surely, etc.), mood forms of verbs (indicative or subjunctive).

2. Structural and communicative types of sentences

Traditionally two main classifications of sentences are given: one is based on their structure and another – on their communicative value.

Graphically the first classification may be represented in the following way:

Sentence

Simple Sentence   Composite Sentence

Full Sentence   Elliptical Sentence   Compound Sentence   Complex Sentence

Two-member Sent. One-member Sent.   Pleni-Comp. Sent.   Semi-Comp. Sent.

Pleni-Comp. Sent.   Semi-Comp. Sent.

Extended Sentence   Unextended Sentence

Note: The term pleni-composite sentence (pleni-compound, pleni-complex) was given by M.Y.Blokh in "A Course in Theoretical English Grammar", 3d edition, p. 332.

Two-member simple declarative sentences represent basic patterns of English sentences while all the other sentence types may be regarded as their transforms, thus different sentence types appear to be connected paradigmatically.

Linguistic units (morphemes, words, sentences) may be connected paradigmatically and syntagmatically. Syntagmatic relations are linear relations of linguistic units in a segmental sequence (string) for example: worker = work + er, poor John = poor + John, I gave this student a book, etc.. As syntagmatic relations are actually observed in utterances, they are known as relations "in praesentia" ("in the presence").

Paradigmatic relations exist between elements of the system outside the strings where they co-occur. They are intra-systemic relations and dependencies which find their expression in the fact that each linguistic unit is included in a set of connections based on different formal and functional properties. Since paradigmatic relations can not be directly observed in utterances, they are referred to as relations "in absentia" ("in the absence").

Paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations are inseparably connected which may be shown by the following example:

I ↔ gave ↔ this ↔ student ↔ a ↔ book. ↔ = syntagmatic relations
↕   ↕   ↕   ↕   ↕

We↔give↔ these↔ students ↔ books. ↕= paradigmatic relations

Grammatical forms of words (student vs students, book vs books, give vs gave, I vs we, this vs these) are connected paradigmatically as they constitute paradigms of words belonging to different parts of speech.

The notions of a "paradigm" and "paradigmatic relations" are transferred to the sphere of syntax which will be shown later on.

The sentence patterns given may be symbolized as SP, SPC, SPO where all the abbreviations are based on syntactic terminology.

In transformational generative grammar (its founder is N.Chomsky) a limited number of basic sentence patterns is distinguished. The views of grammarians differ as far as the number of basic (or kernel) sentences is concerned. Thus, in Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English written by Douglas Biber, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad, Edward Finegan and issued in England in 2000, the following kernel sentences are given: 1. SV, 2. SVA, 3. SVO.

It is written, however, that "the total number of patterns is much larger" (op. cit., p. 141). A limited number of sentence patterns is determined by the potential of the individual verb, often referred to as its valency. The major grammatical classes of verb include one-place verbs (combining with a subject only), two-place verbs (combining with a subject and another element), and three-place verbs (combining with a subject and two other elements). This approach is related to the older grammatical classification of verbs into intransitive, transitive and copular.

Sidney Greenbaum and Randolph Quirk in the book "A Student's grammar of the English language" (Longman, 1998, p. 204) give the following basic structures of simple sentences based on the finite verb valency:
1. SV The sun (S) is shining (V).
2. SVO That lecture (S) bored (V) me (O).
3. SVC Your dinner (S) seems (V) ready (C).
4. SVA My office (S) is (V) in the next building (A).
5. SVOO I (S) must send (V) my parents (O) an anniversary card (O).
6. SVOC Most students (S) have found (V) her (O) reasonably helpful (C).
7. SVOA You (S) can put (V) the dish (O) on the table (A).

There are multiple class verbs which can belong in various senses to more than one class, and hence can enter into more than one sentence type. The verb "get" is particularly versatile, being excluded only from type SV:
SVO He'll get a surprise.
SVC He's getting angry.
SVA He got through the window.
SVOO He got her a splendid present.
SVOC He got his shoes and socks wet.
SVOA He got himself into trouble.

Through the multiple class membership of verbs, amhignities can arise:
She made a good model. – SVO or SVC
I found her an entertaining partner. – SVOC or SVOO
He is cooking his family dinner. – SVO or SVOO

Basic and additional sentence patterns make it possible to present systemically the most important and frequently used structural types of simple sentences in English.

According to their communication value sentences full into declarative (statements), interrogative (questions), imperative (orders, commands) and exclamatory (emotional sentences, exclamations).

3. Cases of Transition from Simple to Composite Sentences

There are several structural types of sentences in English which display an intermediary syntactic character between the composite sentence and the simple sentence.

These sentences represent cases of transition from simple to composite sentences and are known as semi-compound and semi-complex sentences.

Semi-compound sentences include sentences with homogeneous parts, e.g. I swung round, and found her carefully doing her make-up (< I swing round + I found her carefully doing her make-up). Only one predicative line is explicitly expressed in semi-compound sentences as the second predicative line is fused with the first.

Semi-complex sentences include sentences with secondary predication (complex subject, complex object, absolute participial constructions), e.g. I saw him come < I saw that he came. They also include sentences with a dependent appendix such as "He is better than you" (= He is better than you are).

In semi-complex sentences the second predicative line is weakened as it is expressed by a non-finite form of the verb or implicitly.

From the point of view of syntagmatic structure the semi-composite sentence is similar to the simple sentence because it has only one predicative line that is expressed explicitly. From the point of view of syntactic derivation these sentences are similar to complex sentences because they are derived from two or more base sentences.

4. Composite Sentences

The composite sentence is a sentence in which two or more predicative lines are explicitly and separately expressed. The elementary (minimal) composite sentence is formed by two predicative constructions.

Composite sentences (the term was suggested by H.Poutsma) fall into

two types: compound and complex sentences.

A compound sentence consists of two or several clauses which are joined asyndetically or with the help of coordinating conjunctions, e.g. I was too shocked to speak, and the doctor was, too.

Parts of compound sentences are usually interchangeable as they indicate the sequence of events in time, causal-consecutive relations between their constituents, etc., e.g., "We despised them and we had a right to despise them" (= We despised them for we had a right to despise them).

If the base clauses of compound sentences have identical elements, their connection involves substitution and, possibly, permutation in the sequential clause, e.g. She loves painting, and so do I (< She loves painting + I love painting).

The complex sentence is the one which consists of minimum two clauses one of which, called the subordinate clause, is used in a notional position of the other, called the principal (main) clause. In other words, the complex sentence is derived from minimum two base sentences one of which, the insert sentence, is embedded into a notional position of the other – the matrix sentence. In traditional grammar subordinate clauses are classified according to the syntactical function they fulfil within the sentence as subordinate subject, predicative, object, attributive and adverbial clauses.

Subordinate clauses are introduced by subordinating conjunctions, relative subordinators or asyndetically.

Complex sentences may contain several subordinate clauses giving rise to parallel or consequtive subordination. Here are some examples of complex sentences:

1."Our justification was that we were better and nobler and wiser and braver than they were". 2. "The ignorant and the common naturally hate and fear those who are interested in things they don't understand." The schemes of the sentences are given below:

the subordinating → | Our justification was that | we were… braver | ← the main clause
conjunction ⟋ | | ← the subordinate predicative clause

the subordinating conjunction ────────→ than

| they were | ← the subordinate adverbial clause of comparison

2.

consequtive subordination { a relative pronoun →

| The ignorant… those | ← the main clause

| who are Interested in things | ← the subordinate attributive clause

| they don't understand | ← the subordinate attributive contact clause that is introduced asyndetically

There may be compound-complex and complex-compound sentences the structure of which depends on the types of syntactic relation between clauses constituting the sentence.

5. Ellipsis. Substitution and Representation

Ellipsis is frequent in Spoken English. Unstressed words are frequently left out in conversation. For example, subject pronouns which are recoverable from the linguistic or situational context are commonly omitted: "We were looking for you, Joe!" – "Had an autopsy. Took longer than I figured." (= I had an autopsy. It took longer than I figured); "Must be great to have a boy!" Mel said. (= It must be…).

Unstressed auxiliaries are also frequently left out, both in declarative and interrogative sentences: "I been saving him for you"; "You doing out anything special tonight?"

Ellipsis is common with <u>have got</u> and <u>had better:</u> "You better get yourself a lawyer, man, a damned good one" (= You'd…); "I got a spider in here" (= I've got…).

Both subject and link verb <u>be</u> may be ellipted or link verb alone: "Too old to change, aren't we? (= We are too old…); "Glad you got a job all right" (= I am glad…); "The driver o'key?" (= Is the driver…); "Where you girls from?" I asked her (= Where are you…).

In most cases, ellipsis in conversation may be classified as <u>initial</u> ellipsis and <u>final</u> ellipsis. There is also a less-frequent phenomenon of <u>medial</u> ellipsis: "What's his name?" – "Don't know" (initial ellipsis), "You sure I didn't wake you?" (medial ellipsis), "Who is leaving for London?" – "John and Mary" (final ellipsis).

Medial auxiliary and link verb ellipsis often occur in wh-interrogatives, between the question word and the subject: "What she say?", "When you coming back?"

Unlike initial and final ellipsis, medial ellipsis is somewhat more common in American English than in British English speech.

Two kinds of ellipsis: textual and situational are distinguished: the first – in written English and the second – in spoken English. In general, BrE conversation contains more clause-level ellipsis than AmE conversation (see: Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English, pp. 1104-1108). The essence of ellipsis is: speech efforts tending to economy, words of little informative value are often dropped off in conversation.

There is a special kind of ellipsis in Modern English which is known as <u>representation</u> and a specific way of sentence elements economy known as <u>substitution.</u>

Both representation and substitution occur in <u>noun phrases</u> and <u>verb phrases</u>.

Representation in noun phrases is frequent in position after indefinite pronouns such as <u>some</u>, <u>any</u>, <u>all</u>, <u>each</u>, <u>either</u>, <u>neither</u>: "All my friends go to the same school as I do. <u>All</u> want to be doctors" (All = all my friends); "What are you hanging around for?" he snapped. "A job," I said again. – "I told you I haven't any," he replied. (any = any job).

Nouns in the Possessive Case forms, adjectives, participles, numerals, prepositions and occasionally conjunctions may serve as noun phrase representers: "Her eyes rested for a minute on the photograph of the very young man in the Air Force Uniform, with the wide grinning smile so like Tommy's (Tommy's = Tommy's smile); "I like fresh candy better than stale" (stale = stale candy); "Tommy considered a minute or two" (two = two minutes); "I've had two husbands and I'm on the look-out for a third" (a third = a third husband); "He likes his coffee with sugar and cream, I like mine without" (without = without sugar and cream); "He only seemed plump – in effect he was anything but" (but = but plump).

Representation covers all those cases in which the dependent component of a phrase known as representer represents the whole phrase.

The same phenomenon is known in verb phrases where auxiliaries, modal verbs and the infinitival particle "to" fulfil the purpose of representers in Spoken English: "Are you going anywhere?" – "Of course, we are." (are = are going); "You going out tonight?" he said. – "I might. I might not. I don't know. (might = might be going out tonight); "Will you go to the cinema? – "I don't want to" (to = to go to the cinema); "You can laugh if you want to" (to = to laugh).

Verb representers are commonly used in dialogue (in responses). They are usual in simple and composite sentences: "I'd like to"; "I can learn when I want to"; "tell her to say nothing until you instruct her to"; "I'm going to take care of you. If Diana won't, I will!

Substitution is another means of replacement in noun and verb phrases. In cases of substitution noun phrases are replaced most often by the prop-word "one" and verb phrases - by the prop-word "do", both of which are empty words lexically. Substitution is a means of speech economy alongside with representation.

The substitute one replaces noun phrases used in different syntactical functions, most often those functioning as objects: "Seeing has an active part and a passive one"; …"her white sleeve had just touched his black one". The use of the substitute one helps to avoid lexical repetition. The substitute proform one may replace a countable noun that has been mentioned or is inferred from the context, it has two number forms: singular and plural.

The prop-word "do" substitutes for notional verbs (mostly actional verbs, statal verbs are not altogether excluded, however). "He knows the answer. So does she; She speaks English as well as you do (do = speak it); "I knew it before she did"; "You said you loved it." – "I did when you were all right."

In English you may meet cases of clause substitution. The words not and so function as typical clause-substitutes. They are especially frequent in subordinate adverbial clauses of condition: I do not know if it is true. If so, it may explain why there is some lack of vitality in his beautiful and simple French; See if he's in the room – if not, I'll go find him. In dialogue the negation "not" may substitute for the principal clause when followed by an if–clause: "Don't women suffer in the wrong marriage?" – "Not if they have any sense"; "Oh, she won't wake. Not if you don't make a light."

The clause-substitute not is often used in Spoken English to substitute for subordinate object clauses used after such verbs as think, suppose, hope, say, etc.: "But I told him to come!" – "he says not;" "I mean knees are no secret nowadays." – "I suppose not. But be careful." "So" may be used as an antonym of not, sentences of the kind "I hope so," "I think so," "I suppose so" are regarded as ordinary simple sentences.

6. Functional Sentence Perspective

Besides the traditional parsing of sentences into sentence parts known as the principal (the subject and the predicate) and secondary parts (the object, the attribute, the adverbial modifier), there are several other ways of sentence analysis, which are not based directly on the grammatical structure of sentences and syntactic relations of their components. One of these ways of sentence analysis known as functional sentence perspective (FSP for short) is based on the informative value of different sentence elements. The theory of FSP was worked out by representatives of the Prague school of linguistics V.Mathesius, J.Firbas and others.

It has been noticed that different sentence parts are not identical in their communicative value. As a rule we may distinguish two parts in a sentence from this viewpoint: one part indicating the starting point of the statement, and the other the new information for the sake of which the sentence has been uttered or written.

These two parts are called correspondingly as the theme (from the Greek root the – "to set" or "establish") and the rheme (from the Greek root rhe – "to say or tell").

The theme and the rheme do not necessarily coincide with the grammatical subject and grammatical predicate although the coincidence is not at all excluded as communicative dynamism of the sentence usually increases forwards the end of the sentence commonly represented by the predicate group, cnf, the following: The door opened and the young man came in vs The door

Theme (T)   Rheme (R)

opened and a young man came in.

R   T

Let us find the rheme and the theme in the following two sentences: 1. "Inside on a wooden bunk lay a young Indian woman. 2. She had been trying to have her baby for two days." (E.Hemingway. Indian Camp). The subject of the first sentence, which is inverted, serves to express the rheme; in the second sentence with direct word order and the subject being expressed by the referential pronoun she it is the predicate group which series as the rheme of the sentence.

The theory of the functional sentence perspective is historically connected with the logical analysis of the proposition. The main parts of the proposition are the logical subject and the logical predicate. These logical categories are the prototypes of the linguistic categories of the theme and the rheme.

There are several linguistic means (phonetic, lexical, morphological and syntactical) which are used to signal the rheme and the theme.

Phonetic signals of theme-rheme division include stress, pauses and intonation: Mary left for `London; Mary `left for London (different accents underline new
                R   R

information); "The stairs … opening the door … my surprise that no one was there" (R.Gordon. Doctor in the house) – here pauses between clauses make all of them rhematic.

Morphologically the rheme and the theme may be signalled by the definite and the indefinite articles: cnf. There was a river near the house vs. The river was near the house.   R   T

Personal subject-pronouns, the demonstratives this and that functioning as subjects are usually used thematically:

"He was clever"; "That is evident".
  T   R   T   R

There are several syntactic means which signal the theme-rheme division of the sentence. They include word order and a number of different syntactic constructions. New information becomes prominent in cases of subject-predicate inversion with opening adverbials: "Then came the Princess of Wales on his right"; "On one long wall hung a row of Van Goghs"; "Here comes the first question."

Syntactic constructions "there is", "it is … that"… (also it is … who, it is … which) serve to point out the rheme: "There are several students in the room"; "it was here that he met her for the first time." Complex sentences of the type: "It was his voice that held me" (cnf. His voice held me) are termed cleft constructions: "Clefting is similar to dislocation in the sense that information that could be given in a single clause is broken up in this case into two clauses, each with its own verb (D.Biber … Grammar of Spoken and Written English, p. 958).

As to, as for constructions, contrary to the previous ones, introduce the theme: "As for Paul he is an excellent student"; "As to our meeting, it was postponed until next week".

Lexical means of pointing out the rheme include some particles such as even, just, only: "Only he was absent last time", "Even she came to the meeting".

In linguistic literature we may meet other terms indicating different role of sentence elements in information flow: given/topical vs new information.

The theme-rheme arrangement can be applied to the majority of two-member sentences, although there are some purely rhematic and purely thematic sentences as well.

The theory of functional sentence perspective is in a state of further investigation. Some points of the theory have been made more precise in course of its development. Thus, J.Firbas in his analysis of English functional sentence perspective came to the conclusion that there may be some intermediate elements between the theme and the rheme, link verbs mentioned among them.

1. Give the definition of the sentence and enumerate its main distinctive features.
2. Comment on structural and communicative sentence types.
3. What are cases of transition from simple to composite sentences?
4. Describe structural and semantic peculiarities of composite sentences.
5. Comment on substitution and representation.
6. What is the essence of FSP?
7. Enumerate and illustrate by examples different ways of expressing the rheme and the theme.

7. <u>Exercises</u>

Ex. I. Read the extract carefully. Define all the sentences used here from the point of view of their structure and communicative value:

How should he set about it, or how refuse? Both seemed impossible. So, young Jolyon!

He arrived at the Club at three o'clock, and the first person he saw was Bosinney himself, seated in a corner, staring out of the window.

Young Jolyon sat down not far off, and began nervously to reconsider his position. He looked covertly at Bosinney sitting there unconscious. He did not know him very well, and studied him attentively for perhaps the first time; an unusual-looking man, unlike in dress, face, and manner to most of the other members of the Club - young Jolyon himself, however different he had become in mood and temper, had always retained the neat reticence of Forsyte appearance. He alone among Forsytes was ignorant of Bosinney's nickname. The man was unusual, not eccentric, but unusual; he looked worn, too, haggard, hollow in the cheeks beneath those broad, high cheekbones, though without any appearance of ill-health, for he was strongly built, with curly hair that seemed to show all the vitality of a fine constitution.

Something in his face and attitude touched young Jolyon. He knew what suffering was like, and this man looked as if he were suffering.

He got up and touched his arm.

Bosinney started, but exhibited no sign of embarrassment on seeing who it was.

Young Jolyon sat down.

"I haven't seen you for a long time," he said. "How are you getting on with my cousin's house?"

"It'll be finished in about a week."

"I congratulate you!"

"Thanks - I don't know that it's much of a subject for congratulation."

"No?" queried young Jolyon; "I should have thought you'd be glad to get a long job like that off your hands; but I suppose you feel it much as I do when I part with a picture - a sort of child?"

He looked kindly at Bosinney.

"Yes," said the latter more cordially, "it goes out from you and there's an end of it. I didn't know you painted."

"Only water-colours; I can't say I believe in my work."

F. Galsworthy, The Man of Property)

Ex. II. Use the same extract dividing the sentences into two sections: the rheme and the theme where possible.

Ex. III. Comment on the cases of substitution and representation in the extracts below:
1. "Do you feel absolutely no concern for your future, boy?"
   "Oh, I feel some concern for my future all right. Sure, sure I do." I thought about it for a minute. "But not too much, I guess. Not too much, I guess."
   "You will," old Spencer said. "You will, boy. You will when it's too late …"
   "I guess I will," 1 said.
   "I'd like to put some sense in that head of yours, boy.
   I'm trying to help you. I'm trying to help you, if I can."
   He really was, too. You could see that …
   "I know you are, sir," I said. "Thanks a lot. No kidding. I really appreciate it. I really do." (J.Salinger. The Catcher in the Rye)
2. "What do you think about the war, Mrs Cayley?"
   Mrs Cayley jumped.
   "Oh, what do 1 think? - what do you mean?"
   "Do you think it will last as long as six years?"
   Mrs Cayley said doubtfully: "0h, I hope not. It's a very long time, isn't it?".
   "Yes. A long time. What do you really think?"
   Mrs Cayley seemed quite alarmed by the question.
   She said: "Oh, I - 1 don't know. 1 don't know at all.
   Alfred says it will."
   "He's in Egypt at the moment, but from what he said in his last letter - not exactly said - but we have a little private code if you know what I mean? - certain sentences mean certain things. I think that's quite justified, don't you?"
   Mrs O'Rourke replied promptly: "Indeed I do. This is a mother's privilege."
   "Yes, you see I feel I must know just where he is."
   Mrs O'Rourke nodded the Buddha-like head.
   "I feel for you entirely, so I do. If I had a boy out there I'd be deceiving the censor the very same way, so I would. And your other boy, the one in the Navy?" (A. Christie. N or M)

Ex.IV. Open the brackets. Comment on structural types of sentences in which cases of substitution and representation are used.

He finally straightened himself down and said, "Why aren't you down at the game? I thought this was the day of the big game."

"It (to be). I (to be). Only, I just got back from New York with the fencing team?" I said, Boy, his head was like a rock.

He started getting serious as hell. I knew he (will)."

"So you're leaving us, oh?" he said. - Yes, sir, I guess I (to be)."

He started going into this nodding routine. You never saw anybody nod as much in your life as old Spencer (to do)… "What did Dr.Thurmer say to you, boy? I understand you had quite - little chat."

Yes, we (to do). We really (to do). I was in his office for around two hours, I guess?" (is, was, will, am, did, did, did). (J.Salinger. The Catcher in the Rye)

Ex.V. Compose a dialogue by analogy with the one given here:

Ferry: Do you mind if we talk?

Peter: (obviously minding) Why – no, no.

Ferry: Yes, you do; you do.

Peter: No really; I don't mind.

Ferry: Yes, you do.

Peter: (finally decided) No; I don't mind at all, really.

Ferry: It's – it's a nice day.

Peter: Yes, yes, it is; lovely.

Ferry: I've been to the Zoo.

Peter: Yes. I think you said so – didn't you?

Ferry: You'll read about it in the papers tomorrow, if you don't see it on your TV tonight. You have TV, haven't you?

Peter: Why, yes, we have two; one for the children.

(Plays of the Modern Theatre, Leningrad, 1970).)

Ex. VI. Insert substitutes and representers wherever it is possible. Explain their usage.

- "Oh, do you go to Pencey?" she said. She had a nice voice. A nice telephone voice, mostly. She should've carried a goddam telephone around with her.

"Yes, I …," I said.

- "Oh, how lovely! Perhaps you know my son, then Ernest Morrow? He goes to Pencey."

"Yes. I … . He is in my class."

"Do you like Pencey?" she asked me.

"Pencey? It's not too bad. It's not paradise or anything, but it's as good as most schools. Some of the faculty are pretty conscientious.

- "Ernest just adores it:

'I know he ..., "I said. Then I started shooting the old crap around a little bit." He adopts himself very well to things. He really … . I mean he really knows how to adopt himself.

- "Do you think …?" she asked me. She sounded interested as hell.
  "Ernest? Sure," I said.
- "I just broke a nail, getting out of a cab," she said.
  She looked up at me and sort of smiled. She had a terrifically nice smile. She really . ... Most people have hardly any smile at all, or a lousy ….
  "Ernest's father and I sometimes worry about him," she said. "We sometimes feel he's not a terribly good mixer."
  "How do you mean?"
- "Well. He's a very sensitive boy. He's really never been a terribly good mixer with other boys. Perhaps he takes things a little more seriously than he … at his age."
- (1. do, 2. do, 3. does; does, 4. so, 5. had, one, 6. should).

(J.Salinger. The Catcher in the Rye)

Ex. VII. Define the meaning and function of the words "so" and "not":

1. "We've never got on very well together. " – "<u>So</u> she told me."
2. If you think you cannot do it, say <u>so</u> now.
3. "You think this man is definitely mad?"
   "Oh, I should say <u>so.</u> A lunatic all right, but a cunning one."
4. His wife is a witch. A real witch. Fräulein Schiller says <u>so</u>.
5. I don't know if it is true. If <u>so,</u> it may explain why there is some lack of vitality in his beautiful and simple French.
6. "You've started thinking for yourself?" – "I hope <u>so</u>."
7. "Albert, N or M would have to come out in the open and have a shot at eliminating me." – "Yes, and maybe they'd manage it, too," – "<u>Not</u>, if I was on my guard."
8. "Do you think it will last as long as six years?"
   Mrs Cayley said doubtfully: "Oh, I hope <u>not</u>. It's a very long time …"
9. All the same it's an unwise thing to do - and your boy will get into trouble over it some day."
   "Oh, I do hope <u>not</u>."
10. "I should like so much to know more about it - but I suppose I mustn't ask that?"
    "No, I'm afraid <u>not.</u> It's very secret, you see."

Test. Mark cases of substitution (S) and representation (R):

We were the only <u>ones</u> in the can	S
	R
I never knew <u>one</u> could enjoy oneself so much.	S
	R

She wanted fried fish, but they gave us boiled.	S
	R
"There are matches by your side". She saw her hands tremble when she tried to strike <u>one</u>.	S
	R
"Do you need any help?" – "None in the world, my boy."	S
	R
"You say the blackmail note was addressed to you?" – "You know it <u>was</u>".	S
	R
"Can you go back to sleep?" – "I'm afraid not."	S
	R
"Do you love me?" – "You know I <u>do</u>."	S
	R
"Will you come and have a look round?" – "Thanks, I'd like <u>to</u>.	S
	R
"Well, well – the world's a good place after all." – "Of course, it is!"	S
	R

8. <u>Terminology List</u>

Attribute ['ætrlbju:t] *n*
Apposition [æpq'zlʃqn] *n*
Complement ['kɒmpllmqnt]
Composite ['kɒmpqzlt] *adj* **29**
Compound [kɒmpaund] *adj*
Complex ['kɒmpleks] *adj* **29**
Division (actual sentence D.) [dl'vlʒqn] *n*
Ellipt [l'llpt] *v*
Ellipsis [l'llpsls] *n* **30, 31**
Elliptical [l'llptlkql] *adj*
Focus ['fɒukqs] *n*
Inversion [ln'vq:ʃqn]
Adverbial modifier [qd'vq:blql 'mɒdlfalq] *n*
Modality [mq'dælltl] *n* **24, 25**
Object ['ɒbʤqkt] *n*
Paradigm ["pærq'dalm] *n* **26**
Paradigmatic ["pærqdlgmætik] *adj* **26**
Parenthesis [pq'renθlsls] *n*
Parenthetical ["pærqn'θetlkql] *adj*
Perspective (functional sentence) [pq:'spektlv] *n* **33, 34**
Predicate ['predlklt] *n*
Predicative [prq'dlkqtlv] *adj*
Predication ["predl'kelʃqn] *n* **24, 25**
Representation ["reprlzen'telʃqn] *n* **31, 32**

Rheme ['rℐm] *n*   **33, 34**
Rhematic [rl'mɑtlk] *adj*   **33, 34**
Sentence ['sɛntɑns] *n*   **22, 23**
Stance ['stℛns] *n*   **25**
Subject ['sℳbℭɑkt] *n*
Substitute ['sℳbstl'tju:t] *n, v*   **31, 32**
Substitution ["sℳbstl'tju:ℬqn] *n*   **31, 32**
Theme [Tℐm] *n*   **33, 34**
Thematic [Tl'mχtlk] *adj*   **33, 34**
Utterance ['ℳtqrɛns] *n*   **22, 23**

9. Reference Books

1. Арутюнова Н.Д. Предложение и его смысл. – М., 1976.
2. Бархударов Л.С. Структура простого предложения современного английского языка. М., 1966.
3. Богданов В.В. Семантико-синтаксическая организация предложения. Л., 1977.
4. Бондарко А.В. Принципы функциональной грамматики и вопросы аспектологии. Л., 1983.
5. Douglas Biber… Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English. England. 2000.
6. Blokh M.Y. A Course in Theoretical English Grammar. – М., 2000.
7. S.Greenbaum, R.Quirk. A Student's Grammar of the English Language. Lomgman. England. 1998.
8. Ilyish B.A.. The Structure of Modern English. – М., 1971.
9. Iofik L.L., Chakhoyan L.P., Pospelova A.G. Readings in the Theory of English Grammar. L., 1981.
10. Иванова И.П., Бурлакова В.В., Почепцов Г.Г. Теоретическая грамматика современного английского языка. – М., 1981.
11. Колшанский Г.В. Коммуникативная функция и структура языка. – М., 1981.
12. Почепцов Г.Г. Конструктивный анализ структуры предложения. Киев, 1971.
13. Смирницкий А.И. Синтаксис английского языка. – М., 1957.
14. Структурный синтаксис английского языка. (Отв. ред. Иофик Л.Л.) – Л., 1983.
15. Теоретическая грамматика английского языка (под ред. В.В.Бурлаковой). Л., 1983.
16. Человеческий фактор в языке. Языковые механизмы экспрессивности. (Отв. ред. Телия В.Н.)., М.: Наука, 1991.

III. IC Analysis

Outline

Key-words: IC analysis, constituents: immediate constituents, ultimate constituents, multiple ICs, discontinuous ICs, simultaneous ICs, tree diagram, sentence tree, expansion, ambiguity, hierarchical structure.

1. <u>The essence of IC analysis</u>

The modern approach to syntax includes various techniques of grammatical analysis. One of them that was extremely popular in the first half of the last century and is used up to now is known as immediate constituents analysis. The term was introduced by L.Bloomfield in his book "Language" published in New York in 1933. In accordance with the IC model every sentence having a dichotomous structure is divided into two parts each of which is divided, if possible, into smaller parts. The IC analysis proceeds step by step with always two constituents at a time. It begins on the level of the sentence and goes down to the level of morphemes.

L.Bloomfield chose the sentence "Poor John ran away" to split it up into two immediate constituents: "poor John" and "ran away", these being in turn analysable into further constituents: "poor" and "John", and "ran" and "away". Thus, a sentence is seen not as a sequence or a "string" of elements: Poor + John + ran + away, but as being made up of "layers" of constituents, each being given an identifying label in syntactico-morphological terms.

The analysis was made in the form of a "tree diagram":

The ICs of two-member sentences coincide with subject and predicate groups, which is clear from the example of a tree diagram given above . The same can be illustrated by cuts that can be made after each binary division, e.g. Poor | | John | ran | | away. The first cut indicates subject-predicate groups, further cuts are made within two groups. Cuts are made between separate words which are immediately connected and even between word-morphemes until ultimate constituents are reached, e.g.

1. A ||| young |||| man || with ||| a ||| paper | followed ||| the girl || with ||| a |||| blue ||| || dress.

    The tree for the sentence would be:

 A   young   man with   a   paper   follow–ed the   girl with   a   blue   dress

2. The || old ||| man | saw || a |||| black ||||| dog ||| there.

   The   old   man   saw   a   black   dog there

3. The ||| large |||| current ||||| buns || in ||| the |||| window | taste || very ||| nice.

4. It || was ||| ten |||| o'clock | as || she ||| turned out |||| of ||||| the |||||| gate

2. Merits and demerits of IC method

The similarity of IC analysis to traditional techniques of parsing sentences used by traditional grammar should be obvious. In the opinion of D.Crystal (Linguistics, Lnd., 2000), IC analysis is a much more powerful method of analysing sentences than parsing, as it is devoid of the arbitrariness and overconcentration on matters of terminology as an end in itself which were the hallmarks of traditional clause analysis.

IC analysis is an extremely useful technique which provides a first insight into language structure, a preliminary tool for sorting and classifying.

At the same time the IC analysis is not devoid of some drawbacks (demerits). There are many important grammatical relationships which could never be brought to light by IC technique. The kinds and degrees of relationship which exist between some sentences are obscured. Thus, IC analysis does not give rules of forming passive sentences from active ones, and vice versa; it cannot provide the information that such sentences as "That man saw John's mother" vs "John's mother was seen by that man" are closely related and both mean the same thing.

Another, equally important point is that IC analysis does not take account of ambiguity in language. Let us take the following two sentences: "John is easy to please" vs "John is eager to please". It is evident that their IC analysis is absolutely identical whereas the semantic relations between the subject and predicate are

essentially different: in the first sentence it is John who is pleased by someone, in the second sentence the subject indicates the person who pleases somebody.

IC analysis identifies and classifies constituents of sentences and pays next to no attention to the functions of any given constituent, or class of constituents – or of the sentence as wholes. As a result of this IC analysis is helpless in cases of ambiguity such as the one given by N.Chomsky: "The police were ordered to stop drinking about midnight". This sentence is ambiguous in four ways, no less – Was the drinking taking place at midnight, or the ordering? And who was drinking, anyway: the police or someone else?

The given utterance has more than one interpretation or meaning. It is the grammatical structure of the sentence that is ambiguous. We can "disambiguate" the sentence by using "them": "The police were ordered to stop them drinking at midnight", "At midnight the police"…

At that time meaning of language structures was ignored in favour of formal description of these structures. Later on grammarians came to the conclusion that meaning and grammatical analysis are "two sides of the same coin". D.Crystal wrote in this connection: "To talk about linguistic analysis without reference to meaning would be like describing the construction of ships without any reference to the sea' (D.Crystal, Linguistics, p.207). Some drawbacks of IC analysis were overcome by TG grammar which developed later on.

1. What is the essence of IC analysis?
2. What are merits and demerits of IC analysis?
3. How is it possible to prove the importance of meaning in grammar?

3. Exercises

1. Draw diagrams showing two-fold interpretation of some of the following phrases and sentences:
   a) old men and women, old cars salesmen, thin captain's biscuits, stout major's wife, last month salary, wild animal house
   b) He was dancing with the stout major's wife. (Ambiguity is often eliminated by context: The stout major's wife is very thin, The stout major's wife has a very thin husband).
      He was feeding for three days on thin captain's biscuits.

2. Give sentence trees:
   a) The servants have gone to bed.
   b) An icy blast of wind came sweeping into the hall.
   c) He roared and poured himself out another drink, splashing the whisky in with a liberal hand.
   d) I've had a yacht, but I don't like the sea.
   e) He bought two concerns that were bankrupt and made them pay.

f) And then we came up to London.

g) He courted me for eight years, and then we got married.

h) There was no reason why the divorce proceedings shouldn't be started at once; waiting six months was absurd.

i) The lights are low, the gramophone is playing, two couple dance, the odd man out is busy at the record cabinet, close to the Spanish chest and its masking screen.

   (The sentences are taken from A.Christie's "Short Stories", Moscow, Raduga Publishers, 2001).

4. Terminology list

IC analysis ['əl'sJq'nχllsls] *n*   **41, 43**

constituents [kɋn'stltjuɋnts] *n*   **41**

   discontinuous [dlskɋn'tlnjuɋs] *adj*

   immediate [l'mldjɋt] *adj*   **41, 43**

   multiple ['mʌltlpl] *adj*

   simultaneous [slmɋl'tɕinjɋs] *adj*

   ultimate ['ʌltlmlt] *adj*   **42**

tree diagram ['trJ 'dɑlɋɜʳxm] *n*   **41**

sentence tree ['sɕntɕns trJ] *n*   **41, 42**

dichomotous structure [dɑl'kOtɋmɋs strʌkCq] *n*   **41**

5. Reference Books

1. Бархударов Л.С. Структура простого предложения современного английского языка. М., 1966.

2. Blokh M.Y. A Course in Theoretical English Grammar. M/. Vysshaya Shkola, 2000, ch. XXIV, pp. 264-267.

3. Crystal D. Linguistics. Lnd., 1990, pp.100, 201-205.

4. Варшавская А.И. Методика лингвистического анализа. Модель классов слов и модель НС. Структурное дерево.// Теоретическая граматика английского языка, под ред. В.В.Бурлаковой. М., 1983, с. 232-238.

5. Jofik L.L., Chakhoyan L.P., Pospelova A.G. Readings in the Theory of English Grammar, L., 1981, ch. VII, pp.156-157.

6. Hockett Ch. A Course in Modern Linguistics, USA, 1960, pp. 154-156.

7. Palmer F. Grammar. Lnd., 1971, pp. 124-133.

IV. Text Linguistics

Outline

Key-words: sentence, utterance, text linguistics, discourse, discourse analysis, topic sentences, comment sentences, cohesion, coherence, deictic words, deixis, referential words

1. <u>Definition and backgrounds of text linguistics</u>

The highest syntactic unit of language recognized by traditional grammar was the sentence. L.Bloomfield's definition of the sentence which was rather popular among grammarians runs as follows: "Each sentence is an independent linguistic form not included by virtue of any grammatical construction in any larger linguistic form" (L. Bloomfield. "Language". N.-Y., 1933).

Language and speech sequences larger than one separate sentence remained grammatically uninvestigated. In course of time it became obvious that many sentences taken by themselves are ambiguous semantically and grammatically. For example, the sentence 'This one is not so bad' taken at random from S.Maugham's novel "Theatre" is obscure in meaning when used in isolation, and becomes disambiguated in the context: ...'Julia took a bundle of her latest photographs. She handed one to the young man. 'This one is not so bad!"

There are many other sentences which can be disambiguated only within a discourse, i.e. a whole sequence of sentences.

"Some grammarians see the search for patterns of language larger than the sentence as a separate branch of study, sometimes referred to as discourse analysis or (in the context of written language) text linguistics" – this is one of the definitions, of the investigated branch of linguistics given by D.Crystal in his book "Linguistics", Lnd., 1990.

Text linguistics began to develop from the late forties of the previous century. Academician N.S.Pospelov is regarded as the founder of text linguistics in Russia. His first works on the problem were published in 1948 ("Проблема сложного синтаксического целого в современном русском языке», Ученые записки МГУ, М., 1948; «Сложное синтаксическое целое и основные

особенности его структуры», Доклады и сообщения Института Русского Языка АН СССР, вып. 2, М., 1948 и др.). N.S.Pospelov underlined functional and logico-semantic distinctions of super-sentential syntactic units and their structural peculiarities which make them different from separate sentences.

At the same time the theory of text linguistics began to develop in the USA and Western Europe (especially so in England and Germany: Karl Boost (Germany) in his book "Der Deutsche Satz" (1949) pointed out many important means of sentence connection (such as the use of articles, word-repetition, the use of tenses, correlative words, etc.) Z. Harris (the USA) in 1952 published his "Discourse analysis" where he suggested methods of distributive analysis of super-sentential syntactic units.

M.A.Halliday (England) in "Language Structure and Language Function" (1970) introduced the terms 'cohesion', 'coherence', 'cohesive relations' which indicate relations between sentences in a discourse (fr. Lat. cohaerens - bound, mutually related; cohesion fr. physics).

V. Waterhouse in his work "Independent and Dependent Sentences", published in London in 1963 wrote that in any language some structures are independent, others are dependent, both kinds of structures recognized on various levels of language. Within words, free morphemes (boy, come) are independent; bound morphemes (un-, -ed) are dependent. Within certain phrases e.g. (big John) the head John is independent; modifiers are dependent. Within sentences, there are both independent and dependent clauses. The concept of dependence for these levels is recognized by most scholars.

Where sentences are concerned, however, the Bloomfield definition of the sentence seems to have the status of a law. This has resulted in an atomistic preoccupation with units no larger than the sentence from Bloomfield all the way to the exponents of transform grammar.

Then the concept of text was introduced "as the basic linguistic unit manifesting itself, as discourse, in verbal utterances. Such a text may, of course, consist of n sentences (where n ≥ 1), but will not be described in terms of independent sentence-structures alone" (T.A.Van Dijk. Some Aspects of Text Grammars, 1972).

The view that a discourse unit may be equal to a single sentence is not shared by all grammarians which becomes evident from the definition of discourse given in 'Dictionary of Language Teaching and Applied Linguistics', (see 'Bibliography'): "Whereas grammar refers to the rules a language uses to form grammatical units such as clause, phrase and sentence, discourse refers to larger units of language such as paragraphs, conversations, and interviews" (op.cit, p.111).

Opinions also differ on the use of the terms 'Discourse Analysis' and 'Text Linguistics': "Sometimes the study of both written and spoken discourse is known as discourse analysis; some researchers however use discourse and Text Linguistics to refer to the study of written discourse" (op. cit., p.111).

In Longman's Dictionary of Language Teaching and Applied Linguistics, 1999, text linguistics is defined as "a branch of linguistics which studies spoken or written texts, e.g. a descriptive passage, a scene in a play, a conversation. It is concerned, for instance, with the way the parts of a text are organized and related to one another in order to form a meaningful whole." (op.cit, p.378).

As for text, it is regarded as "a piece of spoken or written language. A text may be considered from the point of view of its structure and/or its functions, e.g. warning, instructing, carrying out a transaction.

A full understanding of a text is often impossible without reference to the context in which it occurs.

A text may consist of just one word, e.g. *Danger* on a warning sign, or it may be of considerable length, e.g. a sermon, a novel, or a debate." (op.cit., p.378)

2. Topic and comment sentences

Every text of considerable duration consists of several supersentential syntactic units which usually coincide with a paragraph in writing. When describing the information structure of sentences that constitute supersentential syntactic units we may distinguish topic and comment sentences. *Topic* sentences serve the same sort of purpose as the labels on the folders in a filing cabinet. A label makes it easy to tell what the material in a particular folder is about: a topic sentence makes it easy for a reader to know what a particular paragraph is about. The topic sentence states, in general terms, the main thought of the paragraph, the central idea that the writer especially wants the reader to get. For example, see how the following topic sentence focuses the reader's attention on the main idea of the paragraph:

"She had decided to learn something at all costs. It was better to face the worst, and have it over. And this was her plan: to go first to Phil's aunt, Mrs. Baynes, and failing information there, to Irene herself. She had no clear notion of what she would gain by these visits." (J.Galsworthy. The Man of Property).

The opening sentence here is a topic sentence, which is followed by a number of comment sentences, the later clarifying Jane's decision, her concrete plan of actions.

"Though he had not seen the architect since the last afternoon at Robin Hill, he was never free of the sense of his presence - never free from the memory of his worn face with its high cheekbones and enthusiastic eyes. It would not be too much to say that he had never got rid of the feeling of that night when he heard the peacock's cry at dawn - the feeling that Bosinney haunted the house. And every man's shape that he saw in the dark evenings walking past, seemed that of him whom George had so appropriately named the Buccaneer." (J. Galsworthy. The Man of Property).

In the paragraph above the opening sentence serves as a topic sentence, and all the succeeding sentences contain details of Soames' feelings.

We meet the same in many other supersentential syntactic units, such as:

"She could visualize the Grand Ballroom of the Cameron Plaza, where the party was being held. Baccarat crystall chandeliers would hang from the ceiling, prisms of light reflecting a dazzling diamondlike brilliance. There would be place settings for two hundred guests, at twenty tables. The finest linens, china, silver and stemware would adorn each place setting, and in the centre of each table would be a floral display of white orchids mixed with white freesias." (S. Sheldon. The Stars Shine Down).

Here, as well as in the previous examples, the role of topic and comment sentences is evident, comment sentences being the ones which comment on the topic sentence and develop the idea expressed in the sentence.

Usually the topic sentence comes at the beginning of a paragraph. Sometimes, however, the writer puts it at the end - to call the reader's attention to the central idea developed by the preceding sentences:

"I'm giving Peggy a dowery of five thousand dollars," her father told James. "The money will give you a chance to make something of yourself. You can invest it in real estate, and in five years it will double. I'll help you." (S. Sheldon. The Stars Shine Down).

Here the topic sentence 'I'll help you' comes last to draw James'attention to the importance of the gift from Peggy's father.

Some supersentential syntactic units do not need a topic sentence; the central idea is clear without being expressed in words. The topic of the following supersentential syntactic unit is not stated directly in a topic sentence. Yet since the sentences all give specific details describing Jack London as he was during his freshman years at Oakland High, the reader can easily grasp the central idea of the paragraph - without the aid of a topic sentence:

He [Jack London] was nineteen when he entered the freshman class of Oakland High in a much-worn, wrinkled, and illfitting dark blue suit and woolen shirt without a tie. He was strong and rugged looking, his face sunburned, his tawny hair disheveled as though he always ran his fingers through it. He was still chewing tobacco, a habit he had picked up on the road and had continued when he returned to Oakland because it anesthetized the pain of the numerous cavities in his teeth. When his stepsister, Eliza, offered to have the cavities filled and to replace the extracted teeth with false ones if he would give up chewing tobacco, he readily assented. Pleased with his shining new teeth, Jack invested in the first toothbrush he had ever owned. (Irving Stone. Jack London, Sailor on Horseback).

3. Means of text cohesion

Sentences which constitute the text are connected logically and writing makes them coherent. *Coherence* is defined as the relationships which link the meanings of utterances in a discourse or of the sentences in a text. These links may be based on the speakers' shared knowledge which is known as a

supposition, that is what a speaker or writer assumes that the receiver of the message already knows.

For example: speaker A: What about inviting Simon tonight?

        speaker B: What a good idea; then he can give Monica a lift.

Here, the presuppositions are, amongst others, that speakers A and B know who Simon and Monica are, that Simon has a vehicle, most probably a car, and that Monica has no vehicle at the moment.

Another example: A: Could you give me a lift home?

        B: Sorry, I'm visiting my sister.

The exchange is based on the presupposition that both A and B know that B's sister lives in the opposite direction to A's home.

Coherence demands not only that the details in a text should be arranged in a logical order, but also that the sentences hold together so neatly that the readers can move from one to another without being jolted by a sudden break or gap in the thought. The same refers to speech where the utterances should be coherent and logical. The violation of these demands may produce a humorous effect which is masterfully shown by O'Henry in the story "The Ransome of Red Chief". Here is a vivid example of Red Chief's speech: "I like this fine. I never camped out before; but I had a pet possum once, and I was nine last birthday. I hate to go to school. Rats ate up sixteen of Jimmy Talbot's aunt's speckled hen's eggs. Are there any real Indians in these Woods? I want some more gravy. Does the trees moving make the wind blow? We had five puppies. What makes your nose so red, Hank? My father has lots of money. Are the stars hot? I whipped Ed Walker twice, Saturday. I don't like girls. You dassent catch toads unless with a string. Do oxen make any noise? Why are oranges round? Have you got beds to sleep on in this cave? Amos Murray has got six toes. A parrot can talk, but a monkey or a fish can't. How many does it take to make twelve?"

Getting sentences to hold together is mostly a matter of providing the necessary logical, semantic, lexical and grammatical links to tie the sentences together.

a) *Lexical means*

    Direct links. Sometimes the best way to tie sentences together is to use direct links - connecting words, mostly of adverbial character, that show specifically how one sentence is related to another. In narrative texts, for example, it is important to show the reader the time relationship between sentences. It can be easily done by making use of adverbial linking expressions like these:

First...	A minute later...
Then...	In the meantime...
At last...	On the following day...
The next week...	Before answering him...
Soon afterward...	As soon as I saw them...

In descriptive texts, place linking expressions are especially important. Linking expressions like these should be used wherever they are needed to show this relationship:

Directly ahead...	Below...
To the left...	As you turn right...
Ten feet from the shore...	At the top...
Along the east wall…	Across the hall…

When the details of the text give reasons, examples, or illustrations you will meet such linking words as these:

In the first place…	In the third place…
For example...	Furthermore...
Moreover...	Just as important...
For instance...	Finally...

To make clear the connection between two sentences, the first stating a cause and the second stating the result or effect, the sentences are tied neaty together with one of the following linking words or expressions:

Therefore...	As a result...
So...	Consequently...
For this reason...	Because of this...

Other lexical divices used as sentence links include the use of pronouns referring to a noun in a preceding sentence, the repetition of key words or phrases, the use of synonyms - all these are effective in linking related ideas.

e.g. Then one afternoon the Professor appeared in casualty. *He* stood before *my* desk, looking at *me* with *the same* stare of scientific interest and holding in *his* hand a patient's treatment card.

"Did you write *this*?" he asked. (R. Gordon. Doctor in the House).

You may often meet personal pronouns (he, she, it), possessive pronouns (his, her, its, etc.), demonstrative pronouns (this, that), and some other classes of pronouns used as indirect links.

Words or phrases which directly relate an utterance (or a sentence to person(s), place, time, event, etc. are termed deictic words, examples of deictic words (deixis) include not only pronouns but also adverbs and adverbial expressions of relative character, such as 'here', 'there', 'now', 'then', *e.g.*:

The letter is here. (near the speaker)

The letter is over there. (father away from the speaker)

Every day Jules followed *the same* routine. *At dawn* he got up and worked steadily at his writing until lunch. *In the afternoon he* went to the library to do research. *After leaving* the library, *he* would spend a few minutes in the park feeding the sparrows. *By eight o'clock he* was ready for bed.

Personal, demonstrative pronouns and other deictic words are also known as *referential words* as they indicate the relationship between words, and the things, actions, events, and qualities they stand for.

b) Besides lexical links there are some important grammatical links which are widely used in discourse (text).

Among grammatical means of text cohesion we should mention word order, substitution, representation and other kinds of ellipsis. Word order is of primary importance in the logical arrangement of utterances (sentences) within discourse (text). Substitute words (one, the same, none, this, that, do, etc.) are used to echo words in preceding sentences. Representation and other cases of ellipsis function as indicators of exceedingly close ties between different sentences in texts (or utterances in discourse), *e.g.*:

"Did you write this [this card]?" he asked.

I looked at it. It was directed to the Surgical Registrar, ... who disliked Bingham almost as much as he *did* the Fellowship examiners. The card asked for his opinion on a suspected orthopaedic case, but in the stress of casualty I had scribbled only three words:

Please X-ray. Fracture?

'Yes sir,' I admitted.

'*Have*,' he snapped. '*Isn't.*'

He turned on his heels and disappeared.

In the text above 'did' is a substitute for "disliked", 'Please X-ray' = will you please X-ray the patient, 'Fracture' = Isn't it a case of fracture?', 'Isn't' = It is not a case of fracture.'

Substitution and cases of ellipsis serve as means of cohesion in the given extract.

Different means of sentence cohesion depend on various types of texts.

4. *Different types of texts and their distinctive features*

There are different types of texts: works of fiction (prose and verses), scientific texts, political documents, newspaper and television reports and interviews, instructions, advertisements, slogans, telegrams, etc.

As for works of fiction, they include most often description, narration and conversation, each of them characterized by specific linguistic features (markers).

Description is marked syntactically by the use of long sentences of complicated structure. They are usually composite syntactic units consisting of several clauses, often with homogeneous sentence parts and various participial or infinitival constructions, stylistically marked indirect word order, etc. *e.g.*:

'Seated in a row close to one another were three ladies - Aunt Ann, Hester (the two Forsyte maids), and Julie (short for Julia), who not in first youth had so far forgotten herself as to marry Septimus Small, a man of poor constitution.' (J. Galsworthy. The Man of Property).

Morphologically descriptive texts are characterized by the use of past (sometimes past perfect) verb forms, a frequent use of nouns and complex noun phrases with preposed and postposed adjuncts, *e.g.*:

Eighty years of age, with his fine, white hair, his dome-like forehead, his little, dark grey eyes, and an immense white moustache, which drooped and spread below the level of his strong jaw, he had a patriarchal look, and in spite of lean cheeks and hollows at his temples, seemed master of perennial youth. (J. Galsworthy. The Man of Property).

As for means of sentence cohesion they include the use of referential words (personal, demonstrative pronouns and others), adverbs and adverbial expressions indicating time, place, the manner of actions, etc.: in the centre of the room, at one time or another, thus, etc. ...

A remarkable feature of descriptive texts is that they abound in adjectives, *e.g.*:

"His cab stopped in front of a small house of that peculiar buff colour which implies a long immunity from paint. It had an outer gate, and a rustic approach.

He stepped out, his bearing extremely composed; his massive head, with its drooping moustache and wings of white hair, very upright, under an excessively large top hat; his glance firm, a little angry." (J. Galsworthy. The Man of Property).

What is important for narration is telling the right details in a time order. Hence the most important means of the text cohesion in narrative texts include the use of conjunctions (and, but), adverbs and adverbial phrases expressing the order of events, causal-consequtive relations of the actions described: first, last, finally, as a result, last of all, then, etc. Characteristic of narration is the use of substitute terms which echo words used in previous sentences, *e.g.*:

"I'd nipped into the theatre to have a dekko at him doing an adrenalectomy, and he asked if I knew what school you went to. I told him I couldn't say off-hand. Then he made a most surprising remark, old chap - he thought it was probably one of those progressive ones, where the kids learn all about self-expression and bash the teachers over the head with rulers but are never taught to read or write." (R. Gordon. Doctor in the House).

You may meet two types of narration in works of fiction: the one that belongs to the author, and that which belongs to one of the book's personages. Writer and personage narrations differ in their registers as a rule, one of them being neutral and the other colloquial (see the example of personage narration given above).

Syntactically narrative texts are more simple in comparison with descriptive texts. They have a common morphological feature both containing past tense forms.

Conversation is typically carried out in face-to-face interaction with others, e.g. family members or friends, with whom we share a great deal of contextual background. Face-to-face interaction means that we share not just an

immediate context of time and space, but a large amount of specific social, cultural and institutional knowledge.

In keeping with this shared knowledge, conversation is marked grammatically by a very high frequency of nouns. By far the most common class of pronouns used in conversation is personal pronouns. The user of personal pronouns normally assumes that we share knowledge of the intended reference of you, she, it, etc. Pronoun reference represents only the most common variety of grammatical reduction that characterizes conversation, others being the use of ellipsis and of substitute proforms (e.g. one/ones substituting for a nominal and 'do' substituting for a verb or verb phrase). The frequency of ellipsis in conversation shows up especially in situational ellipsis, in ellipsis across turns (e.g. I don't see any others. - I know you don't <->), and also commonly in answers to questions. Another type of reliance on situational reference is through the use of deictic items (this, that, these, those, then, now, etc.), most of which again are particularly common in conversation. Present tense forms are most common in conversation, which furthermore, abounds in contracted forms (contractions) of auxiliaries and modals (isn't, I've, he's, I'll, hasn't, can't, ain't, etc.). The more private the conversation, the more the understanding of it tends to rely on such deictic identification of reference. The context-bound nature of conversation is also manifested in the non-infrequent occurence in conversation of unembedded dependent clauses such as 'When you are ready' or 'If you don't mind' as complete grammatical units.

Questions and imperatives, the sentence types that typically elicit a response, are more frequent in conversation than anywhere else.

As conversation is usually expressive of emotion, attitude and politeness certain inserts of stereotypical character such as 'sorry', 'please', 'thanks' characterize conversational excerpts. Any conversation abounds in interjections (Oh, Ah, Alas! etc.).

In conversation, discourse markers can be said to have a 'discourse management' function. These markers include address forms or vocatives, linking adverbials (such as 'anyway' and 'so'), and response forms such as 'oh', 'right', 'yeah', 'okay', 'why', 'hey', etc., which, like discourse markers, can either stand alone or attach themselves to larger discoursal units. Here is an excerpt from a work of fiction which illustrates different means of cohesion in conversational English:

"Hell, I can't hear,' he said, *"Don't what?"*

"Please," she said. "Please, please. Please, *Jack,* listen. When are you coming back, *darling?* I need you so. I need you so terribly. When are you coming back?"

"Why, that's the thing," he said. *"That's* what I was going to write you about tomorrow... *Hello.* Hear me all right? *Why, you see,* the way things came out today, it looks a little bit like I'd have to go on to Chicago for a

while. *Looks* like pretty big thing, and it won't mean a very long time, I don't believe. *Looks* as if I'd be going out there next week, I guess."

"Jack, no!" she said. "Oh, don't do that! You can't do that. You can't leave me alone like this. I've got to see you, dearest. I've got to. You've got to come back, or I've got to come back to you, I can't go through this, Jack, I can't, I-" (Dorothy Parker. New York to Detroit).

To sum it all up it should be said that different types of texts are marked by a whole set of peculiar linguistic features which need a careful investigation and analysis.

1. What is the domain of the text linguistics?
2. Describe the essence of topic and comment sentences.
3. What are the most important lexical and grammatical means of text cohesion?
4. Discuss distinctive features of different types of texts.

5. Exercises and tests

Ex.1. Define what type of text (fiction, science, newspaper, anecdote, joke, riddle, advertisement, instruction) each of the given specimens belongs to; give your reasons for doing so:

1. One dollar and eighty seven cents. That was all. And sixty cents of it was in pennies. Pennies saved one and two at a time by bulldozing the grocer and the vegetable man and the butcher until one's cheeks burned with the silent imputation of parsimony that such close dealing implied. Three times Della counted it. One dollar and eighty-seven cents. And the next day would be Christmas.

2. Prague School. As we have seen in the discussion on phonology, this was the name given to a group of scholars working in or around Prague in the late twenties and early thirties. The Linguistic Circle of Prague was founded in 1926, and published an important journal (Trauvaux du Cercle Linguistique de Prague). Much of the inspiration for its work came from Saussure, but two of its most important scholars, Roman Jakobson and Nikolai Trubetskoy, were Russian…

3. Two main kinds of dialects are commonly distinguished: geographic or regional dialects, associated with speakers living in a particular location; and social dialects, associated with a given demographic group (e.g. women vs men, older vs younger speakers, or members of different social classes).

Regional dialects, like registers, can be considered at many different levels of specificity. At the highest level we can distinguish among national

varieties of English: in particular, for the purposes of this grammar, between American English (Am E) and British English (Br E)…

4. On Monday morning when Kemal got up, Dane finished breakfast and dropped him off at school.
"Have a good day, darling".
"See you, Dane".
Dane watched Kemal walk into the front door of the school, and then she headed for the police station.

5. "You are accused of stealing a chicken. Have you anything to say about it?"
"I took it for a lark".
"No resemblance whatsoever. Ten days".

6. An elderly man of convivial habits, but also bookish, was haled before the bar of justice in a small country town.
"You are charged with being drunk and disorderly", snapped the magistrate. "Have you anything to say why sentence should not be pronounced"?
"Man's inhumanity to man makes countless thousands mourn," began the prisoner, in a flight of oratory. "I am not so debased as Poe, so profligate as Byron, as ungrateful as Keats, so intemperate as Burns, so timid as Tennyson, as vulgar as Shakespeare, so – "
"That'll do, that'll do," interrupted the magistrate.
"Seven days. And, Officer, take down the list of names he mentioned and round them up. I think they are as bad as he is".

Ex. 2. Read the following texts (extracts from works of fiction), define topic and comment sentences used there, find out differential grammatical features of the texts, which manifest themselves in structural and communicative types of sentences, types of phrases, cases of substitution and representation, idiomatic syntactic constructions, the use of tenses, passive voice constructions, the use of personal and demonstrative pronouns, etc., define the types of texts in terms of narration, description, conversation:

1. "Hey, how can I hear you when you mumble like that?" he said. "Can't you talk louder? Talk right into the what-you-call-it."
"I can't scream it over the telephone!" she said. "Haven't you any sense? Don't you know what I'm telling you? Don't you know? Don't you know?"
"I give up," he said. "First you mumble, and then you yell. Look, this doesn't make sense. I can't hear anything, with this rotten connection. Why don't you write me a letter, in the morning? Do that, why don't you? And I'll write you one. See?"

"Jack, listen, listen!" she said. "You listen to me! I've got to talk to you. I tell you I'm nearly crazy. Please, dearest, hear what I'm saying. Jack, I – "

"Just a minute," he said. "Someone's knocking at the door. Come in. Well, for cryin' out loud! Come on in, bums. Hang your coats up on the floor, and sit down. The Scotch is in the closet, and there's ice in that pitcher. Make yourselves at home - act like you were in a regular bar. Be with you right away. Hey, listen, there's a lot of crazy Indians just come in here, and I can't hear myself think. You go ahead and write me a letter tomorrow. Will you?"

"Write you a letter!" she said. "Oh, God, don't you think I'd have written you before, if I'd known where to reach you? I didn't even know that, till they told me at your office today. I got so –"

"Oh, yeah, did they?" he said. "I thought I - Ah, pipe down, will you? Give a guy a chance. This is an expensive talk going on here. Say, look, this must be costing you a million dollars. You oughtn't to do this."

"What do you think I care about that?" she said, "I'll die if I don't talk to you. I tell you I'll die, Jack. Sweetheart, what is it? Don't you want to talk to me? Tell me what makes you this way. Is it — don't you really like me any more? Is that it? Don't you, Jack?"

"Hell, I can't hear," he said, "Don't what?"

<div align="right">(Dorothy Parker, New York to Detroit)</div>

2. Then one afternoon the Professor appeared in casualty. He stood before my desk, looking at me with the same stare of scientific interest and holding in his hand a patient's treatment card.

'Did you write this?' he asked.

I looked at it. It was directed to the Surgical Registrar, a genial young specialist with whom I had played rugger and drunk beer, and who disliked Bingham almost as much as he did the Fellowship examiners. The card asked for his opinion on a suspected orthopaedic case, but in the stress of casualty I had scribbled only three words:

Please X-ray. Fracture?

Now I remembered with alarm that the Registrar had the afternoon off to visit the Royal Society of Medicine, and the Professor was taking over his work.

'Yes, sir,' I admitted.

'Have,' he snapped. 'Isn't.'

He turned on his heel and disappeared.

Bingham said eagerly a few days later, 'The Prof. was talking about you this morning, old man.'

'Oh, yes?'

'I'd nipped into the theatre to have a dekko at him doing an adrenalectomy, and he asked if I knew what school you went to. I told him I couldn't say off-hand. Then he made a most surprising remark, old chap - he thought it was probably one of those progressive ones, where the kids learn all about self-expression and bash the teachers over the head with rulers but are

never taught to read or write. I suppose you didn't really go to a place like that, did you?'

'As a matter of fact I did. We never learnt to read, write, do arithmetic, play cricket, or swap marbles, but at least we were brought up not to go around kissing the backsides of people we wanted to get jobs from.'

(R.Gordon. Doctor at Large)

Ex. 3. Define means of cohesion used in the texts below (take into consideration syntactical, morphological and lexical devices):

3. OLD JOLYON came out of Lord's cricket ground that same afternoon with the intention of going home. He had not reached Hamilton Terrace before he changed his mind, and hailing a cab, gave the driver an address in Wistaria Avenue. He had taken a resolution.

June had hardly been at home at all that week; she had given him nothing of her company for a long time past, not, in fact, since she had become engaged to Bosinney. He never asked her for her company. It was not his habit to ask people for things! She had just that one idea now - Bosinney and his affairs - and she left him stranded in his great house, with a parcel of servants, and not a soul to speak to from morning to night. His Club was closed for cleaning; his Boards in recess; there was nothing, therefore, to take him into the City. June had wanted him to go away; she would not go herself, because Bosinney was in London.

But where was he to go by himself? He could not go abroad alone; the sea upset his liver; he hated hotels. Roger went to a hydropathic - he was not going to begin that at his time of life, those new-fangled places were all humbug!

With such formulas he clothed to himself the desolation of his spirit; the lines down his face deepening, his eyes day by day looking forth with the melancholy that sat so strangely on a face that was wont to be strong and serene.

And so that afternoon he took this journey through St. John's Wood, in the golden light that sprinkled the rounded green bushes of the acacias before the little houses, in the summer sunshine that seemed holding a revel over the little gardens; and he looked about him with interest; for this was a district which no Forsyte entered without open disapproval and secret curiosity.

His cab stopped in front of a small house of that peculiar buff colour which implies a long immunity from paint. It had an outer gate, and a rustic approach.

He stepped out, his bearing extremely composed; his massive head, with its drooping moustache and wings of white hair, very upright, under an excessively large top hat; his glance firm, a little angry. He had been driven into this!

(J.Galsworthy. The Man of Property)

4. On his bench in Madison Square Soapy moved uneasily. When wild geese honk high of nights, and when women without sealskin coats grow kind to their husbands, and when Soapy moves uneasily on his bench in the park, you may know that winter is near at hand.

A dead leaf fell in Soapy's lap. That was Jack Frost's card. Jack is kind to the regular denizens of Madison Square, and gives fair warning of his annual call. At the corners of four streets he hands his pasteboard to the North Wind, footman of the mansion of All Outdoors, so that inhabitants thereof may make ready.

Soapy's mind became cognizant of the fact that the time had come for him to resolve himself into a singular Committee of Ways and Means to provide against the coming rigour. And therefore he moved uneasily on his bench.

The hibernatorial ambitions of Soapy were not of the highest. In them there were no considerations of Mediterranean cruises, of soporific Southern skies or drifting in the Vesuvian Bay. Three months on the Island was what his soul craved. Three months of assured board and bed and congenial company, safe from Boreas and bluecoats, seemed to Soapy the essence of things desirable.

For years the hospitable Blackwell's has been his winter quarters. Just as his more fortunate fellow New Yorkers had bought their tickets to Palm Beach and the Riviera each winter, so Soapy had made his humble arrangements for his annual hegira to the Island. And now the time was come.

(O.Henry. The Cop and the Anthem)

5. 'The boys are all at the hospital at the moment, but just come in anyway. Would you like a cup of tea? My name's Vera.'

'How do you do,' I said politely. I picked up my cases and entered hesitantly. After conditioning myself to living with four coarse men, being greeted by a delicate girl was puzzling.

'This is the sitting-room,' Vera continued. 'How about the tea?'

'No, thanks. Very kind of you, but I've had some.'

'That's good, because I've got to go and change anyway. If you do want anything the kitchen's through there, just look round as you please.'

The girl slipped through a door leading off the hall, leaving me in the centre of the sitting-room feeling like a participant in the opening scene of a bedroom farce. I had learnt since being at St Swithin's that the best way to treat anything unusual was to ignore it, so I directed attention towards my new home.

The furniture in the sitting-room had an original touch which reflected the profession of the occupants. Like Axel Munthe's room in the Hotel de l'Avenir, there were books everywhere. A row of them stood along the mantelpiece, from which the names of distinguished consultants could stare at the students in gold lettering from red and black bindings, rebuking their loose activities like a row of church elders. In the window an uneven line of thick volumes ran along the ledge like battlements. There were books on the floor, dropped carelessly behind

chairs, or lost between pieces of furniture and the wall. They were scattered over the table like litter on a beach, mixed up with jam-pots, pieces of bread, tobacco, newspapers, and beer bottles.

<div align="right">(R.Gordon. Doctor in the House)</div>

6. One morning I was in the sluice-room half-heartedly performing the routine chemical tests on my patients' excreta when she came in and resignedly began to clean out the sink. Sister had sent her there obviously not knowing of my presence; the door shut us off from the ward; we were alone; so I took a chance.

' I say,' I said.

She looked up from the sink.

'I say,' I repeated, 'number six looks much better today, doesn't he ? The Chief did a good job on him all right. You should have seen the way he got hold of the splenic artery when a clip came off! I've never seen so much blood in my life.'

'Please!' she said, holding her stomach. 'You're making me feel sick.'

'Oh, I'm awfully sorry,' I apologized quickly. 'I just thought you'd be interested.'

'I'm not,' she said. 'The sight of blood makes me sick. In fact, the whole damn place makes me sick. I thought I was going to put my cool hands on the fevered brows of grateful young men, and all I do is clean the floors and give out bedpans to bad-tempered old daddies who smell.'

'If you don't like it,' I suggested, shocked by her confession, 'why did you take it up at all ? Why don't you leave?'

'The hell I won't! My mother was a nurse and she's been ramming it down my throat for nineteen years. If she could take it I damn well can!'

'Would you like to come out to the pictures ?' I asked. I thought it best to cut out her complaints and reach my object without further skirmishing. Our privacy might be broken at any moment.

<div align="right">(R.Gordon. Doctor in the House)</div>

Test I. Define the type of the text judging from the extracts given:

Texts	Types of Texts
1. As there were no classes arranged for the day of the Dean's lecture I had the afternoon to myself.	1. Fiction 2. Newspaper 3. Science
2. We are ignorant too of the neuro-physiological mechanisms that make speech, and grammar in particular, possible.	1. Fiction 2. Newspaper 3. Science
3. Similarly, herbicido-resistant crops are designed to cut costs.	1. Fiction 2. Newspaper 3. Science

| 4. School texts are rewriting the past in hopes of changing the course of history. | 1. Fiction
2. Newspaper
3. Science |

Test II. Define whether extracts from fiction represent conversation, narration, description:

Texts	Put the correct number: 1, 2, 3
1. In the New Year I began work in the out-patient department. It was my first contact with the hard routine of the general practitioner's surgery.	1. Conversation 2. Narration 3. Description
2. "Hello!" he said: "Lost something?" "Not exactly, sir", she said, giving him a worried look.	1. Conversation 2. Narration 3. Description
3. Penguinews, which appears every month, contains details of all the new books issued by Penguinses as they are published. From time to time it is our complete list of almost 5,ooo titles.	1. Conversation 2. Narration 3. Description

6. Terminology list

Coherence [kƆu'hlqrqns] *n* **47, 49, 50**
Coherent [kƆu'hlqrqnt] *adj* **49**
Cohesion [kƆu'hJƵqn] *n* **47, 52, 53**
correlative [kq'r¢lqtlv] *adj* **47**
conversation ["kƆnvq's¢lꞩqn] *n* **52, 53, 54**
description [dls'krlpꞩqn] *n* **52, 53**
discourse [dls'kƆ:s] *n* **47, 49, 52, 54**
discourse analysis ['dlskƆ:s q'nxllsls] **47**
narration [nq'r¢lꞩqn]*n* **52, 53**
sentence ['s¢ntqns] *n* **46, 47, 48, 49**
topic ['tƆplk] *adj* **48, 49**
comment ['kƆmqnt] *adj* **48, 49**
text linguistics ['t¢kst 'llnꞵwlstlks] *n* **46, 48**
referential words ["r¢fq'r¢nꞩql wq:dz] *n* **54**
reference ['r¢fqr¢ns] *n* **54**
supersentential syntactic unit ["sju: pqs¢n't¢nꞩlql sln'txktlk 'ju:nlt] *n* **49**
utterance ['ꞮΛtqr¢ns] *n* **47**

7. <u>Reference books</u>

1. Biber, Douglas, Stig Johansson, Geoffrey Leech, Susan Conrad. Longman Grammar of Spoken and Written English. Lnd., third impression, 2000.
2. Blokh M.Y. A Course in Theoretical English Grammar. M., 2000. Ch XXXI, pp.351-363.
3. Dijk T.A. van. Text and Context. Exploration in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse, Lnd.-N.Y., 1980.
4. Гальперин И.Р. Текст как объект лингвистического исследования. М., 1981.
5. Greenbaum Sidney, Randolph Quirk. A Student's Grammar of the English Language. Longman, Lnd., revised impression, 1998, pp.434-475.
6. Halliday M., Hasan R. Cohesion in English. Lnd., 1976.
7. Joffik L.L., Chakhoyan L.P., Pospelova A.G. Readings in the Theory of English Grammar. L. 1981, ch. IX, pp.199-220.
8. Москальская О.И. Грамматика текста. М., 1981.
9. Теоретическая грамматика английского языка (под. Ред. В.В.Бурлаковой), Л., 1989, с.176-189.
10. Тураева З.Я. Лингвистика текста. М., 1986.

V. Introduction to Pragmatics

Outline

Key-words: Pragmatics, pragmaticist, utterance, communicative intention, speech act, propositional meaning, locutionary meaning, illocutionary meaning (force), perlocutionary act, indirect speech act, direct speech act, cooperation, implication, entailment, cooperative principles, conversational maxim, deixis, deictic, reference, inference, anaphora, presuppositions, existential, factive, non-factive, lexical structure, counterfactual, politeness, face politeness, negative politeness, interaction, role relationship, competence, appropriateness, appropriate, face, face-work, loss of face.

1. Definitions and backgrounds of pragmatics

Pragmatics (fr.Gr. pragma – a thing done) is a comparatively new branch of linguistics. It began to develop in England since the early 80-ies of the XX-th century. (Leach, G 1983 Principles of Pragmatics. London: Longman's Levinson, S.1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Palmer. F. R. 1981 (2nd edition) Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; etc.)There are several definitions of pragmatics. Some of them are as follows: "Pragmatics is the study of the relationships between linguistic forms and the users of those forms (George Yule, 2000 (fifth impression) Pragmatics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 4; "Pragmatics is concerned with the study of meaning as communicated by a speaker (or writer) and interpreted by a listener (or a reader)" (op.cit..,p. 3); "Pragmatics is the study of the use of language in communication, particularly the relationships between sentences and the contexts and situations in which they are used." (John Platt, Heidi Platt. Dictionary of Language Teaching and Applied Linguistics. England, Longman, p. 287); Pragmatics is about explaining how we produce and understand everyday but apparently rather peculiar uses of language" (Grundy Peter, 1995 Doing Pragmatics. Great Britain, London, p. 4); "One of the features of

language use that is of interest to pragmatics is its appropriacy in relation to those who use it and those they address (op.cit., p. 6); "… pragmaticists are interested in the meanings of utterances, they are also interested in the contexts in which utterances occur, since the two are closely integrated" (op.cit., p. 12); "Pragmatics is the study of language used in communication and the associated usage principles" (op.cit., p. 210); "Pragmatics is precisely about accounting for the ability of speakers and addresses to involve a common context in relation to which a very wide range of language uses can be interpreted. This kind of interpretation is necessary because basic literal meanings are radically underdetermined. (op.cit., p. 34), etc…

The definitions given above differ in some respects but all of them have one feature in common: they center around the interrelation between utterances (a sentence or a series of sentences in speech) and human beings by whom or to whom they are uttered.

Every sentence may be characterized syntactically, semantically and pragmatically. The syntactic structure of the sentence shows how the sentence is organized formally; its semantic structure indicates the meaning of the sentence as a form of meanings of its components. As for pragmatic aspect of the sentence, it tries to reveal the actual meaning of the sentence under the given circumstances. Thus one and the same sentence may differ pragmatically under different communicative conditions: e.g. the sentence "It is 12 o'clock already" when uttered in various situations may imply: 1) It is time to go to sleep; 2) It is time to part; 3) It is time to finish the work; etc.…

The example above illustrates it clearly that the semantic and pragmatic meanings of the sentence do not always coincide. Let us consider one more example: the sentence "The TV is out of order", addressed to the father that came back from work may have the meaning: "It is necessary to mend it"; when addressed to the children coming back from school it would rather mean: "You will not watch any TV programmes to-day", etc. The examples given above serve to prove it that one denotative meaning of the sentence may correspond to several pragmatic meanings of the same sentence which depends on the speakers' communicative intention.

2. Speech acts

The speaker's communicative intention is realized in speech acts, which every conversation consists of. A speech act is an utterance regarded as a functional unit of communication. In speech act theory utterances have two meanings: a) propositional meaning (also known as locutionary meaning. This is the basic literal meaning of the utterance which is covered by the particular words and structures which the utterance contains. b) Illocutionary meaning (also known as illocutionary force) is the effect the utterance or written text has on the reader or listener. For example, in "I am thirsty" the propositional meaning is what the utterance says about the speaker's physical state. The

illocutionary meaning (force) is the effect the speaker wants the utterance to have on the listener. It may be intended as a request for something to drink. A speech act is a sentence or utterance which has both propositional meaning and illocutionary force. A <u>perlocutionary act</u> is the results or effects that are produced by means of saying something: "He ate an apple". Eating an apple would be a perlocutionary act.

There are many different kinds of speech acts, such as requests, orders, commands, complaints, promises.

A speech act which is performed indirectly is known as <u>an indirect speech act</u>, such as the speech act of requesting above (I am thirsty – Я хочу пить).

Indirect speech acts are often felt to be more polite ways of performing certain kinds of speech acts, such as requests and results (e.g. Let's go to the cinema tonight – I have an exam in grammar tomorrow).

The philosopher J.R.Searle established a five-part classification of speech acts in his work "What is a Speech Act" (published in London in 1965 in the book "Philosophy in America" and reissued in 1981):

a) <u>Commissive</u>: a speech act that commits to doing something in the future, such as a promise or a threat. For example: If you don't stop fighting I'll call the police (threat). I'll take you to the movies tomorrow (promise).

b) <u>Declarative</u>: a speech act which changes the state of affairs in the world. For example, during the wedding ceremony the act of marriage is performed when the phrase: "I now pronounce you man and wife" is uttered.

c) <u>Directive:</u> a speech act that has the function of getting the listener to do something, such as a suggestion, a request, a command. For example, "Please, sit down. Why don't you close the window?"

d) <u>Expressive</u>: a speech act in which the speaker expresses feelings and attitudes about something, such as an apology, a complaint, thanks, congratulations. For example:" The meal was delicious".

e) <u>Representative:</u> a speech act which describes states or events in the world, such as an assertion, a claim, a report, for example, the assertion: " This is a German car".

3. <u>Cooperation and implicature</u>

Speakers and listeners involved in conversation are generally cooperating with each other. As George Yule states it in his "Pragmatics", "this sense of cooperation is simply one in which people having a conversation are not normally assumed to be trying to confuse, trick, or withhold relevant information from each other. In most circumstances, this kind of cooperation is only the starting point for making sense of what is said" (George Yule. Pragmatics. 2000, p. 35). H.P. Grice (Logic in Conversation, USA, 1967) has classified the factors which affect the success of a conversation in terms of cooperative principles between speaker and hearer. These principles control the

way a conversation proceeds and include such "maxims" as "Do not say what you believe to be false", "Be relevant", "Be brief" and "Avoid ambiguity".

These "maxims", of course, are easier to state than to follow. Conversational maxim is an unwritten rule about conversation which people know and which influences the form of conversational exchanges. For example, in the following exchange:

A: Let's go to the movies.
B: I've an examination in the morning.

B's reply might appear not to be connected to A's remark. However, since A has made an invitation and since a reply to an invitation is usually either an acceptance or a refusal, B's reply is here understood as an excuse for not accepting the invitation (i.e. a refusal). B has used the "maxim" that speakers normally give, which is relevant to the question that has been asked. The philosopher H.Grice has suggested that there are four conversational maxims:

a) The maxim of quantity: give as much information as is needed.
b) The maxim of quality: speak truthfully.
c) The maxim of relevance: say things that are relevant.
d) The maxim of manner: say things clearly and briefly.

The use of conversational maxims to imply meaning during conversation is called conversational implicature, and the "cooperation" between speakers in using the maxims is sometimes called co-operative principle.

For many linguists, the notion of "implicature" is one of the central concepts in pragmatics. An implicature is certainly a prime example of more being communicated than is said.

Every utterance, whether it abides by or flouts the maxims, has both "natural" meaning (entailment) and "non-natural" meaning (implicature), e.g. Some people believe in God" – its natural meaning (entailment) is a statement of a certain fact, the implied meaning is that "not all people believe in God but only some of them." "My watch goes slow: Can you tell me the time? It is necessary to go to the watch-maker's! It would not be bad to buy a new one, etc…."

Thus, we may come to the conclusion that most utterances communicate much more than is said.

4. Deixis and distance

Deictic (Gr. *deiktikos* serving to show or point out) expressions contribute much to the effect that utterances communicate much more than is said. Deictic expressions include a word or phrase which directly relates an utterance to word or phrase or person(s): "here" and "there" which refer to a place in relation to the speaker, e.g. The book is here (near the speaker), The book is over there (father away from the speaker); "now" and "then" which refer to time, e.g. He is

in London now; He was in London then; demonstrative pronouns "this" (these) and "that" (those) and personal pronouns "he", "she", "it" and others which have a direct force, e.g. "He (F.Palmer) is a linguist". Hence pragmaticists distinguish spatial deixis, temporal deixis and person deixis.

5. <u>Reference and inference</u>

Most descriptions refer to different referents (persons, objects, notions) on each occasion when they are used.

The function of picking out an object in the world is called referring – that is the definition of reference given in Peter Grundy's book "Doing Pragmatics", 1999, p. 210. In the Glossary inference is defined as "a conclusion derived from premises" (op.cit., p.209).

All referring expressions in most cases have identifiable physical referents. Listeners (readers) can identify what speakers (writers) are talking (writing) about, even when the entity or individual described may not exist, as in "A dead leaf fell in Soapy's lap. That was Jack Frost's card." (O.Henry The Cop and the Anthem).

There is a pragmatic connection between proper names and objects that will be conventionally associated with those names. Using a proper name referentially to identify any such object invites the listener to make the expected inference, for example, from name of writer to book by writer in "Shakespeare takes up the whole bottom shelf."

The physical environment, or context (linguistic, material, or co-text) has a powerful impact on how referring expressions are to be interpreted: cnf.

a.   A cheese sandwich is made with white bread.

b.   The cheese sandwich left without paying (in a restaurant). Correspondingly, "cheese sandwich" in the example a. means "food", in b. – "person".

Most often cases of anaphoric reference are used, e.g.
Peel <u>an onion</u> and slice <u>it</u> (an onion is the antecedent, "it" is the <u>anaphora</u>). <u>Cataphora</u> is much less common than anaphora, e.g. I turned the corner and almost stepped on <u>it.</u> There was <u>a large snake</u> in the middle of the path." There are also cases of zero anaphora, or ellipsis, e.g.:

a.   Peel an onion and slice it.

b.   Drop the slices into hot oil.

c.   Cook (?) for three minutes, where (?) = the slices, which is evident from the context.

The use of zero anaphora is an obvious case of more being communicated than is said.

Successful reference means that an intention was recognized, via inference, indicating a kind of shared knowledge and hence social connection. The assumption of shared knowledge is also crucially involved in the study of presupposition.

6. Presupposition and entailment

Presupposition is what a speaker or writer assumes that the receiver of the message already knows. For example:

Speaker A: What about inviting Simon tonight?

Speaker B: What a good idea; then he can give Monica a lift.

Here, the presuppositions are, amongst others that speakers A and B know who Simon and Monica are, that Simon has a vehicle, most probably a car, and that Monica has no vehicle at the moment.

A presupposition is something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance.

Entailment is a relationship between two or more sentences. If knowing that one sentence is true gives us certain knowledge of the truth of the second sentence, then the first sentence entails the second. An entailment is something that logically follows from what is asserted in the utterance.

There are several types of presupposition distinguished in pragmatics, they are known as existential, factive, non-factive, lexical, structural, counterfactual presuppositions.

An existential presupposition is assumed to be present in possessive constructions (for example, "Your car" >> "You have a car" and in any definite noun phrase (for example, the Queen of England, the cat, the girl next door, etc.).

A factive presupposition indicates the presupposed information following a verb like "know" which can be treated as a fact, e.g. She realized he was ill (>> He was ill).

A lexical presupposition involves such lexical items as "manage", "stop", "start", "again", etc., e.g. He stopped smoking. (>> He used to smoke); You're late again. (>>You were late before).

A structural presupposition is associated with certain sentence structures such as wh-questions, for example, When did he leave? (>>He left). What did he say? (>>He said something).

A non-factive presupposition is one that is assumed not to be true, e.g. He pretends to be ill. (>>He is not ill).

A counter-factual presupposition means that what is presupposed is not only not true, but is the opposite of what is true, e.g. If I had a yacht,…). A conditional structure of unreal condition presupposes that the information in the if-clause is not true at the time of utterance.

7. Politeness and interaction

Pragmatics studies the factors which govern someone's choice of language, when they speak or write. If we choose to say something, there are all kinds of factors which contain what we will say, and how we will say it. In

theory, we can say anything we like. In practice we follow a large number of special rules which govern the way we speak.

There is no law which says that people must not crack jokes at funerals, but it is generally not done.

There are norms of formality and politeness which anyone has intuitively assimilated, which we follow when talking to other people of special rank and so on. These norms affect the way in which we select sounds, grammatical constructions and lexemes from the resources of the language. The English must not say "How's tricks, Your Majesty?" for example. And children from an early age are taught not to talk like that to – your mother, - your teacher, - your elders, etc. …

In many languages pragmatic distinctions of formality, politeness and intimacy are spread throughout the grammatical system. Several oriental languages (Japanese is a well-known instance) have different grammatical patterns, depending on whether one is talking to an equal, a superior, or an inferior. Here are the examples of address to socially close and socially distant people.

A. Excuse me, Mr. Buckingham, but can I talk to you for a minute?

(socially distant)

B. Hey, Bucky; got a minute? (socially close)

Role relationship is of importance, that is the relationship which people have to each other in an act of communication and which influences the way they speak to each other. One of the speakers may have a role which has a lighter status than that of the other speaker(s), e.g. School principal — teacher, teacher — students(s), lieutenant — sergeant. Sometimes people temporarily take on superior roles, either because of the situation, e.g. Bank managers — loan seeker, or because one of them has a stronger personality, e.g. student A — student B.

Communicative competence plays a certain role in pragmatics. Communicative competence is the ability not only to apply the grammatical rules of a language to form grammatically correct sentences but also to know when and where to use these sentences and to whom.

Communicative competence includes:

a. knowledge of the grammar and vocabulary of the language;

b. knowledge of the rules of speaking (e.g. knowing how to begin and end conversations, knowing what topics may be talked about in different types of speech events, knowing which address forms should be used with different persons one speaks to and in different situations;

c. knowing how to use and respond to different types of speech acts, such as requests, apologies, thanks and invitations;

d. knowing how to use language appropriately.

When producing an utterance, a speaker needs to know that it is grammatical, and also that it is suitable (appropriate) for the particular situation, for example:

Give me a glass of water !

is grammatical, but it would not be appropriate if the speaker wanted to be polite. A request such as:

May I have a glass of water, please?

would be more appropriate.

Even if we are talking to someone who is a social equal, there are many rules (see section 3: cooperative principles) which we tacitly accept, such as the turn-taking conventions which are found in conversation. We cannot simply interrupt someone, without risk of being considered rude. Nor can we hop a conversation, or keep talking on topics which other members of the group do not want to hear about. There are certain phrases we use when entering a conversation or taking our leave of it. Certain topics are widely expected at the beginning - the weather and health are common in English. Certain topics are expected at the end – a reference to the next time of meeting or a formula expressing farewell.

Much of what we say is determined by our social relationships. A linguistic interaction is necessarily a social interaction. There are various external and internal factors which are often negotiated during an interaction, which relate to social distance and closeness. External factors involve the relative status of the participants, based mainly on age and social status. The internal social factors include the amount of imposition or degree of friendliness, which are often negotiated during an interaction and may result in social distance or social closeness. External and internal factors have an influence not only on what people say but also on how they are interpreted. In many cases the interpretation includes evaluations such as "rude", and "inconsiderate", or "considerate" and "thoughtful". Such evaluations make it very clear that more is being communicated than is said. The investigation of the impact of such evaluations is normally carried out in terms of politeness. In the book "Pragmatics" by G. Yule we find the following definition of politeness: "It is possible to treat politeness as a fixed concept, as in the idea of "polite social behavior", or etiquette, within a culture. It is also possible to specify a number of different general principles for being polite in social interaction within a particular culture. Some of these include being tactful, generous, modest and sympathetic toward others." (G.Yule, op.cit., p. 60)

Politeness markers include differences between formal speech and colloquial speech, the use of address forms, etc…. In expressing politeness, the anthropologists P. Brown and S. Levinson distinguished between positive politeness strategies (those which show the closeness, intimacy and rapport between speaker and hearer) and negative politeness strategies (those which indicate the social distance between speaker and hearer). (P. Brown and S.

Levinson, 1978 "Universals in language usage: politeness phenomena". In E. Goody (ed.) Questions and politeness: strategies in social interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

In order to describe politeness the concept of "face" is introduced. "As a technical term, "face" means the public self-image of a person. It refers to that emotional and social sense of self that everyone has and expects everyone else to recognize. Politeness in an interaction can often be behind as the means employed to show awareness of another person's face. In this sense politeness can be accomplished in situations of social distance or closeness" (G. Yule, op.cit., p. 60).

So, in communication between two or more persons, the positive image or impression of oneself one shows or intends to show to the other participant is called face. In any special meeting between people, the participants attempt to communicate a positive image of themselves which reflect the values and beliefs of the participants. For example, Mr.Smith's "face" during a particular meeting might be that of "a sophisticated, intelligent, witty and educated person". If this image is not accepted by other participants, feelings may be hurt and there is a consequent "loss of face". Social contacts between people thus involve what is called face-work, that is efforts by the participants to communicate a positive-face and to prevent loss of face. The study of face and face-work is important in considering how languages express politeness.

Pragmatics is an extremely popular branch of linguistic science nowadays. It provides contemporary linguists with a great number of problems for investigation and further discussion.

8. Questions and assignments

1. What are definitions and backgrounds of pragmatics?
2. Comment on the theory of speech acts.
3. What is meant by cooperation and implicature?
4. Describe the role of deixis in the system of language.
5. Comment on reference and inference.
6. Define the role of presupposition in pragmatics.
7. Express your opinion on the role of politeness in an interaction.
8. Give definitions of keywords.

9. Exercises and Assignments

I. Compare the following definitions of pragmatics. Try to choose the most adequate one of them and give your reasons of doing so:
1. Pragmatics is "the study of language used in communication and the associated usage principles" (P.Grundy, Doing Pragmatics, Great Britain, 1999, p. 210).

2. Pragmatics is concerned with the study of meaning as communicated by a speaker (or writer) and interpreted by a listener (or reader). (G.Yule. Pragmatics. Oxford, 2000, p.3).

3. "Pragmatics is the study of the relationships between linguistic forms and the users of those forms" (op.cit., p.4).

4. Pragmatics is "the study of speaker meaning as distinct from word or sentence meaning" (op.cit., p. 133).

5. Pragmatics is "the study of the use of language in communication, particularly the relationships between sentences and the contexts and situations in which they are used." (Longman Dictionary of Language Teaching and Applied Linguistics. England, 1999, p. 284).

II. The advertisement "Radion removes dirt and odours "is an indirect way of saying that other washing powders are good at getting the dirt out but leave your clothes smelling foul.
Think of other examples similar to the one given above.

III. What principle of pragmatics is violated in the episode described by P. Grundy in his book "Doing Pragmatics (Great Britain, 1999, p. 13): "A misfire I rather enjoyed "occurred at a dinner, when someone said to an important professor sitting across the table from me "Will you have some more chocolate?"

None of us had realized up to then that when the chocolates had come round the first time he had somehow got missed out, but he made us all too aware of it with his petulant reply, "I didn't have any to begin with."
What seemed to make him particularly angry was that "some more chocolate" presupposed that he had already some "to begin with", so that this presupposition was taken by the person to whom it was addressed as a considerable insult."

How does the professor's answer characterize him from the point of view of social interaction, the principle of politeness and face-work?

IV. 1. Try to think of utterances in which the following words might be used: (a) gesturally, (b) symbolically in a direct way, (c) non-deictically: this, now, behind.

2. Think of five or six sentences containing either the word "that" or the word "then" which you could place on a line from very obviously deictic to non-deictic.

V. List all the examples of person, place, and time deixis you can think of.

VI. Comment on implicit meanings of the sentence "It's the taste" used in the following situations described by P. Grundy (op.cit., p. 36): "Take an example:

the advertisement for instant tea, which, like the Coca-Cola advertisement, promotes its product with the legend "It's the taste".

By itself this statement means very little, because we are not told what the taste is or does. And yet you and I understand it to mean that the taste is good. How can this be? And more puzzling still, when my daughter comes home from school and starts her destructive journey through the biscuit barrel, and I ask her why she did not eat her school dinner, and she replies "It's the taste" I understand her to mean exactly the opposite: that the taste is not good. How can the same sentence be understood to convey two meanings that are exactly the opposite to one another?

VII. What implications are associated with the following utterances:

1. Some people believe inGod.
2. Sometimes it's cold and rainy in June.
3. Perhaps, she will pass her exam well.
4. My watch shows the wrong time.
5. Even Peter was late for the lesson.
6. He would have helped her.
7. I don't eat ice-creams in cold weather.
8. His hair is too long.
9. Her dress is extremely short.
10. He failed to pass the exam again.
11. When will dinner be ready?
12. It's me again.
13. This is a smoking zone.

VII. Explain the difference between:
  Pass the salt.
  Can you pass the salt.
  Would (could) you pass the salt, please?
  What particular principles determine speech act choice?

VIII. Define the pragmatic meaning of "Well" and "I see" in the following conversations:
A: Somebody told me it was cheaper to go by plane than by train. Is that right?
B: Well, we're not British rail agents, so I don't know the difference.
A: I see.

IX. Answer the question:
  What are the conditions under which the principle of politeness can be violated?

10. Terminology List.

act [xkt] *n* **64**
speech act ['spJC 'xkt] *n* **64**
direct speech act ['dalrqkt 'spJC 'xkt] *n* **65**
indirect speech act [ln'dalrqkt 'spJC 'xkt] *n* **65**
anaphora [q'nxfqrq] *n* **67**
zero anaphora ['zlqrqu q'nxtqrq] *n* **67**
appropriateness [q'prquprlqtnls] *n* **64**
cataphora [kq'txfqrq] *n* **67**
competence ['kOmpqtqns] *n* **69**
communicative competence [kq'mju:nlkqtlv 'kOmpqtqns] *n* **69**
cooperation ["kouOpq'rɛlSqn] *n* **65**
cooperative principles [kqu'Opqrqtlv 'prlnslpql] **65**
deixis ['dalksls] *n* **66**
deictic ['dalktlk] *adj* **66**
entailment [ln'tɛllmqnt] *n* **68**
face ['fɛls] *n* **71**
face-work ['fɛlswq:k] *n* **71**
loss of face ['lOs qv 'fɛls] *n* **71**
implicature [lm'pllkqCq] *n* **66**
inference ['lnfqrɛns] *n* **67**
interaction ["lntqr'xkSqn] *n* **68, 70, 71**
maxim ['mxkslm] *n* **66**
conversational ["kOnvq'sɛlSqnql] *adj*
meaning ['mJnlN] *n* **64**
     locutionary [lqu'kju:SqnqrI] *adj* **64**
     illocutionary [ilqu'kju:SqnqrI] *adj* **64**
perlocutionary ['pq:lqukju:SqnqrI] *adj* **65**
propositional ["prOpq'zlSqnql] *adj* **64, 65**
politeness [pq'laltnls] *n* **70**
     positive ['pOzltlv] *adj* **70**
     negative ['nɛgqtlv] *adj* **70**
pragmatics [prxg'mxtlks] *n* **63, 64, 71, 72**
presupposition ["prJsʌpq'zlSqn] *n* **68**
     existential ["ɛgzl'stɛnSql] *adj* **68**
     factive ['fxktlv] *adj* **68**
     non-factive ['nOn'fxktlv] *adj* **68**
     counterfactual ["kauntq'fxktju:ql] *adj*
role [rOul] *n* **69**
role relationship ['rOul rl'lɛlSqnSlp] *n* **69**

11. Reference books

1. Austine, G. 1975, (2-nd edition) How to do Things with Words.
2. Blokh M.Y. 2000, A Course in Theoretical English Grammar, p.p. 245-246, Москва, Высшая школа.
3. Brown P. and Levinson S. 1987, Politeness. Some Universals of Language Usage Cambridge University Press.
4. Burton-Robert, N. 1989, The Limits to Debate. A Revised Thing of Semantic Presupposition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5. Crystal D. 1990, (2-nd edition) Linguistics, England: Penguin Books.
6. Davis S. (ed.) 1991, Pragmatics, A Reader, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. Grundy P. 1999, (fifth edition) Doing Pragmatics. Great Britain.
8. Leech G. 1983, Principles of Pragmatics. Longman.
9. Levinson S. 1983, Pragmatics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. Lyons G. 1991, Natural Language and Universal Grammar, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11. Новое в зарубежной лингвистике, T.XVI, M. 1985.
12. Palmer F.R. 1981 (2-nd edition) Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
13. Практика и проблемы интенсиональности (отв. ред. Арутюнова). M: Наука, 1988.
14. Searle G. 1969, Speech Acts, An Essay of the Philosophy of Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15. Searle G. 1979, Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
16. Van der Sandt. Rot 1988, Context and Presupposition, Croom Helm.
17. Yule G. Pragamtics 2000 Oxford: Oxford University Press.

PART II
READINGS

I. Phrase

Text 1 B.Ilyish: The Structure of Modern English. L., 1971, p. 171-181.

In giving a general preview of our subject on p. 12 we pointed out that within the domain of syntax two levels should be distinguished: that of phrases and that of sentences. In giving characteristics of a part of speech we consistently kept apart the two layers in so far as they concern the syntactical functions of parts of speech - their ability to combine with other words into phrases, on the one hand, and their function in the sentence, on the other.

In starting now to analyse problems of syntax itself, we must first of all try to elucidate as far as possible the sphere belonging to each of the two levels. After that we will proceed to a systematic review of each level.

We will term "phrase" every combination of two or more words which is a grammatical unit but is not an analytical form of some word (as, for instance, the perfect forms of verbs). The constituent elements of a phrase may belong to any part of speech. For instance, they may both be nouns, or one of them may be an adjective and the other a noun, or again one of them may be a verb and the other a noun, or one may be a preposition and the other a noun; or there may be three of them, one being a preposition, the other a noun, and the third a preposition, etc.

We thus adopt the widest possible definition of a phrase and we do not limit this notion by stipulating that a phrase must contain at least two notional words, as is done in a number of linguistic treatises.[1] The inconvenience of restricting the notion of phrase to those groups which contain at least two notional words is that, for example, the group "preposition + noun" remains outside the classification and is therefore neglected in grammatical theory.

The difference between a phrase and a sentence is a fundamental one. A phrase is a means of naming some phenomena or processes, just as a word is. Each component of a phrase can undergo grammatical changes in accordance with grammatical categories represented in it, without destroying the identity of the phrase. For instance, in the phrase *write letters* the first component can change according to the verbal categories of tense, mood, etc., and the second component according to the category of number. Thus, *writes a letter, has written a letter, would have written letters,* etc., are grammatical modifications of one phrase.

With a sentence, things are entirely different. A sentence is a unit with every word having its definite form. A change in the form of one or more words would produce a new sentence.

---

[1] See, for instance, *Грамматика русского языка,* Т. III, 1954, Ч. 1, С. 10.

It must also be borne in mind that a phrase as such has no intonation, just as a word has none. Intonation is one of the most important features of a sentence, which distinguish it from a phrase.

Last not least, it is necessary to dwell on one of the most difficult questions involved in the study of phrases: the grammatical aspect of that study as distinct from the lexicological.

The difference should be basically this: grammar has to study the aspects of phrases which spring from the grammatical peculiarities of the words making up the phrase, and of the syntactical functions of the phrase as a whole, while lexicology has to deal with the lexical meaning of the words and their semantic groupings.

Thus, for instance, from the grammatical point of view the two phrases *read letters* and *invite friends* are identical, since they are built on the same pattern "verb + noun indicating the object of the action". From the lexicological point of view, on the other hand, they are essentially different, as the verbs belong to totally different semantic spheres, and the nouns too; one of them denotes a material object, while the other denotes a human being. Thus, the basic difference between the grammatical and the lexicological approach to phrases appears to be clear. However, it is not always easy to draw this demarcation line while doing concrete research in this sphere.

It is to the phrase level that the syntactical notions of agreement (or concord) and government apply.

In studying phrases from a grammatical viewpoint we will divide them according to their function in the sentence into (1) those which perform the function of one or more parts of the sentence, for example, predicate, or predicate and object, or predicate and adverbial modifier, etc., and (2) those which do not perform any such function but whose function is equivalent to that of a preposition, or conjunction, and which are, in fact to all intents and purposes equivalents of those parts of speech. The former of these two classes comprises the overwhelming majority of English phrases, but the latter is no less important from a general point of view.

TYPES OF PHRASES

The type "noun + noun" is a most usual type of phrase in Modern English. It must be divided into two subtypes, depending on the form of the first component, which may be in the common or in the genitive case.[2]

The type "noun in the common case + noun" may be used to denote one idea as modified by another, in the widest sense. We find here a most varied choice of semantic spheres, such as *speech sound, silver watch, army unit,* which of course deserve detailed study from the lexicological viewpoint. We

---

[2] We will use these terms here in the traditional way. On the problems concerning them, see above p. 41 ff.

may only note that the first component may be a proper name as well, as in the phrases *a Beethoven symphony* or *London Bridge*.

The type "noun in the genitive case + noun" has a more restricted meaning and use, which we need not go into here, as we have discussed the meaning of the form in – '*s* at some length in Chapter III.

Another very common type is "adjective + noun", which is used to express all possible kinds of things with their properties.

The type "verb + noun" may correspond to two different types of relation between an action and a thing. In the vast majority of cases the noun denotes an object of the action expressed by the verb, but in a certain number of phrases it denotes a measure, rather than the object, of the action. This may be seen in such phrases as, *walk a mile, sleep an hour, wait a minute,* etc. It is only the meaning of the verb and that of the noun which enable the hearer or reader to understand the relation correctly. The meaning of the verb divides, for instance, the phrase *wait on hour* from the phrase *appoint an hour*, and shows the relations in the two phrases to be basically different.

In a similar way other types of phrases should be set down and analysed. Among them will be the types, "verb + adverb", "adverb + adjective", "adverb + adverb", "noun + preposition + noun", "adjective + preposition + noun", "verb + preposition + noun", etc.

An important question arises concerning the pattern "noun + verb". In our linguistic theory different opinions have been put forward on this issue. One view is that the phrase type "noun + verb" (which is sometimes called "predicative phrase") exists and ought to be studied just like any other phrase type such as we have enumerated above.[3] The other view is that no such type as "noun + verb" exists, as the combination "noun + verb" constitutes a sentence rather than a phrase.[4] This objection, however, is not convincing. If we take the combination "noun + verb" as a sentence, which is sometimes possible, we are analysing it on a different level, namely, on sentence level, and what we can discover on sentence level cannot affect analysis on phrase level, or indeed take its place. Besides, there is another point to be noted here. If we take, for instance, the group *a man writes* on the phrase level, this means that each of the components can be changed in accordance with its paradigm in any way so long as the connection with the other component does not prevent this. In the given case, the first component, *man,* can be changed according to number, that is, it can appear in the plural form, and the second component, *writes,* can be changed according to the verbal categories of aspect, tense, correlation, and mood (change of person is impossible due to the first component, change of number is predetermined by the number of the first component, and change of voice is

---

[3] See, for instance, В.П.Сухотин, *Проблема словосочетания в современном русском языке*. Вопросы синтаксиса современного русского языка, С. 127-182.

[4] See В.В.Виноградов, *Понятие синтагмы в синтаксисе русского языка.* Вопросы синтаксиса современного русского языка, С. 183-256.

made impossible by its meaning). Thus, the groups, *a man writes, men write, a man wrote, men are writing, men have written, a man would have been writing,* etc., are all variants of the same phrase, just as *man* and *men* are forms of the same noun, while *writes, wrote, has written,* etc. are forms of the same verb. It is also important to note that a phrase as such has no intonation of its own, no more than a word as such has one. On the sentence level things are different. *A man writes,* even if we could take it as a sentence at all, which is not certain, is not the same sentence as *Men have been writing,* but a different sentence.

This example is sufficient to show the difference between a phrase of the pattern "noun + verb" and a sentence. The existence of phrases of this type is therefore certain. The phrase pattern "noun + verb" has very ample possibilities of expressing actions as performed by any kind of subject, whether living, material, or abstract.

Besides phrase patterns consisting of two notional words with or without a preposition between them, there are also phrases consisting of a preposition and another word, mainly a noun. Thus, such groups as *in the street, at the station, at noon, after midnight, in time, by heart,* etc. are prepositional phrases performing some function or other in a sentence. Some of these phrases are phraseological units (e.g. *in time, by heart*), but this is a lexicological observation which is irrelevant from the grammatical viewpoint.

Phrases consisting of two components may be enlarged by addition of a third component, and so forth, for instance the phrase pattern "adjective + noun" (*high houses*) may be enlarged by the addition of an adjective in front, so that the type, "adjective + adjective + noun" arises (*new high houses*). This, in its turn, may be further enlarged by more additions. The limit of the possible growth of a phrase is hard to define, and we will not inquire into this subject any further.

AGREEMENT

By agreement we mean a method of expressing a syntactical relationship, which consists in making the subordinate word take a form similar to that of the word to which it is subordinate. In Modern English this can refer only to the category of number: a subordinate word agrees in number with its head word if it has different number forms at all.[5] This is practically found in two words only, the pronouns *this* and *that*, which agree in number with their head word. Since no other word, to whatever part of speech it may belong, agrees in number with its head word, these two pronouns stand quite apart in the Modern English syntactical system.

As to the problem of agreement of the verb with the noun or pronoun denoting the subject of the action (*a child plays, children play*), this is a controversial problem. Usually it is treated as agreement of the predicate with

---

[5] In some other languages, such as Russian, there is also agreement in case and gender.

the subject, that is, as a phenomenon of sentence structure. However, if we assume (as we have done) that agreement and government belong to the phrase level, rather than to the sentence level, and that phrases of the pattern "noun + verb" do exist, we have to treat this problem in this chapter devoted to phrases.

The controversy is this. Does the verb stand, say, in the plural number because the noun denoting the subject of the action is plural, so that the verb is in the full sense of the word subordinate to the noun? Or does the verb, in its own right, express by its category of number the singularity or plurality of the doer (or doers) ?[6]

There are some phenomena in Modern English which would seem to show that the verb does not always follow the noun in the category of number. Such examples as, *My family are early risers*, on the one hand, and *The United Nations is an international organization*, on the other, prove that the verb can be independent of the noun in this respect: though the noun is in the singular, the verb may be in the plural, if the doer is understood to be plural; though the noun is plural, the verb may be singular if the doer is understood to be singular. Examples of such usage are arguments in favour of the view that there is no agreement in number of the verb with the noun expressing the doer of the action.

The fact that sentences like *My family is small*, and *My family are early risers* exist side by side proves that there is no agreement of the verb with the noun in either case: the verb shows whether the subject of the action is to be thought of as singular or plural, no matter what the category of number in the noun may be.

Thus, the sphere of agreement in Modern English is extremely small: it is restricted to two pronouns - *this* and *that*, which agree with their head word in number when they are used in front of it as the first components of a phrase of which the noun is the centre.

GOVERNMENT

By government we understand the use of a certain form of the subordinate word required by its head word, but not coinciding with the form of the head word itself - that is the difference between agreement and government.

The role of government in Modern English is almost as insignificant as that of agreement. We do not find in English any verbs, or nouns, or adjectives, requiring the subordinate noun to be in one case rather than in another. Nor do we find prepositions requiring anything of the kind.

The only thing that may be termed government in Modern English is the use of the objective case of personal pronouns and of the pronoun *who* when

---

[6] This question was raised with reference to Indo-European languages in general by A. Meillet in his book *Introduction à l'étude comparative des langues indoeuropéennes,* 6ᵉᵐᵉ ed., 1924, p. 323, and with reference to the Russian language by A.Peshkovsky (see Пешковский А. М., *Русский синтаксис в научном освещении*, изд. 7-е, 1956, С. 183 сл.).

they are subordinate to a verb or follow a preposition. Thus, for instance, the forms *me, him, her, us, them*, are required if the pronoun follows a verb (e. g. *find or invite*) or any preposition whatever. Even this type of government is, however, made somewhat doubtful by the rising tendency, mentioned above (p. 66 ff.), to use the forms *me, him*, etc., outside their original sphere as forms of the objective case. The notion of government has also become doubtful as applied to the form *whom*, which is rather often superseded by the form *who* in such sentences as, *Who(m) did you see?* (compare p. 69).

As to nouns, the notion of government may be said to have become quite uncertain in present-day English. Even if we stick to the view that *father* and *father's* are forms of the common and the genitive case, respectively, we could not assert that a preposition always requires the form of the common case. For instance, the preposition *at* can be combined with both case forms: compare *I looked at my father* and *I spent the summer at my father's*, or, with the preposition to: *I wrote to the chemist*, and *I went to the chemist's*, etc. It seems to follow that the notion of government does not apply to forms of nouns.

OTHER WAYS

In Russian linguistic theory, there is a third way of expressing syntactical relations between components of a phrase, which is termed примыкание. No exact definition of this notion is given: its characteristic feature is usually described in a negative way, as absence both of agreement and of government. The most usual example of this type of connection is the relation between an adverb and its head word, whether this is an adjective, or a verb (or another adverb, for that matter). An adverb is subordinate to its head word, without either agreeing with or being governed by it. This negative characteristic cannot, however, be said to be sufficient as a definition of a concrete syntactical means of expression. It is evident that the subject requires some more exact investigation. For instance, if we take such a simple case as the sentence, ... *lashes of rain striped the great windows almost horizontally* (R. WEST) and inquire what it is that shows the adverb *horizontally* to be subordinate to the verb *striped*, we shall have to conclude that this is achieved by a certain combination of factors, some of which are grammatical, while others are not. The grammatical factor is the fact that an adverb can be subordinate to a verb. That, however, is not sufficient in a number of cases. There may be several verbs in the sentence, and the question has to be answered, how does the reader (or hearer) know to which of them the adverb is actually subordinated. Here a lexicological factor intervenes: the adverb must be semantically compatible with its head word. Examples may be found where the connection between an adverb and its head word is preserved even at a considerable distance, owing to the grammatical and semantic compatibility of the adverb. Compare, for instance, the following sentences: *Nobly, nobly Cape Saint Vincent to the North-West died*

away. (BROWNING) *Swiftly he thought of the different things she had told him.* (DREISER)

An adverb can only be connected with its head word in this manner, since it has no grammatical categories which would allow it to agree with another word or to be governed by it. With other parts of speech things stand differently in different languages. In inflected languages an adjective will agree with its head word, and even in French and Italian, though they are analytical languages, adjectives agree with their head words both in number and gender. In Modern English no agreement is possible. The same can be said about many other types of phrases.

However, there is another means of expressing syntactical connection which plays a significant part in Modern English. It may be called "enclosure" (Russian замыкание) and its essence is this. Some element of a phrase is, as it were, enclosed between two parts of another element. The most widely known case of "enclosure" is the putting of a word between an article and the noun to which the article belongs. Any word or phrase thus enclosed is shown to be an attribute to the noun. As is well known, many other words than adjectives and nouns can be found in that position, and many phrases, too. It seems unnecessary to give examples of adjectives and nouns in that position, as they are familiar to everybody. However, examples of other parts of speech, and also of phrases enclosed will not be out of place here. *The then government* - here the adverb *then*, being enclosed between the article and the noun it belongs to, is in this way shown to be an attribute to the noun.[7] In the phrase *an on-the-spot investigation* the phrase *on-the-spot* is enclosed between the article and the noun to which the article belongs, and this characterizes the syntactic connections of the phrase.

The unity of a phrase is quite clear if the phrase as a whole is modified by an adverb. It is a rather common phenomenon for an adverb to modify a phrase, usually one consisting of a preposition and a noun (with possible words serving as attributes to the noun). Here, first, is an example where the phrase so modified is a phraseological unit: ... *that little thimbleful of brandy ... went sorely against the grain with her.* (TROLLOPE) The adverb *sorely* cannot possibly be said to modify the preposition *against* alone. So it is bound to belong to the phrase *against the grain* as a whole.

An adverb modifying a prepositional phrase is also found in the following example: *The funeral was well under way.* (HUXLEY) The adverb *well* can only modify the phrase *under way*, as a phrase *well under* is unthinkable. This is possible because the phrase *under way*, which is a phraseological unit, has much the same meaning as *going on, developing*, etc.

A phrase may also be modified by a pronoun (it should be noted, though, that in our example the whole phrase, including the pronoun, is a phraseological unit): *Every now and again she would stop and move her mouth as though to*

---

[7] Another view is that *then* is an adjective here.

speak, but nothing was said. (A. WILSON) It is clear that a phrase *every now* would not be possible. A similar case is the following: *Every three or four months Mr Bodiham preached a sermon on the subject.* (HUXLEY) It is quite evident that the whole phrase, *three or four months* is here modified by the pronoun *every*. This may be to some extent connected with the tendency to take phrases consisting of a numeral and a noun in the plural indicating some measure of time or space as denoting a higher unit (compare p. 38).

The phrase "noun + *after* + the same noun" may be a syntactic unit introduced as a whole by a preposition, thus: *She spent the Christmas holidays with her parents in the northern part of the State, where her father owned a drug-store, even though in letter after letter Eve Grayson had urged and begged her to come to New Orleans for the holidays, promising that she would meet many interesting men while she was there.* (E. CALDWELL) That the preposition *in* introduces the whole phrase *letter after letter* is evident from the fact that it would not be possible to use the noun *letter* (alone) after the preposition without either an article or some other determinative, such as, for example, *her*.

In the following example the preposition *with* introduces, not a noun, but a phrase consisting of a noun, a preposition (*upon*) and the same noun repeated. *Brown varnished bookshelves lined the walls, filled with row upon row of those thick, heavy theological works which the second-hand booksellers generally sell by weight.* (HUXLEY) That the preposition *with* introduces the phrase *row upon row* rather than the noun *row* alone, is evident from the fact that it would not be possible to say *... filled with row of those ... works ...* The noun *row* could not be used without the article, to say nothing of the fact that one row of books was not enough to fill the walls of a room.

Sometimes a phrase of the pattern "adverb + preposition + noun" may be introduced by another preposition. Compare this sentence from Prof. D. Jones's Preface to his "English Pronouncing Dictionary": *For help in the preparation of this new edition I am particularly indebted to Mr P. A. D. MacCarthy, who supplied me with upwards of 500 notes and suggestions.* The phrase *upwards of 500 notes and suggestions* means the same as *more than 500 notes and suggestions,* and this may explain its use after the preposition *with*. But the fact remains that a preposition (*with*) is immediately followed by a prepositional phrase (*upwards of*).

PHRASES EQUIVALENT TO PREPOSITIONS AND CONJUNCTIONS

Under this heading we will treat such formations as *apart from, with reference to, as soon as, so long as,* etc., which quite obviously are phrases rather than words, and which quite definitely perform the same function in a sentence as prepositions and conjunctions respectively.

The treatment of these units in grammatical theory has been vague and often contradictory. Most usually they are treated as prepositions or conjunctions of a special type, variously described as compound, analytical, etc. This view ignores the basic difference between a word and a phrase and is therefore unacceptable. We will stick to the principle that a phrase (as different from a word) cannot be a part of speech and that phrases should be studied in Syntax.

An obstacle to this treatment was the view that a phrase must include at least two notional words (see above, p. 170). As we have rejected this limitation, we can include under phrases any groups, whether consisting of a form word and a notional word, or of two form words, etc.

Among phrases equivalent to prepositions we note the pattern "adverb + preposition", represented, for instance, by *out of, apart from, down to,* as in the sentences*, "I love you so," she answered, "but apart from that, you were right."* (R. WEST) *As the cool of the evening now came on, Lester proposed to Aram to enjoy it without, previous to returning to the parlour.* (LYTTON) *All within was the same, down to the sea-weed in the blue mug in my bedroom.* (DICKENS) The phrases equivalent to prepositions (we may accept the term "prepositional phrases") perform the very functions that are typical of prepositions, and some of them have synonyms among prepositions. Thus, the phrase *apart from* is a synonym of the preposition *besides,* the phrase *previous to* a synonym of the preposition *before*, etc.

Another pattern of prepositional phrases is "preposition + noun + preposition", e. g. *in front of, on behalf of, with reference to, in accordance with*, as in the sentences, *His friend was seated in front of the fire.* (BLACK) *Caesar crossed in spite of this.* (JEROME K. JEROME) It must be admitted that there may be doubts whether a group of this type has or has not become a prepositional phrase. Special methods can then be used to find this out. For instance, it may prove important whether the noun within such a phrase can or cannot be modified by an adjective, whether it can or cannot be changed into the plural, and so forth. Opinions may differ on whether a given phrase should or should not be included in this group. On the whole, however, the existence of such prepositional phrases is beyond doubt.

Other types of phrases ought to be carefully studied in a similar way, for example the phrase *of course*, which is the equivalent of a modal word, etc.

The number or phrases equivalent to conjunctions is rather considerable. Some of the more specialized time relations are expressed by phrases e.g. *as soon as, as long as*. Phrases with other meanings also belong here, e. g. *in order that, notwithstanding that*. These phrases may be conveniently termed "conjunctional phrases", though this term is not so usual as the term "prepositional phrases".

There are several patterns of conjunctional phrases. One of them is "adverb + adverb + conjunction" (*as soon as, as long as, so long as*). The first

component of the two former phrases is probably an adverb, though it might also be argued that it is a conjunction. We may say that the distinction between the two is here neutralized.

There is also the pattern "preposition + noun + conjunction", as in the phrase *in order that*, which is used to introduce adverbial clauses of purpose, or in the phrase *for fear that*, which tends to become a kind of conjunctional phrase introducing a special kind of clause of cause: *For fear that his voice might betray more of his feelings, which would embarrass the old lady so involved still with her voyage and getting away to where it would be quiet again, so without such sudden, sick floods of sentiment herself, he simply repeated again how good, good it was to see her...* (BUECHNER)[8]

It would appear that the treatment of such phrases attempted here does better justice both to their structure and function than a treatment which includes them under prepositions and conjunctions proper and thus obliterates the essential difference between words (parts of speech) and phrases (groups of words).

In passing now from a study of phrases to that of the sentence we are, it should be remembered, proceeding to a different level of language structure. Notions referring to the phrase level should be carefully kept apart from those referring to the sentence and its members. An indiscriminate use of terms belonging to the two levels (as, for instance, in the familiar expression "subject, verb and object") leads to a hopeless muddle and makes all serious syntactic investigation impossible. It must, however, be pointed out that in some cases distinction between the two levels proves to be a very difficult task indeed.[9] We will try in such cases to point out whatever can be urged in favour of each of the diverging views and to suggest a solution of the problem.

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

1. What is termed "phrase"?
2. Define the difference between a phrase and a sentence.
3. Enumerate and characterize types of phrases.
4. Comment on the phrase pattern "noun + verb".
5. Discuss syntactical relations between phrase components.
6. Comment on phrases equivalent to prepositions and conjunctions.
7. What problematic points are touched upon in this chapter?

---

[8] From the lexicological viewpoint some of these phrases functioning as equivalents of prepositions and conjunctions must certainly be described as phraseological units. This, however, is irrelevant for their grammatical characteristic.

[9] We shall see this when we come to the problem of the attribute (p.222 ff).

Text 2 M.Y.Blokh: A Course in Theoretical English Grammar. M., 2000, p. 222-229.

Chapter XX
SYNTAGMATIC CONNECTIONS OF WORDS

§ 1. Performing their semantic functions, words in an utterance form various syntagmatic connections with one another.

One should distinguish between syntagmatic groupings of notional words alone, syntagmatic groupings of notional words with functional words, and syntagmatic groupings of functional words alone.

Different combinations of notional words (notional phrases) have a clearly pronounced self-dependent nominative destination, they denote complex phenomena and their properties in their inter-connections, including dynamic inter-connections (semi-predicative combinations). *Cf.*: a sudden trembling; a soul in pain; hurrying along the stream; to lead to a cross-road; strangely familiar; so sure of their aims.

Combinations of a notional word with a functional word are equivalent to separate words by their nominative function. Since a functional word expresses some abstract relation, such combinations, as a rule, are quite obviously non-self-dependent; they are, as it were, stamped as artificially isolated from the context. *Cf.:* in a low voice; with difficulty; must finish; but a moment; and Jimmy; too cold; so unexpectedly.

We call these combinations "formative" ones. Their contextual dependence ("synsemantism") is quite natural; functionally they may be compared to separate notional words used in various marked grammatical forms (such as, for instance, indirect cases of nouns). *Cf.*: *Eng*. Mr. Snow's - of Mr. Snow; him - to him; *Russ*. Иванов – к Иванову; лесом – через лес.

Expanding the cited formative phrases with the corresponding notional words one can obtain notional phrases of contextually self-dependent value ("autosemantic" at their level of functioning). *Cf.*: *Eng*. Mr. Snow's considerations - the considerations of Mr. Snow; gave it him - gave it to him; *Russ*. Позвонили Иванову – позвонили к Иванову; шли лесом – шли через лес.

In this connection we should remember that among the notional word-classes only the noun has a full nominative force, for it directly names a substance. Similarly, we may assert that among various phrase-types it is the noun-phrase that has a full phrasal nominative force (see further).

As for syntagmatic groupings of functional words, they are essentially analogous to separate functional words and are used as connectors and specifiers of notional elements of various status. *Cf.*: out of; up to; so that; such as; must be able; don't let's.

Functional phrases of such and like character constitute limited groups supplementing the corresponding subsets of regular one-item functional words, as different from notional phrases which, as free combinations, form essentially open subsets of various semantic destinations.

§ 2. Groupings of notional words fall into two mutually opposite types by their grammatical and semantic properties.

Groupings of the first type are constituted by words related to one another on an equal rank, so that, for a case of a two-word combination, neither of them serves as a modifier of the other. Depending on this feature, these combinations can be called "equipotent".

Groupings of the second type are formed by words which are syntactically unequal in the sense that, for a case of a two-word combination, one of them plays the role of a modifier of the other. Due to this feature, combinations of the latter type can be called "dominational".

§ 3. Equipotent connection in groupings of notional words is realised either with the help of conjunctions (syndetically), or without the help of conjunctions (asyndetically). *Cf*.: prose and poetry; came and went; on the beach or in the water; quick but not careless; no sun, no moon; playing, chatting, laughing; silent, immovable, gloomy; Mary's, not John's.

In the cited examples, the constituents of the combinations form logically consecutive connections that are classed as coordinative. Alongside these, there exist equipotent connections of a nonconsecutive type, by which a sequential element, although equal to the foregoing element by its formal introduction (coordinative conjunction), is unequal to it as to the character of nomination. The latter type of equipotent connections is classed as "cumulative".

The term "cumulation" is commonly used to mean connections between separate sentences. By way of restrictive indications, we may speak about "inner cumulation", i.e. cumulation within the sentence, and, respectively, "outer cumulation".

Cumulative connection in writing is usually signalled by some intermediary punctuation stop, such as a comma or a hyphen. *Cf*.: *Eng.* Agreed, but reluctantly, quick - and careless; satisfied, or nearly so. *Russ.* сыт, но не очень; согласен, или почти согласен; дал – дал неохотно.

Syndetic connection in a word-combination can alternate with asydetic connection, as a result of which the whole combination can undergo a semantically motivated subgrouping. *Cf*.:

He is a little man *with irregular features, soft dark eyes and a soft voice, very shy, with a gift of mimicry and a love of music* (S.Maugham).

In enumerative combinations the last element, in distinction to the foregoing elements, can be introduced by a conjunction, ;which underlines the close of the syntagmatic series. *Cf*.:

All about them happy persons were enjoying the good things of life, talking, laughing, *and* making merry. (S. Maugham).

The same is true about combinations formed by repetition. *E.g.*:

There were rows of books, books *and* books everywhere.

§ 4. Dominational connection, as different from equipotent connection, is effected in such a way that one of the constituents of the combination is principal (dominating) and the other is subordinate (dominated). The principal element is commonly called the "kernel", "kernel element", or "head-word"; the subordinate element, respectively, the "adjunct", "adjunct-word", "expansion".

Dominational connection is achieved by different forms of the word (categorial agreement, government), connective words (prepositions, i.e. prepositional government), word-order.

Dominational connection, like equipotent connection, can be both consecutive and cumulative. *Cf.*: a careful observer - - an observer, seemingly careful; definitely out of the point - - out of the point, definitely; will be helpful in any case - - will be helpful, at least in some cases.

The two basic types of dominational connection are bilateral (reciprocal, two-way) domination and monolateral (one-way) domination. Bilateral domination is realized in predicative connection of words, while monolateral domination is realized in completive connection of words.

§ 5. The predicative connection of words, uniting the subject and the predicate, builds up the basis of the sentence. The reciprocal nature of this connection consists in the fact that the subject dominates the predicate determining the person of predication, while the predicate dominates the subject, determining the event of predication, i.e. ascribing to the predicative person some action, or state, or quality. This difference in meaning between the elements of predication, underlying the mutually opposite directions of domination, explains the seeming paradox of the notion of reciprocal domination, exposing its dialectic essence. Both directions of domination in a predicative group can be demonstrated by a formal test.

The domination of the subject over the predicate is exposed by the reflective character of the verbal category of person and also the verbal category of number which is closely connected with the former.

The English grammatical forms of explicit subject-verb agreement (concord) are very scarce (the inflexion marking the third person singular present, and some special forms of the verb *be*). Still, these scarce forms are dynamically correlated with the other, grammatically non-agreed forms. *Cf.*: he went – he goes - - I went - I go.

But apart from the grammatical forms of agreement, the predicative person is directly reflected upon the verb-predicate as such; the very semantics of the person determines the subject reference of the predicative event (action,

state, quality). Thus, the subject unconditionally dominates over the predicate by its specific substantive categories in both agreed, and non-agreed forms of predicative connection.

As for the predicate dominating the subject in its own sphere of grammatical functions, this fact is clearly demonstrated by the correlation of the sentence and the corresponding noun-phrase. Namely, the transformation of the sentence into the noun-phrase places the predicate in the position of the head-word, and the subject, in the position of the adjunct. *Cf.*:

The train arrived. → The arrival of the train.

Alongside fully predicative groupings of the subject and the finite verb-predicate, there exist in language partially predicative groupings formed by a combination of a non-finite verbal form (verbid) with a substantive element. Such are infinitival, gerundial, and participial constructions.

The predicative person is expressed in the infinitival construction by the prepositional *for*-phrase, in the gerundial construction by the possessive or objective form of the substantive, in the participial construction by the nominative (common) form of the substantive. *Cf.*:

The pupil understands his mistake → *for the pupil* to understand his mistake → *the pupil('s)* understanding his mistake → *the pupil* understanding his mistake.

In the cited semi-predicative (or potentially-predicative) combinations the "event"-expressing element is devoid of the formal agreement with the "person"-expressing element, but the two directions of domination remain valid by virtue of the very predicative nature of the syntactic connection in question (although presented in an incomplete form).

Thus, among the syntagmatic connections of the reciprocal domination the two basic subtypes are distinguished: first, complete predicative connection, second, incomplete predicative connections (semi-predicative, potentially-predicative connections).

§ **6.** The completive, one-way connection of words (monolateral domination) is considered as subordinative on the ground that the outer syntactic status of the whole combination is determined by the kernel element (head-word). *Cf.*:

She would be reduced to a nervous wreck. → She would be reduced to a wreck. → She would be reduced. That woman was astonishingly beautiful. → That woman was beautiful.

In the cited examples the head-word can simply be isolated through the deletion of the adjunct, the remaining construction being structurally complete,

though schematic. In other cases, the headword cannot be directly isolated, and its representative nature is to be exposed, for instance, by diagnostic questions. *Cf.*:

Larry greeted the girl heartily. → Whom did Larry greet? → How did Larry greet the girl?

The questions help demonstrate that the verb is presupposed as the kernel in its lines of connections, i.e. objective and adverbial ones.

All the completive connections fall into two main divisions: objective connections and qualifying connections.

Objective connections reflect the relation of the object to the process and are characterized as, on the whole, very close. By their form these connections are subdivided into non-prepositional (word- order, the objective form of the adjunct substantive) and prepositional, while from the semantico-syntactic point of view they are classed as direct (the immediate transition of the action to the object) and indirect or oblique (the indirect relation of the object to the process). Direct objective connections are non-prepositional, the preposition serving as an intermediary of combining words by its functional nature. Indirect objective connections may be both prepositional and non-prepositional. Since, on the other hand, some prepositional objective-connections, in spite of their being indirect, still come very near to direct ones in terms of closeness of the process substance relation expressed, all the objective connections may be divided into "narrow" and "broader". Semantically, narrow prepositional objective connections are then to be classed together with direct objective connections, the two types forming the corresponding subclasses of non-prepositional (direct) and prepositional (indirect) narrow objective connections of words. *Cf.*:

He remembered *the man*. I won't stand *any more nonsense*. I sympathized *with the child*. They were working *on the problem*.

Cf. examples of broader indirect objective connections, both non-prepositional and prepositional:

Will you show *me* the picture? *Who(m)* did he buy it *for*? Tom peeped *into the hall.*

Further subdivision of objective connections is realized on the basis of subcategorizing the elements of objective combinations, and first of all the verbs; thus, we recognize objects of immediate action, of perception, of speaking, etc.

Objective connection may also combine an adjunct substance word with a kernel word of non-verbal semantics (such as a state or a property word), but the meaning of some processual relation is still implied in the deep semantic base of such combinations all the same. *Cf.: aware* of John's presence → *am aware; crazy* about her → *got crazy* about her; *full* of spite → *is full* of spite; etc.

Qualifying completive connections are divided into attributive and adverbial. Both are expressed in English by word-order and prepositions.

Attributive connection unites a substance with its attribute expressed by an adjective or a noun. *E.g.*: an *enormous* appetite; an *emerald* ring; a woman *of strong character*, the case *for the prosecution*; etc.

Adverbial connection is subdivided into primary and secondary.

The primary adverbial connection is established between the verb and its adverbial modifiers of various standings. *E.g.*; to talk *glibly*, to come *nowhere*; to receive (a letter) *with surprise*; to throw (one's arms) *round a person's neck;* etc.

The secondary adverbial connection is established between the non-verbal kernel expressing a quality and its adverbial modifiers of various standings. *E.g.*: *marvellously* becoming; *very much* at ease; *strikingly* alike; *no longer* oppressive; *unpleasantly* querulous; etc.

§ 7. Different completive noun combinations are distinguished by a feature that makes them into quite special units on the phrasemic level of language. Namely, in distinction to all the other combinations of words they are directly related to whole sentences, i.e. predicative combinations of words. This fact was illustrated above when we described the verbal domination over the subject in a predicative grouping of words (see § 5). Compare some more examples given in the reverse order:

The arrival of the train → The train arrived. The baked potatoes → The potatoes are baked. The gifted pupil → The pupil has a gift.

Completive combinations of adjectives and adverbs (adjective-phrases and adverb-phrases), as different from noun combinations (noun-phrases), are related to predicative constructions but indirectly, through the intermediary stage of the corresponding noun-phrase. *Cf.*: utterly neglected - utter neglect - The neglect is utter, very carefully - great carefulness - The carefulness is great; speechlessly reproachful - speechless reproach - The reproach is speechless.

These distinctions of completive word combinations are very important to understand for analysing paradigmatic relations in syntax (see further).

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

1. What types of syntagmatic connection of words are distinguished by M.Y.Blokh?
2. What is the opinion of M.Y.Blokh on the predicative connection of words?
3. What is meant by completive connections and their two main divisions?
4. Express your opinion on the theory of phrases suggested by M.Y.Blokh.

Text 3 F.Palmer: Grammar. Lnd., 1971, p. 76-78.

The sentence consists of words, but the words are grouped into elements that are smaller than the sentence. For these most linguists use the term 'phrase'. Sentences are thus analysable into phrases. The most important phrases of the sentences are the verb phrases and the noun phrases (symbolized as VP and NP respectively), e.g.

John likes Mary (NP VP NP).

A phrase in this sense can be a single word, but the phrases are often much longer than single words:

The little boy has been reading a fairy story (NP VP NP).

In addition there are elements within the sentence such as *this morning* or *in the garden* which are sometimes called 'adjuncts', but are better called 'adverbial' phrases.

The structure of the noun phrase and the verb phrase will vary from language to language. If we consider the 'simple' phrases (for complex phrases, see below, p. 133) of English, we find that a noun phrase consists either of a pronoun alone (or, rarely, with an adjective, e.g. *Poor you!*), or of a noun preceded by various words some of which are adjectives and others determinatives (*the, this, my*, etc.), and sometimes followed by a word such as *abroad* or *asleep (people abroad, children asleep).* In fact the modifiers of the noun phrase, all the words that is to say except the noun itself, are of numerous and varied types. In particular they have their own place in the sequence. Not only can we not place *asleep* before the noun *asleep children*, but we have to put the adjectives in the right order - *little red hen*, not *red* little hen - putting also any other elements before or after the adjectives and in their right order. This is clearly shown by the following sequences which permit little or no variation:

All the twenty-five little English children.

Both her worn-out red cotton dresses.

The study of the noun phrase itself is worthy of a complete book.

So too is the verb phrase. Its structure is a little less complex in some ways, somewhat more complex in others. The maximum length of a verb phrase seems to be five words, e.g.:

He may have been being beaten,

though it may be doubted whether all five often occur together. There are certainly five elements that occur in sequence:

(1) a 'modal' - WILL, SHALL, CAN, MAY, MUST, OUGHT TO, followed by the simple form of a verb.

(2) HAVE followed by the past participle (the perfect).

(3) BE followed by the *-ing* form of the verb (the 'progressive' or 'continuous').

(4) BE followed by the past participle (the passive).

(5) the main verb.

We can choose any combination of these, provided that, as with the noun phrase, there is a 'head' - the main verb.

It is at this level (or 'rank' - the technical term sometimes used to distinguish a sentence, phrase, word), the level of phrase, that we can talk about 'subjects' and 'objects'. Traditional grammar talks about nouns or noun phrases being subjects or objects of verbs, e.g. in *John loves Mary, John* is the subject and *Mary* the object of *loves*. In English we can, in fact, define 'subject' and 'object' in terms of the position of the noun phrase in the sentence and also in terms of 'agreement' of the subject with the verb (see p. 98). But notice that we should not now talk about 'verb' in this context. It is an error to analyse *John loves Mary* into subject-verb-object. This confuses two kinds of classification. 'Subject' and 'object' refer to sentence elements while 'verb' is the name of a word class like 'noun'. So we must either say that this sentence consists of noun-verb-noun, or more strictly of NP - P - NP or else we must find a new name for the sentence element denoted by the verb. One suggested is 'predicator'. We can, therefore, consider that the sentence elements are subject-predicator-object.

We can and must define subjects and objects in terms of their functions within the sentence. We have already seen (p. 71) that it is impossible to define subject and predicate logically. It would be even more difficult to define object as well in this way. Nor can we define the subject as the 'actor', the person who performs the action, and the object the 'goal' or 'recipient', the person or thing that is affected by it. This would not allow us to identify the subject as *John* in any of the following sentences, for in none of them is *John* 'acting' in any intelligible sense:

John suffered terribly.
John looked sad.
John saw his brother.
John sank under the waves.

It would be equally impossible to determine the subject in

John lent a book to Bill.

in view of

Bill borrowed a book from John.

Who is the actor, who the recipient? If *John* is the subject in the first sentence, *Bill* cannot be the subject in the second as long as we rely on purely notional definitions. But there is no real doubt in linguistic terms - in terms of position in the sentence.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the most important phrases of the sentence?
2. Why is the study of NP and VP "worthy of a complete book"?

Text 4 S.Greenbaum, R.Quirk: A Student's Grammar of the English Language. Lnd., 1998, p. 274-275

COMBINATORY AND SEGREGATORY COORDINATION
OF NOUN PHRASES

13.22. Phrases linked by *and* may express COMBINATORY or SEGREGATORY meaning. The distinction is clearest with noun phrases. When the coordination is segregatory, we can paraphrase it by clause coordination:

> *John and Mary* know the answer. [= John knows the answer, and Mary knows the answer]

When it is combinatory we cannot do so, because the conjoins function in combination with respect to the rest of the clause:

> John and Mary make a pleasant couple. [≠*John makes a pleasant couple, and Mary makes a pleasant couple]

Many conjoint noun phrases are in fact ambiguous between the two interpretations:

> *John and Mary* won a prize.

This may mean that they each won a prize or that the prize was awarded to them jointly.

Further examples of combinatory meaning:

> *John and Mary* played as partners in tennis against *Susan and Bill*.
> *Peter and Bob* separated (from each other).
> *Paula and her brother* look alike.
> *Mary and Paul* are just good friends.
> *John and Peter* have different tastes (from each other).
> *Mary and Susan* are colleagues (of each other)
> *Law and order* is a primary concern of the new administration.

NOTE The distinction between the two meanings applies to plural noun phrases in general. The combinatory meaning in *The three girls look alike* contrasts with the segregatory meaning in *The three girls have a cold*, and *They are married* is ambiguous.

Indicators of segregatory meaning

13.23 Certain markers explicitly indicate that the coordination is segregatory:

> *both (. . . and)*   *neither . . . nor*   *respectivelv* ‹formal›
> *each*   *respective* ‹formal›   *apiece* ‹rather rare›

While *John and Mary have won a prize* is ambiguous, we are left in no doubt that two prizes were won in:

> John and Mary have *each* won a prize.
> John and Mary have won a prize *each*.
> *Both* John and Mary have won a prize.
> John and Mary have *both* won a prize.

Similarly, whereas *John and Mary didn't win a prize* is ambiguous, *Neither John nor Mary won a prize* is unambiguously segregatory.

The adjective *respective* premodifies a plural noun phrase to indicate segregatory interpretation. For example, *Jill and Ben visited their respective uncles* can only mean that Jill visited her uncle or uncles and that Ben visited his uncle or uncles, whereas *Jill and Ben visited their uncles* is ambiguous between the *respective* reading and the reading that they visited persons who were uncles to both. The related nouns can be in different clauses or even in different sentences:

> *Bob and his best friend* have had some serious trouble at school lately. Their *respective* parents are going to see the principal about the complaints.

The adverb *respectively* indicates which constituents go with which in the two parallel sets of conjoint phrases:

> John. Peter, *and* Robert play football, basketball, *and* baseball *respectively*.
> [= John plays football, Peter plays basketball, and Robert plays baseball].
> Thomas Arnold *and* his son Matthew were *respectively* the greatest educator *and* the greatest critic of the Victorian age.
> [= Thomas Arnold was the greatest educator of the Victoian age and his son Matthew was the greatest critic of the Victorian age].

NOTE   *Both, each, respective*, and *apiece* also mark segregatory meaning with plural noun phrases that are not coordinated: *My children have both won a prize. The boys visited their respective uncles.*

<div align="center">QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS</div>

1. What is the distinction between combinatory and segregatory coordination of noun phrases?
2. Give your opinion on the two meanings which may be expressed by noun phrases.

II. The Sentence

Text 1 B.Ilyish: The Structure of Modern English. L., 1971, p. 182-190

<div align="center">Chapter XXIV</div>

<div align="center">THE SENTENCE</div>

The notion of sentence has not so far received a satisfactory definition, which would enable us by applying it in every particular case to find out whether a certain linguistic unit was a sentence or not.

Thus, for example, the question remains undecided whether such shop notices as *Book Shop* and such book titles as *English* are sentences or not. In favour of the view that they are sentences the following consideration can be brought forward. The notice *Book Shop* and the title *English Grammar* mean 'This is a book shop', 'This is an English Grammar'; the phrase is interpreted as the predicative of a sentence whose subject and link verb have been omitted, that is, it is apprehended as a unit of communication. According to the other possible view, such notices as *Book Shop* and such titles as *English Grammar* are not units of communication at all, hut units of nomination, merely appended to the object they denote. Since there is as yet no definition of a sentence which would enable us to decide this question, it depends on everyone's subjective view which alternative he prefers. We will prefer the view that such notices and book titles are not sentences but rather nomination units.

We also mention here a special case. Some novels have titles formulated as sentences, e. g. *The Stars Look Down*, by A. Cronin, or *They Came to a City*, by J. B. Priestley. These are certainly sentences, but they are used as nomination units, for instance, *Have you read The Stars Look Down?*, *Do you like They Came to a City?* [10]

---

[10] The same may be found in Russian, for instance in some titles of plays by Alexander Ostrovski: Бедность не порок, Свои люди – сочтемся, Не в свои сани не садись.

With the rise of modern ideas of paradigmatic syntax yet another problem concerning definition of sentence has to be considered.

In paradigmatic syntax, such units as *He has arrived, He has not arrived, Has he arrived, He will arrive, He will not arrive, Will he arrive,* etc., are treated as different forms of the same sentence, just as *arrives, has arrived, will arrive* etc., are different forms of the same verb. We may call this view of the sentence the paradigmatic view.

Now from the point of view of communication, *He has arrived* and *He has not arrived* are different sentences since they convey different information (indeed, the meaning of the one flatly contradicts that of the other).

CLASSIFICATION OF SENTENCES

The problem of classification of sentences is a highly complicated one, and we will first consider the question of the principles of classification, and of the notions on which it can be based.

Let us begin by comparing a few sentences differing from each other in some respect. Take, for example, the following two sentences: (1) *But why did you leave England?* (GALSWORTHY) and (2) *There are to-day more people writing extremely well, in all departments of life, than ever before; what we have to do is to sharpen our judgement and pick these out from the still larger number who write extremely badly.* (CRUMP)

Everyone will see that the two sentences are basically different. This is true, but very general and not grammatically exact. In order to arrive at a strictly grammatical statement of the difference (or differences) between them we must apply more exact methods of observation and analysis.

Let us, then, proceed to a careful observation of the features which constitute the difference between the two sentences.

1. The first sentence expresses a question, that is the speaker expects an answer which will supply the information he wants. The second sentence expresses a statement, that is, the author (or speaker) states his opinion on a certain subject. He does not ask about anything, or expect anybody to supply him any information. This difference is expressed in writing by the first sentence having a question mark at the end, while the second sentence has a full stop.

2. The first sentence is adressed to a certain hearer (or a few hearers present), and is meant to provoke the hearer's reaction (answer). The second sentence is not adressed to any particular person or persons and the author does not know how anybody will react to it.

3. The two sentences differ greatly in length: the first consists of only 6 words, while the second has 39.

4. The first sentence has no punctuation marks within it, while the second has two commas and a semicolon.

5. The first sentence has only one finite verb (*did ... leave*), while the second has three (*are, have, write*).

These would seem to be some essential points of difference. We have not yet found out which of them are really relevant from a grammatical viewpoint. We have not included in the above list those which are quite obviously irrelevant from that viewpoint; for example, the first sentence contains a proper name (*England*), while the second does not contain any, or, the second sentence contains a possessive pronoun (*our*) while the first does not, etc.

Let us now consider each of the five points of difference and see which of them are relevant from a purely grammatical point of view, for a classification of sentences.

Point 1 states a difference in the types of thought expressed in the two sentences. Without going into details of logical analysis, we can merely say that a question (as in the first sentence), and a proposition (as in the second)[11] are different types of thought, in the logical acceptation of that term. The problem now is, whether this difference is or is not of any importance from the grammatical viewpoint. In Modern English sentences expressing questions (we will call them, as is usually done, interrogative sentences) have some characteristic grammatical features. These features are, in the first place, a specific word order in most cases (predicate — subject), as against the order subject—predicate[12] in sentences expressing propositions (declarative sentences). Thus word order may, with some reservations, be considered as a feature distinguishing this particular type of sentence from others. Another grammatical feature characterizing interrogative sentences (again, with some reservations) is the structure of the predicate verb, namely its analytical form "*do* + infinitive" (in our first sentence, *did .., leave ..., not left*), where in a declarative sentence there would be the simple form (without *do*). However, this feature is not restricted to interrogative sentences: as is well known, it also characterizes negative sentences. Anyhow, we can (always with some reservations) assume that word order and the form "*do* + infinitive" are grammatical features characterizing interrogative sentences, and in so far the first item of our list appears to be grammatically relevant. We will, accordingly, accept the types "interrogative sentence" and "declarative sentence" as grammatical types of sentences.

Point 2, treating of a difference between a sentence addressed to a definite hearer (or reader) and a sentence free from such limitation, appears not to be grammatical, important as it may be from other points of view. Accordingly, we will not include this distinction among grammatical features of sentences.

---

[11] As a matter of fact, our second sentence contains more than one proposition; but this does not affect the basic difference between the two types of sentences.

[12] We will here provisionally accept the terms "subject" and "predicate" without definition. For a full discussion of these terms see p. 198 ff

Point 3, showing a difference in the length of the sentences, namely in the number of words making up each of them, does not in itself constitute a grammatical feature, though it may be more remotely connected with grammatical distinctions.

Point 4 bears a close relation to grammatical peculiarities; more especially, a semicolon would be hardly possible in 'certain types of sentences (so-called simple sentences). But punctuation marks within a sentence are not in themselves grammatical features: they are rather a consequence of grammatical features whose essence is to be looked for elsewhere.

Point 5, on the contrary, is very important from a grammatical viewpoint. Indeed the number of finite verbs in a sentence is one of its main grammatical features. In this particular instance it should be noted that each of the three finite verbs has its own noun or pronoun belonging to it and expressing the doer of the action denoted by the verb: *are* has the noun *people, have* the pronoun *we*, and *write* the pronoun *who*. These are sure signs of the sentence being composite, not simple.[13] Thus we will adopt the distinction between simple and composite sentences as a distinction between two grammatical types.

The items we have established as a result of comparing the two sentences given on page 183 certainly do not exhaust all the possible grammatical features a sentence can be shown to possess. They were only meant to illustrate the method to be applied if a reasonable grammatical classification of sentences is to be achieved. If we were to take another pair or other pairs of sentences and proceed to compare them in a similar way we should arrive at some more grammatical distinctions which have to be taken into account in making up a classification. We will not give any more examples but we will take up the grammatical classification of sentences in a systematic way.

It is evident that there are two principles of classification. Applying one of them, we obtain a classification into declarative, interrogative, and imperative sentences. We can call this principle that of "types of communication".

The other classification is according to structure. Here we state two main types: simple sentences and composite sentences. We will not now go into the question of a further subdivision of composite sentences, or into the question of possible intermediate types between simple and composite ones. These questions will be treated later on (see pages 200 and 254 respectively). Meanwhile, then, we get the following results:

---

[13] We use the term "composite sentence" in the same meaning as that attributed .to it in H. Poutsma's *Grammar of Late Modern English*, namely as opposite to the term "simple sentence".

TYPES OF SENTENCES ACCORDING TO TYPES OF COMMUNICATION
(1)Declarative
(2)Interrogative
(3)Imperative

Sentences belonging to the several types differ from each other in some grammatical points, too. Thus, interrogative sentences are characterized by a special word order (see Chapter XXX). In interrogative sentences very few modal words are used, as the meanings of some modal words are incompatible with the meaning of an interrogative sentence. It is clear that modal words expressing full certainty, such as *certainly, surely, naturally*, etc., cannot appear in a sentence expressing a question. On the other hand, the modal word *indeed*, with its peculiar shades of meaning, is quite possible in interrogative sentences, for instance, *Isn't so indeed*? (SHAKESPEARE)

There are also sentences which might be termed semi-interrogative. The third sentence in the following passage belongs to this type:

"Well, I daresay that's more revealing about poor George than you. At any rate, he seems to have survived it." "Oh, you've seen him?" She did not particularly mark her question for an answer, but it was, after all, the pivot-point, and Bone found himself replying — that indeed he had. (BUECHNER) The sentence *Oh, you've seen him?* is half-way between the affirmative declarative sentence, *You have seen him*, and the interrogative sentence, *Have you, seen him?* Let us proceed to find out the precise characteristics of the sentence in the text as against the two sentences just given for the sake of comparison. From the syntactical viewpoint, the sentence is declarative, as the mutual position of subject and predicate is, *you have seen*, not *have you seen*, which would be the interrogative order. In what way or ways does it, then, differ from a usual declarative sentence? That is where the question of the intonation comes in. Whether the question mark at the end of the sentence does or does not mean that the intonation is not that typical of a declarative sentence, is hard to tell, though it would rather seem that it does. To be certain about this a phonetic experiment should be undertaken, but in this particular case the author gives a context which itself goes some way toward settling the question. The author's words, *She did not particularly mark her question for an answer*, seem to refer to the intonation with which it was pronounced: the intonation must not have been clearly interrogative, that is not clearly rising, though it must have differed from the regular falling intonation to some extent: if it had not been at all different, the sentence could not have been termed a "question", and the author does call it a question. Reacting to this semi-interrogative intonation, Bone (the man to whom the question was addressed) answered in the affirmative. It seems the best way, on the whole, to term such sentences semi-interrogative. Their purpose of course is to utter a somewhat hesitating statement and to expect the other person to confirm it.

Imperative sentences also show marked peculiarities in the use of modal words. It is quite evident, for example, that modal words expressing possibility, such as *perhaps, maybe, possibly*, are incompatible with the notion of order or request. Indeed, modal words are hardly used at all in imperative sentences.

The notion of exclamatory sentences and their relation to the three established types of declarative, interrogative, and imperative sentences presents some difficulty. It would seem that the best way to deal with it is this. On the one hand, every sentence, whether narrative, interrogative, or imperative, may be exclamatory at the same time, that is, it may convey the speaker's feelings and be characterized by emphatic intonation and by an exclamation mark in writing. This may be seen in the following examples: *But he can't do anything to you!* (R. WEST) *What can he possibly do to you!* (Idem) *Scarlett, spare me!* (M. MITCHELL)

On the other hand, a sentence may be purely exclamatory, that is, it may not belong to any of the three types classed above. This would be the case in the following examples: *"Well, fiddle-dee-dee!" said Scarlett.* (M. MITCHELL) *Oh, for God's sake, Henry!* (Idem)

However, it would perhaps be better to use different terms for sentences which are purely exclamatory, and thus constitute a special type, and those which add an emotional element to their basic quality, which is either declarative, or interrogative, or imperative. If this view is endorsed, we should have our classification of sentences according to type of communication (see p. 185) thus modified:

(1) Declarative (including emotional ones)
(2) Interrogative (including emotional ones)
(3) Imperative (including emotional ones)
(4) Exclamatory

This view would avoid the awkward contradiction of exclamatory sentences constituting a special type and belonging to the first three types at the same time.

TYPES OF SENTENCES ACCORDING TO STRUCTURE

(1) Simple
(2) Composite

The relations between the two classifications should now be considered.

It is plain that a simple sentence can be either declarative, or interrogative, or imperative. But things are somewhat more complicated with reference to composite sentences. If both (or all) clauses making up a composite sentence are declarative, the composite sentence as a whole is of course declarative too. And so it is bound to be in every case when both (or all) clauses making a composite

sentence belong to the same type of communication (that is the case in an overwhelming majority of examples). Sometimes, however, composite sentences are found which consist of clauses belonging to different types of communication. Here it will sometimes be impossible to say to what type of communication the composite sentence as a whole belongs. We will take up this question when we come to the composite sentence.

Some other questions connected with the mutual relation of the two classifications will be considered as we proceed.

THE SIMPLE SENTENCE

We will now study the structure of the simple sentence and the types of simple sentences.

First of all we shall have to deal with the problem of negative sentences. The problem, briefly stated, is this: do negative sentences constitute a special grammatical type, and if so, what are its grammatical features? In other words, if we say, "This is a negative sentence," do we thereby give it a grammatical description?

The difficulty of the problem lies in the peculiarity of negative expressions in Modern English. Let us take two sentences, both negative in meaning: (1) *She did not know when she would be seeing any of them again*. (R. MACAULAY) (2) *Helen's tremendous spell — perhaps no one ever quite escaped from it*. (Idem) They are obviously different in their ways of expressing negation. In (1) we see a special form of the predicate verb (*did . . . know,* not *knew*) which is due to the negative character of the sentence and is in so far a grammatical sign of its being negative. In (2), on the other hand, there is no grammatical feature to show that the sentence is negative. Indeed, there is no grammatical difference whatever between the sentences *Nobody saw him and Everybody saw him.* The difference lies entirely in the meaning of the pronouns functioning as subject, that is to say, it is lexical, not grammatical. The same is of course true of such sentences as *I found nobody* and *I found everybody*. On the other hand, in the sentence *I did not find anybody* there is again a grammatical feature, viz. the form of the predicate verb (*did. . . find*, not *found*).

The conclusion to be drawn from these observations is obviously this. Since in a number of cases negative sentences are not characterized as such by any grammatical peculiarities, they are not a grammatical type: They are a logical type, which may or may not be reflected in grammatical structure. Accordingly, the division of sentences into affirmative and negative ought not to be included into their grammatical classification.[14]

---

[14] If we were to accept affirmative and negative sentences as grammatical types, we should find it very awkward to deal with sentences like *Nobody saw him or I found nothing*: we should have to class them as affirmative. The category of negation does of course exist in the morphological system of the English verb (see above, p. 123 ft.)

Before we proceed with our study of sentence structure it will be well to consider the relation between the two notions of sentence and clause. Among different types of sentences treated in a syntactic investigation it is naturally the simple sentence that comes first. It is with specimens of simple sentences that we study such categories as parts of the sentence, main and secondary; homogeneous members, word order, etc. It is also with specimens of simple sentences that we illustrate such notions as declarative, interrogative, imperative, and exclamatory sentences, as two-member and one-member sentences, and so forth. As long as we limit ourselves to the study of simple sentences, the notion of "clause" need not occur at all.

When, however, we come to composite sentences (that is, sentences consisting of two or more clauses), we have to deal with the notions of main clause, head clause, and subordinate clause. Everything we said about the simple sentence will also hold good for clauses: a clause also has its parts (main and secondary), it can also be a two-member or a one-member clause; a main clause at least must also be either declarative, interrogative, imperative, or exclamatory, etc. We will consider these questions in due course.

So then we will take it for granted that whatever is said about a simple sentence will also apply to an independent clause within a composite sentence. For instance, whatever we say about word order in a simple sentence will also apply to word order in an independent clause within a composite sentence, etc.

TYPES OF SIMPLE SENTENCES.
MAIN PARTS OF A SENTENCE

It has been usual for some time now to classify sentences into two-member and one-member sentences.[15]

This distinction is based on a difference in the so-called main parts of a sentence. We shall therefore have to consider the two problems, that of two-member and one-member sentences and that of main parts of the sentence, simultaneously.

In a sentence like *Helen sighed* (R. MACAULAY) there obviously are two main parts: *Helen*, which denotes the doer of the action and is called (grammatical) subject, and *sighed*, which denotes the action performed by the subject and is called (grammatical) predicate. Sentences having this basic structure, viz. a word (or phrase) to denote the doer of the action and another word (or phrase) to denote the action, are termed two-member sentences. However, there are sentences which do not contain two such separate parts; in these sentences there is only one main part: the other main part is not there and it could not even be supplied, at least not without a violent change in the structure of the sentence. Examples of such sentences, which are accordingly termed one-

---

[15] The Russian terms are, двусоставные and односоставные предложения.

member sentences, are the following: *Fire! Come on!* or the opening sentence of "An American Tragedy": *Dusk — of a summer night.* (DREISER)

There is no separate main part of the sentence, the grammatical subject, and no other separate main part, the grammatical predicate. Instead there is only one main part (*fire, come on,* and *dusk,* respectively). These, then, are one-member sentences.

It is a disputed point whether the main part of such a sentence should, or should not, be termed subject in some cases, and predicate, in others. This question has been raised with reference to the Russian language. Academician A. Shakhmatov held that the chief part of a one-member sentence was either the subject, or the predicate, as the case might be (for example, if that part was a finite verb, he termed it predicate).[16] Academician V. Vinogradov, on the other hand, started on the assumption that grammatical subject and grammatical predicate were correlative notions and that the terms were meaningless outside their relation to each other.[17] Accordingly, he suggested that for one-member sentences, the term "main part" should be used, without giving it any more specific name. Maybe this is rather a point of terminology than of actual grammatical theory. We will not investigate it any further, but content ourselves with naming the part in question the main part of one-member sentence, as proposed by V. Vinogradov.

One-member sentences should be kept apart from two-member sentences with either the subject or the predicate omitted, i. e. from elliptical sentences, which we will discuss in a following chapter.[18] There are many difficulties in this field. As we have done more than once, we will carefully distinguish what has been proved and what remains a matter of opinion, depending to a great extent on the subjective views or inclinations of one scholar or another. Matters belonging to this latter category are numerous enough in the sphere of sentence study.

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

1. What difficulties arise in defining the sentence?
2. Point out grammatical distinctions between different communicative types of sentences.
3. What contradiction arises in connection with the status of exclamatory sentences?
4. What are the two main structural types of sentences?
5. Why does B.A.Ilyish exclude the division of sentences into affirmative and negative from grammatical classification?
6. Comment on the distinction between one-member and two-member sentences.

---

[16] А. А. Шахматов, *Синтаксис русского языка*, С. 49—50.

[17] В.В.Виноградов, «*Синтаксис русского языка» А.А.Шахматова.* Вопросы синтаксиса современного русского языка, 1950, С. 108.

[18] See p. 252.

Text 2 M.Y.Blokh: A Course in Theoretical English Grammar. M., 2000, p. 229-236.

Chapter XXI
THE SENTENCE GENERAL

§ 1. The sentence is the immediate integral unit of speech built up of words according to a definite syntactic pattern and distinguished by a contextually relevant communicative purpose. Any coherent connection of words having an informative destination is effected within the framework of the sentence. Therefore the sentence is the main object of syntax as part of the grammatical theory.

The sentence, being composed of words, may in certain cases include only one word of various lexico-grammatical standings. *Cf.*:

Night. Congratulations. Away! Why? Certainly.

The actual existence of one-word sentences, however, does not contradict the general idea of the sentence as a special syntactic combination of words, the same as the notion of one-element set in mathematics does not contradict the general idea of the set as a combination of certain elements. Moreover, this fact cannot lead even to the inference that under some circumstances the sentence and the word may wholly coincide: a word-sentence as a unit of the text is radically different from a word-lexeme as a unit of lexicon, the differentiation being inherent in the respective places occupied by the sentence and the word in the hierarchy of language levels. While the word is a component element of the word-stock and as such is a nominative unit of language, the sentence, linguistically, is a predicative utterance-unit. It means that the sentence not only names some referents with the help of its word-constituents, but also, first, presents these referents as making up a certain situation, or, more specifically, a situational event, and second, reflects the connection between the nominal denotation of the event, on the one hand, and objective reality, on the other, showing the time of the event, its being real or unreal, desirable or undesirable, necessary or unnecessary, etc. *Cf.*:

I am satisfied, the experiment has succeeded. I would have been satisfied if the experiment had succeeded. The experiment seems to have succeeded - why then am I not satisfied?

Thus, even one uninflected word making up a sentence is thereby turned into an utterance-unit expressing the said semantic complex through its concrete contextual and consituational connections. By way of example, compare the different connections of the word-sentence "night" in the following passages:

1) Night. Night and the boundless sea, under the eternal star-eyes shining with promise. Was it a dream of freedom coming true? 2) Night? Oh no. No

night for me until I have worked through the case. 3) Night. It pays all the day's debts. No cause for worry now, I tell you.

Whereas the utterance "night" in the first of the given passages refers the event to the plane of reminiscences, the "night" of the second passage presents a question in argument connected with the situation wherein the interlocutors are immediately involved, while the latter passage features its "night" in the form of a proposition of reason in the flow of admonitions.

It follows from this that there is another difference between the sentence and the word. Namely, unlike the word, the sentence does not exist in the system of language as a ready-made unit; with the exception of a limited number of utterances of phraseological citation, it is created by the speaker in the course of communication. Stressing this fact, linguists point out that the sentence, as different from the word, is not a unit of language proper; it is a chunk of text built up as a result of speech-making process, out of different units of language, first of all words, which are immediate means for making up contextually bound sentences, i.e. complete units of speech.

It should be noted that this approach to the sentence, very consistently exposed in the works of A.I. Smirnitsky, corresponds to the spirit of traditional grammar from the early epoch of its development. Traditional grammar has never regarded the sentence as part of the system of means of expression; it has always interpreted the sentence not as an implement for constructing speech, but as speech itself, i.e. a portion of coherent flow of words of one speaker containing a complete thought.

Being a unit of speech, the sentence is intonationally delimited. Intonation separates one sentence from another in the continual flow of uttered segments and, together with various segmental means of expression, participates in rendering essential communicative-predicative meanings (such as, for instance, the syntactic meaning of interrogation in distinction to the meaning of declaration). The role of intonation as a delimiting factor is especially important for sentences which have more than one predicative centre, in particular more than one finite verb. *Cf*.:

1) The class *was over*, the noisy children *filled* the corridors. 2) The class *was over*. The noisy children *filled* the corridors.

Special intonation contours, including pauses, represent the given speech sequence in the first case as one compound sentence, in the second case as two different sentences (though, certainly, connected both logically and syntactically).

On the other hand, as we have stated elsewhere, the system of language proper taken separately, and the immediate functioning of this system in the process of Intercourse, i.e. speech proper, present an actual unity and should be looked upon as the two sides of one dialectically complicated substance - the human language in the broad sense of the term. Within the framework of this unity the sentence itself, as a unit of communication, also presents the two

different sides, inseparably connected with each other. Namely, within each sentence as an immediate speech element of the communication process, definite standard syntactico-semantic features are revealed which make up a typical model, a generalized pattern repeated in an indefinite number of actual utterances. This complicated predicative pattern does enter the system of language. It exists at its own level in the hierarchy of lingual segmental units in the capacity of a "linguistic sentence" and as such is studied by grammatical theory.

Thus, the sentence is characterized by its specific category of predication which establishes the relation of the named phenomena to actual life. The general semantic category of modality is also defined by linguists as exposing the connection between the named objects and surrounding reality. However, modality, as different from predication, is not specifically confined to the sentence; this is a broader category revealed both in the grammatical elements of language and its lexical, purely nominative elements. In this sense, every word expressing a definite correlation between the named substance and objective reality should be recognized as modal. Here belong such lexemes of full notional standing as "probability", "desirability", "necessity" and the like, together with all the derivationally relevant words making up the corresponding series of the lexical paradigm of nomination; here belong semi-functional words and phrases of probability and existential evaluation, such as *perhaps, may be, by all means,* etc.; here belong, further, word-particles of specifying modal semantics, such as *just, even, would-be*, etc.; here belong, finally, modal verbs expressing a broad range of modal meanings which are actually turned into elements of predicative semantics in concrete, contextually-bound utterances.

As for predication proper, it embodies not any kind of modality, but only syntactic modality as the fundamental distinguishing feature of the sentence. It is the feature of predication, fully and explicitly expressed by a contextually relevant grammatical complex, that identifies the sentence as opposed to any other combination of words having a situational referent.

The centre of predication in a sentence of verbal type (which is the predominant type of sentence-structure in English) is a finite verb. The finite verb expresses essential predicative meanings by its categorial forms, first of all, the categories of tense and mood (the category of person, as we have seen before, reflects the corresponding category of the subject). However, proceeding from the principles of sentence analysis worked out in the Russian school of theoretical syntax, in particular, in the classical treatises of V.V. Vinogradov, we insist that predication is effected not only by the forms of the finite verb connecting it with the subject, but also by all the other forms and elements of the sentence establishing the connection between the named objects and reality, including such means of expression as intonation, word order, different functional words. Besides the purely verbal categories, in the predicative semantics are included such syntactic sentence meanings as purposes of

communication (declaration - interrogation - inducement), modal probability, affirmation and negation, and others, which, taken together, provide for the sentence to be identified as a unit forming its own, proposemic level of lingual hierarchy.

§ 2. From what has been said about the category of predication, we see quite clearly that the general semantic content of the sentence is not at all reduced to predicative meanings only. Indeed, in order to establish the connection between some substance and reality, it is first necessary to name the substance ifself. This latter task is effected in the sentence with the help of its nominative means. Hence, the sentence as a lingual unit performs not one, but two essential signemic (meaningful) functions: first, substance-naming, or nominative finction; second, reality-evaluating, or predicative function.

The terminological definition of the sentence as a predicative unit gives prominence to the main feature distinguishing the sentence from the word among the meaningful lingual units (signemes). However, since every predication is effected upon a certain nomination as its material semantic base, we gain a more profound insight into the difference between the sentence and the word by pointing out the two-aspective meaningful nature of the sentence. The semantics of the sentence presents a unity of its nominative and predicative aspects, while the semantics of the word, in this sense, is monoaspective.

Some linguists do not accept the definition of the sentence through predication, considering it to contain tautology, since, allegedly, it equates the sentence with predication ("the sentence is predication, predication is the sentence"). However, the identification of the two aspects of the sentence pointed out above shows that this negative attitude cannot be accepted as justified; the real content of the predicative interpretation of the sentence has nothing to do with definitions of the "vicious circle" type. In point of fact, as follows from the given exposition of predication, predicative meanings do not exhaust the semantics of the sentence; on the contrary, they presuppose the presence in the sentence of meanings of quite another nature, which form its deeper nominative basis. Predicative functions work upon this deep nominative basis, and as a result the actual utterance-sentence is finally produced.

On the other hand, we must also note a profound difference between the nominative function of the sentence and the nominative function of the word. The nominative meaning of the syntagmatically complete average sentence (an ordinary proposemic nomination) reflects a processual situation or event that includes a certain process (actional or statal) as its dynamic centre, the agent of the process, the objects of the process, and also the various conditions and circumstances of the realization of the process. This content of the proposemic event, as is known from school grammar, forms the basis of the traditional syntactic division of the sentence into its nominative parts. In other words, the identification of traditional syntactic parts of the sentence is nothing else than the nominative division of the sentence. *Cf.:*

The pilot was steering the ship out of the harbour. - - The old pilot was carefully steering the heavily loaded ship through the narrow straits out of the harbour.

Any separate (notional) part of the sentence (subject, object, etc.) can denote a wide range of the elements of the reflected situation. For instance, the subject of the sentence, besides denoting the agent of the action (as in the example above), may point out the object of the action, the addressee of the action, the instrument with which the action is performed, the time and place of it, etc. *Cf.*:

The ship was carefully steered by the pilot. The pilot was entrusted with the ship's safety. The rudder, obeying the helmsman, steadily directed the boat among the reefs. The quiet evening saw the boat sailing out into the open sea...

The semantic reflections of the elements of the situation, in contrast to the parts of the sentence, are sometimes referred to as the "semantic roles" of the sentence, or the "deep cases" of it.

However, no matter what the concrete referential meaning of any part of the sentence might be, it is only through those nominative, syntactically determined sentence constituents that the situation together with its various elements can be reflected. Thus, it must be clearly understood that what is called the "semantic roles" of the sentence is in fact the situational meanings of its syntactic parts.

As is easily seen, no separate word, be it composed of so many stems, can express the described situation-nominative semantics of the proposition. Even hyperbolically complicated artificial words such as are sometimes coined for various expressive purposes by authors of fiction cannot have means of organizing their root components analogous to the means of arranging the nominative constituents of the sentence.

Quite different in this respect is a nominal phrase - a compound signemic unit made up of words and denoting a complex phenomenon of reality analysable into its component elements together with various relations between them. Comparative observations of predicative and non-predicative combinations of words have unmistakably shown that among the latter there are quite definite constructions which are actually capable of realizing nominations of proposemic situations. These are word combinations of full nominative value represented by expanded substantive phrases. It is these combinations that, by their nominative potential, directly correspond to sentences expressing typical proposemic situations. *Cf.*:

... → The pilot's steering of the ship out of the harbour. ... → The old pilot's careful steering of the heavily loaded ship through the narrow straits out of the harbour.

In other words, between the sentence and the substantive word-combination of the said full nominative type, direct transformational relations are established: the sentence, interpreted as an element of paradigmatics, is

transformed into the substantive phrase, or "nominalized", losing its processual-predicative character. Thus, syntactic nominalization, while depriving the sentence of its predicative aspect (and thereby, naturally, destroying the sentence as an immediate communicative unit), preserves its nominative aspect intact.

The identification of nominative aspect of the sentence effected on the lines of studying the paradigmatic relations in syntax makes it possible to define more accurately the very notion of predication as the specific function of the sentence.

The functional essence of predication has hitherto been understood in linguistics as the expression of the relation of the utterance (sentence) to reality, or, in more explicit presentation, as the expression of the relation between the content of the sentence and reality. This kind of understanding predication can be seen, for instance, in the well-known "Grammar of the Russian Language" published by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, where it is stated that "the meaning and purpose of the general category of predication forming the sentence consists in referring the content of the sentence to reality".[19] Compare with this the definition advanced by A.I. Smirnitsky, according to which predication is understood as "referring the utterance to reality" [Смирницкий, 1957, 102].

The essential principles of this interpretation of predication can be expressed even without the term "predication" as such. The latter approach to the exposition of the predicative meaning of the sentence can be seen, for instance, in the course of English grammar by M.A. Ganshina and N.M. Vasilevskaya, who wrote: "Every sentence shows the relation of the statement to reality from the point of view of the speaker" [Ganshina, Vasilevskaya, 321].

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

1. What is the difference between the sentence and the word?
2. Comment on predication and modality.
3. What are the two identified aspects of the sentence in the opinion of M.Y.Blokh?

---

[19] Грамматика русского языка. М., 1960. Т. 2, Н. I, С. 79 - 80.

Text 3 F.Palmer: Grammar. Lnd., 1971, p. 71-82.

SENTENCE, CLAUSE AND PHRASE

In traditional grammars 'sentence 'like 'word' is a basic though largely undefined term. Sentences are thus simply composed of words', and it is the function of syntax to state what words can be combined with others to form sentences and in what order.

Most people are quite clear in their own mind that they know exactly what a sentence is. This confidence arises because in a literate society we are taught to indicate sentences in our writing by putting in the punctuation. The normal mark of the sentence is the full stop; it would be an error of punctuation to mark the end of a sentence with a comma. In addition new sentences must begin with capital letters. This does not, however, help us to understand what a sentence is. It certainly does not give us a definition. In fact, we are taught at school to recognize sentences through practice, not by a set of rules.

The traditional grammars, however, sometimes provide a kind of definition: a sentence is the expression of a complete thought. But this is notional and shares all the faults of the notional definitions that we discussed in Chapter 1. How do we know what a complete thought is? Is 'cabbage' or 'man' a complete thought? If not, why not? And is *If it rains I shan't come* one thought, or two joined together? It would seem quite impossible to provide any definition along these lines. Equally it is impossible to provide a logical definition for the sentence. One such would be that it contains a subject and predicate - that on the one hand it indicates something that we are talking about, and on the other it says something about it. For instance, in *John is coming* we are talking about John, the subject, and also saying that he is coming, the predicate. The difficulty here is that if this definition is to be of any use we must be able to identify what we are talking about, and very often we talk about several things at once. For instance, in the sentence *John gave the book to Mary* we are clearly talking about *John, the book* and Mary and all three might seem to be the 'subject' in this sense. A natural reaction, especially from someone who has learnt some traditional grammar, might be to say that we are talking about John and that what we are saying about him is that he gave the book to Mary. But this begs the question. It defines the subject as the GRAMMATICAL subject, and the grammatical subject can only be defined in terms of the sentence. Moreover the grammatical subject often does not indicate what we are 'talking about'. *In the birds have eaten all the fruit* it is probable that what we are talking about is the missing fruit and not the unidentified birds! More strikingly, in *It's raining* what is the subject? *It*? But what is 'It'? - the weather, the universe, or what ? Clearly no definition of sentence in terms of such logical concepts is going to help, though (and this is an important caveat) once we have

established what a sentence is we may well look to see if it can be interpreted in terms of a subject and a predicate (defined GRAMMATICALLY).

Even if we have learnt by some means or other at school to put our full stops and our capital letters in the right places and even if, therefore, it is possible to establish just how many sentences there are on the page, it would be a mistake to think that speech is equally made up of sentences. As we saw in Chapter 1, although sections of speech are often marked by intonation, it is not the case that every intonation tune will mark a stretch of speech that, if written; would begin with a capital letter and end with a full stop. Moreover a great deal of spoken language does not consist of sentences in the sense in which the term is understood for writing at all. Much of it is made up of incomplete, interrupted, unfinished, or even quite chaotic sentences. Speech may be made up of utterances - separate 'bits' - but utterances seldom correspond to sentences.

We could not, for instance, identify all the sentences in a conversation that went:

MARY: John! Coming?

JOHN: Yes dear, I was only -

MARY: Oh do hurry up and - we ought to catch the bus - only they don't always run on time - if we're lucky - wretched people - as long as you're quick. I've been ready for some - since half past seven.

Such a conversation is not abnormal; much of our everyday speech is like this.

A linguistic definition of the sentence must, in fact, be in terms of its internal structure. A sentence will be composed of certain specified elements in a certain order, ultimately, of course, of words or parts of words. A statement then of the structures will provide us with a definition of the sentence. For instance, we might argue that the basic sentence structures of English are of the type NV, NVA, NVN, NVNN, where A stands for adjective. Examples would be *John came, John is good, John saw Bill, John made Bill president*. (This is by no means a satisfactorily complete list.) All other sentences could be regarded as derived from these by either addition, e.g. of adverbs - *John came quickly* - or by expansion: instead of *John* we could have *the boy, the little boy, the silly little boy and even the silly little boy on the other side of the room*. Clearly we can state what is possible, and the sentence is then defined in terms of all these possibilities. But even this is not really satisfactory. We can, indeed, say that a sentence is a linguistic item that accords with our description - that has the structure we assign to the sentence. But why these structures? In particular why not much larger structures, e.g. one that would allow a combination of several of those we have been considering? Why do we not want to consider *It's raining; I'm not going out* as a single sentence? The answer is that these sentence structures are the largest that can be handled in a grammatical description. We can make an accurate statement about the structure of a sentence, that is to say about the limitations on the co-occurrence of the items in the sentence, but we cannot with any accuracy deal with larger structures, structures consisting of two

or more sentences. This was put quite clearly by Bloomfield, who defined a sentence as 'an independent linguistic form, not included by virtue of any grammatical construction in any larger linguistic form'. He considered the example: *How are you? It's a fine day. Are you going to play tennis this afternoon* ? and goes on to show that there are no grammatical restraints linking these into a single structure; they have to be regarded as three separate units, that is to say, three sentences.

In a sense, then, what is meant by sentence is defined in practical terms. It is the largest unit to which we can assign a grammatical structure. Nevertheless it would be an error to believe that outside the sentence there are no restraints, no features that link one sentence to another. There are, on the contrary, plenty. Many words such as *however, therefore, later, other* serve very often to refer from one sentence to another. More striking perhaps are what are sometimes called the 'pro-forms' of a language. Pronouns are familiar enough. *He, she* and *it* may 'stand for' *the man, the woman, the table*, etc. We find in one sentence *The man ...* but in the next, *He . ..* But there are also 'pro-verbs'. *Did* in *John came and so did Mary* clearly stands for *came* - Mary came. All the auxiliary verbs in English can act as pro-verbs in the sense that they alone stand for the whole of the verbal element of which they are or were only the first word:

> *John is coming.*   *Is he?*
> *I haven't seen him.*   *But I have.*
> *Must you come ?*   *I really must.*
> *He'll have been there.*   *No he won't.*

The verb DO is particularly important and special because it is the pro-form used where there is no auxiliary verb:

> *He came yesterday. No, he didn't.*

We must not overstate the restrictions within a sentence. There are not very many restrictions on pronouns. We can say *She lost her hat*, but it is not the case that we cannot say *She lost his hat*, though we can say only *She washed herself* and not *She washed himself*. But in general the limits of the sentence are clear because beyond the sentence the limitations are fewer and less strict. In particular there seems to be no restriction at all on the co-occurrence of one sentence type with another, whereas within sentences there are restrictions on the parts. *Mary loves John* is possible but *Loves Mary John* and *Mary John loves* are not (except in a special kind of poetry). Furthermore, beyond the sentence there is no clear limit at all. In writing we use paragraphs, but what are the rules for paragraphing? There are, perhaps, some vague rules - that we start a new paragraph where we start on a new subject - but one may well suspect that paragraphs are also dictated by purely aesthetic considerations; pages without

paragraphs look uninteresting. We may not, perhaps, like Alice, demand conversation or pictures in our books but we DO like paragraphs.

A problem is raised by the incomplete, interrupted 'sentences' that we discussed earlier (p. 72). What are we to do with these? Some linguists have argued that they should be analysed independently and treated as possible structures of the English language. But this would seem to be a mistake, above all because there would then be an infinite number of structures and no grammar could claim even partial completeness. There are, however, three kinds of 'incomplete sentence'.

First, there are those that are caused by interruptions or changes of mind on the part of the speaker. In the imaginary conversation on page 72 we find examples in *I was only -* and *I've been ready for some -*. These raise no problems for grammar; they are genuinely incomplete sentences, understandable and analysable as such. (The linguist may not be altogether uninterested in them, however; he may well want to know whether there are conditions for interrupting, for hesitation, change of mind, etc.)

Secondly, there are incomplete sentences that are dependent on what has gone before. *John*, for instance, might be a reply for *Who did it* ? or *Who did you see* ? It can therefore be reasonably understood as an incomplete form of *John did it* or *I saw John*. There are two important grammatical points about incomplete sentences of this kind. First, as we have already seen from the examples on page 74 they make extensive use of pro-forms; they are, then, to be analysed in terms of the complete, expanded, 'original' form. Secondly, their characteristics are often found within sentences too, as was illustrated also on page 74. Clearly the formation of these sentences is important, and they must be treated as very closely related to what has preceded: they are 'contextually' conditioned and can only be understood as such.

Thirdly, there are incomplete sentences such as *Coming? Coming! Found them ? Got you!* which might seem equally to be shortened forms of *Are you coming ? I'm coming! Have you found them? I've got you!* But these are not contextually conditioned; they do not in any way depend on what has gone before. There is therefore a case for treating them as English sentences in their own right. Indeed, some linguists would argue that there is no more reason to derive *Coming?* from *Are you coming?* than to suppose that the latter is an expanded form of the former. Generally in grammar we treat simpler forms as more basic. But there is an argument for treating these as derived from the longer forms by 'deletion' – we 'delete' the pronoun and the auxiliary verb.

Traditional grammars also talk of 'clauses', which are sentences that are part of larger sentences. This definition is, strictly, self-contradictory, but it still indicates what is meant, and illustrates a very important characteristic of natural languages. In, for instance, *John stood and Mary ran away* we have a larger sentence consisting of two sentences joined together by *and*. Similarly in *While*

John was standing there Mary ran away there are two sentences, the first introduced by *while*, making up the larger sentence.

However, these two larger sentences are different, and illustrate two quite different ways in which sentences may be joined together. In the first, they are simply linked by *and*, and we can link as many as we wish in this way. Moreover, the relationship between the two sentences is not very different from that of two sentences separated by a full stop. There would be little difference in, for instance, *John stood still. Mary ran away*. (It is not true, however, that we can link any two sentences with *and*. We cannot say * *Come here and John has arrived* though we can say *Come here. John has arrived.* But, for the most part, there are few restrictions on sentences joined by *and*.) This kind of linking of sentences is known as 'coordination'.

The second way in which two sentences may form a larger sentence is one in which, instead of the two sentences being joined together as equals, one of the sentences functions as part of the other. For instance, alongside *He said many things*, we can say *He said that he was coming*. Clearly *that he was coming* has the same kind of function as *many things*. It is, in fact, the object of the sentence *He said* … So we here find one sentence taking the place of part of a sentence. This feature linguists have known by a variety of names – 'rank-shifting', 'downgrading' and more recently 'embedding' - one sentence, that is to say, is embedded in another. The traditional grammars referred to this as 'subordination' and talked about the embedded sentence as a 'subordinate clause'. These subordinate clauses were further classified into noun-clauses, adjective-clauses and adverb-clauses, according to whether they had the function of nouns, adjectives or adverbs within the other sentence (the 'main' clause). For instance, in the example we have just mentioned *that he was coming* has the function of a noun, for it is nouns and noun phrases that act as objects. An example of an adjective clause would be *who was standing there* in *The boy who was standing there ran away*. It has a function similar to that of *little* in *the little boy,* though the rules of English permit *little* to come before *boy* but the adjective clause to come after it. An adverb clause would be *while I was standing there* which has the same kind of function as *yesterday* in *I saw John while I was standing there*.

The traditional grammars, then, reserve the term sentence for the 'larger sentence' and talk about the sentences of which it is composed as 'clauses'. But there is really very little to be gained by introducing this new term 'clause', because it is needed only to deal with the problems of subordination, and this is better seen in terms of embedding one sentence within another. A sentence with another sentence embedded in it is still a sentence. There is not much to be gained by treating it as a sentence consisting of two clauses. In the case of coordinate sentences there is even less reason for distinguishing between sentence and clause since we can coordinate other linguistic elements too, for example noun phrases - *the little boy and the big girl* - and we surely do not

want a different name for the whole phrase and the two smaller phrases of which it is made up.

The grammars make a distinction, moreover, between 'clause' and 'phrase', though not using 'phrase' in the sense in which I have used it (to distinguish the essential parts of a sentence – the noun phrase, the verb phrase, etc.), but to refer (amongst other things) to a special kind of embedded sentence - one without a finite verb. A 'finite verb' is a verb form that can stand alone in an independent sentence - *comes* is finite but coming is not, since we can say *He comes every day* but not *He coming every day*. We are told therefore that *how to do this* in *I don't know how to do this* is a noun phrase, not a noun clause, because it has no finite verb. But this seems an unimportant distinction. There are all sorts of rules for embedding or subordination, but what is important is that the embedded sentence has still many of the characteristics of a sentence. In the example above we still have a predicator *do* and object *this*. In *I don't like John doing that* we have *John* (subject) *doing* (predicator) and *that* (object) - an almost normal sentence, but without a finite form of a verb. We shall discuss some of these problems again later.

In this chapter we have talked about 'analysing sentences. Traditional grammar made analysis or 'parsing', as it was often called, an essential exercise. In Nesfield, for instance, we are instructed to divide a sentence first into subject and predicate, then to divide the subject into nominative and its enlargement and finally its predicate into finite verb, completion and extension, the completion being either object or complement or both. For the sentences *The new master soon put the class into good order* and *A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush* the analysis is:

1. Subject		2. Predicate			
Nominative Or Equivalent	*Enlargement*	*Finite verb*	*Completion*		*Extension*
			Object	*Comple ment*	
Master	(1) The			Into	
			the	good	
	(2) new	put	Class	order	soon
Bird	(1) A				
				worth	
	(2) in the			two in	
	hand	is	-	the bush	-

This certainly does indicate in some degree the 'structure' of the sentence, though we shall be criticizing attempts to analyse language structurally in the next chapter. But it is, even within its own lights, far from satisfactory. Why, for instance, do we have enlargement only for the nominative? The enlargement

includes all of what today would be called the modifier of the noun - the article and the adjective, etc. But ALL nouns in the sentence may have similar modifiers too. *The* occurs as a modifier in *the class* which is the object, and in *the bush* which is part of the complement, and nouns can equally occur in the extension as part of prepositional phrases. It is misleading too to talk about 'completions' which are required, according to Nesfield, because some verbs 'do not make sense in themselves' but need either objects (the transitive verbs) or complements (the copulative verbs). For there are verbs which seem also to require extensions. An example is *to lie* (as in *to lie down*) which needs such extensions as *there* or *on the table* {*it lay there/on the table*). In fact, if we investigate carefully we shall find that verbs can be classified into a number of different types requiring various kinds of following elements. We need to recognize at least six different sentence structures exemplified by:

(1) *John signs* (NV).
(2) *John is happy* (NVAdj).
(3) *John is a man* (NVN).
(4) *John hit the man* (NVN).
(5) *John gave the man a book* (NVNN).
(6) *The book is on the table* (NVPrepN).

(3) differs from (4) in that in (3) the verb is what Nesfield calls a 'copulative verb' and what more recent linguists have referred to as a 'linking verb'. We can distinguish it partly because the verbs in the class are largely the same as those of (2), which are followed by adjectives, but more importantly because they have no passive - for (4) we have *The man was hit by John* but for (3) there is no **A man is been by John*. We can, moreover, add to these at least three more:

(7) *The girl made John happy* (NVNAdj).
(8) *The girl made John chairman* (NVNN).
(9) *John put the book on the table* (NVNPrepN).

These three, however, are basically developments from (2), (3) and (4) (by transformation - see pp. 139-41) and are perhaps to be treated as such and not as three new structures.

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

1. What is wrong with a logical definition of the sentence in the opinion of F.Palmer?
2. What should a linguistic (grammatical) definition of the sentence be based on?
3. Why does F.Palmer not accept L.Bloomfield's definition of the sentence? Are his critical remarks connected with text linguistics? What are the proofs of it?

4. What kinds of 'incomplete sentences' are mentioned by F.Palmer? Are all of them contextually conditioned?
5. What are the most important phrases of the sentence?
6. Characterize F.Palmer's approach to composite sentences.
7. What is the total number of basic sentence structures distinguished by F.Palmer? Can you compare his view on the problem with the views put forward by other grammarians?

Text 4 Ch.Hockett: A Course in Modern Linguistics. USA, 1960, p. 200-207

John got here early and we left with marker *and; John can't come but we're coming anyway* with marker *but; Either he will or he won't* with markers *either… or … ; It's ten o'clock, I want to go home,* with the intonation of the first half marking the linkage. Such sentences are *compound*.

In still others, the ICs, apart from the intonation, are a predicative constitute and a word or phrase attributive to it. Such sentences are *complex*. The attribute precedes in So ⎟ *I can't go; In that case* ⎟ *I can't go; If that is true* ⎟ *I can't go; Unless he says it's all right*, ⎟ *I won't*. When an attribute follows, it is often difficult to tell whether it is attributive to all that precedes or just to the second IC of the predicative construction. If our analysis is correct in the following, they are complex sentences: *He is coming* ⎟ *if you will let him; He is coming* ⎟ *if possible; He'll go* ⎟ *if he wants to*. But if the proper first IC cut is, say, *He* ⎟ *is coming if possible* (like *He* ⎟ *is coming tomorrow*), then the sentence is simple, and the attribute *if possible* is part of the predicate. Intonation and pausing can make the situation clear: if we say ^{3}*He's* ^{3}*coming*^{2} ↓, (pause) ^{2}*if* ^{3}*possible*^{2} ↑ then the attribute goes with the preceding predicative constitute. But often intonation does not help. When it does not, the ambiguity inheres in the language, and the grammarian cannot eliminate it.

More complicated sentences are possible. *John may not come and if he can't we won't come either* is a compound sentence, but its second part is in turn complex rather than simple. *If John can't and you can't, I won't* is complex with attribute first, but the attribute is in turn built (with conjunction *if*) on a form that could stand alone as a compound sentence.

All the varieties of sentences discussed above center on a predicative constitute: just one (simple sentence); two or more in coordination (compound); or just one with an attribute (complex). Most English sentences are of one or another of these varieties, or represent some combination of them. Accordingly, we class all the varieties together as the *favorite sentence-type* of the language. Any English sentence which is not of the favorite type is of some *minor* type.

One minor type consists of predicate without subject: *Come here; Go away; Please find me a larger box.* These are common as commands, but not all

commands have this form (*You get out of here!*), and not all *subjectless* sentences are commands: (*What did you do?*) - *Found a nickel.*

Another minor type is the *vocative: John! Boy! Waiter! O ye faithless ones!*

Still a third minor type is the *aphoristic: The more the merrier; The bigger the better.* An example like *The bigger they come the harder they fall* is marginal between the aphoristic and favorite types.

All other minor types may be classed together as *fragments.* They occur, however, especially often in two sets of circumstances. If something other than a favorite sentence is added as an afterthought to what has already been said, either by the same speaker or by some other, or is offered by one speaker as answer to another's question, the fragment is *completive: (Where are you going?) – Home; (I'm going to do that now.) - If I can. Yes* and *No* occur as special completive fragments in answer to certain kinds of questions. Strong emotion, or its simulation, may produce *exclamatory* fragments: *Ouch! Goodness gracious! The devil you say!*

23.2. Predicative Constructions. The kernel of an English sentence of the favorite sentence-type is a predicative constitute. This is true also in most other languages, and quite possibly in all, though there are subsidiary differences to be noted shortly.

The most general characterization of predicative constructions is suggested by the terms "topic" and "comment" for their ICs: the speaker announces a topic and then says something about it. Thus *John │ ran away; That new book by Thomas Guernsey │ I haven't read yet.* In English and the familiar languages of Europe, topics are usually also subjects, and comments are predicates: so in *John │ ran away.* But this identification fails sometimes in colloquial English, regularly in certain special situations in formal English, and more generally in some non-European languages.

In the second example given above, *That new book by Thomas Guernsey* is spoken first because it specifies what the speaker is going to talk about: it is the topic of the sentence, though not its subject. The topic is at the same time the *object* of the verb *haven't read (yet)*, and the subject of that verb is *I*, part of the comment of the whole sentence.

In formal *the man whom you visited here yesterday*, the relative clause *whom you visited here yesterday* has *whom* as topic, the remainder as comment. But *whom* is object of *visited*, and *you* is its subject.

When the topic and comment of a predicative constitute are not also the subject and predicate, then usually the comment in turn is a predicative constitute consisting of subject and predicate. In *That new book by Thomas Guernsey │ I haven't read yet*, the comment consists of subject *I* and predicate *haven't read yet*; in *whom │ you visited here yesterday*, the comment consists of subject *you* and predicate *visited here yesterday.* Thus subject-predicate

constructions are one variety of topic-comment constructions, but by no means the only kind.

In Latin one may say *Puer puellam amat* 'The boy loves the girl,' or simply *Puellam amat* 'He (or she) loves the girl.' But the structure is quite different. The verb *amat* specifies morphologically that its subject is singular and third person. The sentence *Puellam amat* still includes both subject and predicate, though the subject is represented only by morphemes within the verb. The Chinese sentence *hěn ài nèige nyǔhár* 'very-much love(s) that girl' includes no topic at all, either in separate words or within the verb; in context, the unspecified lover or lovers might be the speaker, the addressee, someone else, or any combination of these.

Since the favorite sentence-type of Latin, like that of English, turns on a predicative constitute, and since Latin verbs regularly include a subject within their own morphological structure, we call Latin verbs *sentence-words*. A sentence-word is a word which contains within itself the nuclear construction of the favorite sentence-type of its language. Menomini, Spanish, and many other languages are like Latin in having sentence-words; many others are like Chinese and English in having none.

23.3 Clauses. In the remainder of § 23 we survey the range and variety of English predicative constructions: We can only hint at the total complexity of this phase of English grammar. The complexity in other languages is just as great, though exact parallelism of details is rare.

A simple English sentence (*Birds sing*) consists, apart from intonation, of a single *clause*. A compound sentence consists of two or more clauses; complex sentence has a clause as head and often has a clause included in the attribute. English clauses are often topic-comment constitutes (those that are not, such as the *so* in *if so*, do not concern us at present), very often of the subject-predicate type.

Limiting ourselves first to clauses of the subject-predicate variety, we can outline one classification of English clauses as follows:

The predicate is a verb, with or without attributive elements: *ran away, I | sat down, She | was weeping, They | were left alone, (I John | to sit down, (I saw) her | weeping loudly.* These are *intransitive* predicates, and hence intransitive clauses.

The predicate is an objective constitute (§22.5), with or without attributive elements: *John | saw me, He | put the box in the corner, I | asked to run away, I | saw her weeping loudly, She | gave me a cookie last night I called on her, (I saw) John | crossing the street.* These are *transitive* predicates, yielding transitive clauses.

The predicate is a connective constitute (§22.6), with or without attributive elements. The resulting clauses are *equational*. There are three subtypes:

A. The predicate attribute is a noun: *John | is a big man, The boy | became a giant, (We asked) him | to be chairman, (I consider) him | one of my best friends.*

B. The predicate attribute is an adjective: *John | is big, The boy | grew tall, (I consider) him | to be correct, (She likes) milk | fresh, (We regard) this milk | as fresh.*

C. The predicate attribute is adverbial (a form which might occur as an attribute to a verb): *John | is here, The meeting | was last night, They | were in the room, (He put) the box | on the table.*

For instances like *It costs five dollars, It weighed ten pounds, We walked three miles* some grammarians set up a fourth category: these fit easily into neither type II nor type IIIA.

Cutting across the above is a classification into *active* and *passive* clauses. A passive clause may be intransitive or transitive, but it matches another clause (usually a transitive one) in the following way:

intransitive passive   transitive active
They | were left alone on the island.   Someone | left them alone on the island.
The job | was done by Bill.   Bill | did the job.

transitive passive   transitive active
John | was given a book.   ⎤   Someone | gave John a book.
A book | was given to John.   ⎦

In these cases the subject in the passive clause is equivalent to the object, or one of the objects, in a corresponding active clause. The correspondence is different in:

intransitive passive   intransitive active
The baby | was sung to by her mother.   The mother | sang to her baby.

Here the subject in the passive corresponds to the object of a preposition in the active. Equational clauses are not matched by passives. But if an equational clause is the object of a verb in a transitive clause, as in *I consider him correct (him | correct*, an equational clause, object of *consider*), then a corresponding intransitive passive may separate the ICs of the included equational clause: *He | is considered correct*. The result is similar to an equational clause (*He | is correct*), except that one could expand the predicate of the passive clause, yielding, say, *He | is considered correct by me*, and this is not done with an equational clause.

Different from all the foregoing are clauses in which the topic is not a subject: *John | I saw (but Bill I didn't see) James | we asked to be chairman, Him* (colloquially often *He) | I consider one of my best friends, This milk | we consider strictly fresh, Last night | was the meeting!?, Ten pounds | it weighed!* Just as passives correspond to actives, clauses of this variety correspond to one

of the subject-predicate variety: *James | we asked to be chairman* corresponds to ordinary *We asked James to be chairman*. The topic of the special clause is some element drawn from the predicate of the ordinary clause (*James*). The comment then consists of the subject of the ordinary clause (*we*) plus what is left of the predicate (*asked to be chairman*). The comment thus consists in turn of subject and predicate; but the predicate is often a form which could hot stand as the predicate of an ordinary clause - *asked to be chairman* could not.

23.4 Dependent and Independent Clauses. A further classification of English clauses, which cuts across those already set forth, is into *dependent* and *independent*. An independent clause is one in proper shape to occur as a simple sentence: *John ran*. An independent clause can be rendered dependent with a subordinating conjunction: *if John ran*, occurring as a whole sentence, is a fragment.

Otherwise, dependent clauses are shown to be so by the verb, or by the absence of any verb (or the presence of the particle *as*) instead of the verb *be*. Thus *John is there* is independent, but *John be there, John were there* (both often used in formal discourse after *if*), *John being there, John to be there, John there* are dependent. The examples given in §23.3 under I, II, and III include the following further instances: *John | to sit down, her | weeping loudly, John | crossing the street, him | one of my best friends, him | to be correct, milk | fresh, this milk | as fresh*.

Each variety of dependent clause has its own range of use. The variety in which the verb appears with suffix *-ing* is thus used: as subject (*John singing that song annoys me*); as object of certain prepositions (*Don't count on John singing that song, I thought of John singing that song*); and as object of certain verbs (*I heard John singing that song*; likewise with *see, find, enjoy, detest, hate*, and others). The variety with the bare verb is used as object with a partly different array of verbs: *I heard John sing that song; see, help,* but not *find* or others of the preceding list. *As* replaces some form of *be* largely after certain verbs or prepositions: *We regard this milk as fresh, We considered him as a friend, We thought of you as very competent, We shall take this one as an example.*

23.5. Classification by Order. A final classification of English independent clauses is by *order*.

In *direct order* clauses, the subject precedes all of the verb: *John is young, John does go, John has been going*. In *normal inverted order* clauses, the verb, or the first word of a verb longer than one word, precedes the subject: *Is John going, Does John go, Has John been going*.

If the verb is just one word, normal inverted order occurs only with *be, have, can, could, may, might*, and a few others. The normal inverted parallel to *John can go* is *can John go;* that of *John goes today*, however, is not *goes John*

today but *does John go today.* The verb is expanded into a phrase with *do (does, did)*, and this is what precedes the subject. In direct order, the expansion with *do* is used only with special stress, as *John DOES today,* and in the negative, as *John doesn't go*.

Normal inverted order is common in questions, but many questions do not have it. Normal inversion is also regular after introductory elements *only thus, only in this way, seldom*, and a few others: *Only thus can we achieve our purpose.* In elevated style some dependent clauses have invertion instead of a conjunction: *Were we there, (we should know the answer)*.

Special inverted order clauses place various verbs of motion before the subject: *Away ran John, Here comes the train, There go all my hopes*. Only a few patterns of this sort are common; an introductory word (*away, here, there*) seems always to be present.

Related to the preceding are two common types of English clauses of more complicated structure.

In one, an "empty" subject *it* occupies the subject position, but refers to an "expanded" subject placed later in the clause: *It's hard to do that* with expanded topic *to do that*; *Is it common for people to act that way?; It was John that I meant; It became difficult to get a ticket*. These tie in with clauses of type III (§23.3): the predicate is a connective constitute, most often with an adjective as predicate attribute, and the expanded subject follows it.

In the other, a "dummy" subject *there* (usually unstressed /ðqr/) occupies the subject position, and the real subject comes later: *There's a circus in town; There're some pencils in that drawer; Is there a doctor in the audience?; Are there any restaurants in this town?; Then there arrived a long cavalcade.* The verb is usually *be*, and its form shows that the postposed subject is the real one: *is* with *a circus, are* with *some pencils*. These also relate to clauses of type III (§23.3): the predicate is usually a connective constitute, most often with an adverb as predicate attribute, but the real subject comes before the predicate attribute.

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

1. What minor types of sentences are distinguished by Ch.Hockett?
2. Give a detailed analysis of predicative constructions.
3. Comment on different classifications of sentences and clauses given by Ch.Hockett.

Text 5 B.Ilyish: The Structure of Modern English. L., 1971, p. 191-197

FUNCTIONAL SENTENCE PERSPECTIVE

In studying the structure of a sentence, we are faced with a problem which has been receiving ever greater attention in linguistic investigations of recent years. This is the problem of dividing a sentence into two sections, one of them containing that which is the starting point of the statement, and the other the new information for whose sake the sentence has been uttered or written. This has been termed "functional perspective". We will illustrate it by a simple example. Let us take this sentence from a contemporary novel: *I made the trip out here for curiosity, just to see where you were intending to go.* (M. MITCHELL) Here the words / *made the trip out here* are the starting point, and the rest of the sentence (*for ... go)* contains the new information. It cannot be said that every sentence must necessarily consist of two such sections. Some sentences (especially one-member sentences) cannot be divided up in this way, and doubts are also possible about some other types. However, most sentences do consist of these two sections and the relation between the syntactic structure of the sentence and its division into those two sections presents a linguistic problem deserving our attention.

Before we go on to study the problem it will be well to establish the terms which we will use to denote the sections of a sentence from this viewpoint.

There have been several pairs of terms proposed for this purpose, such as "psychological subject" and "psychological predicate", "lexical subject" and "lexical predicate", "semantic subject" and "semantic predicate", and others. Some of these are distinctly unacceptable, as they either suggest a wrong view of the phenomena in question, or are incompatible with our general principles for analysing language phenomena.

Thus, the terms "psychological subject" and "psychological predicate", proposed by the German scholar H. Paul,[20] obviously will not do, as they introduce a notion of individual psychology, which lies beyond the sphere of linguistic investigation: the question we are discussing is not, what individual interpretation an individual reader or hearer may give to a sentence but what is objectively expressed in it, independently of a hearer's personal views or tastes.

The terms "lexical subject" and "lexical predicate", proposed by Prof. A. Smirnitsky,[21] will not do either, because they appear to take the whole problem out of the sphere of syntactic study and to include it into that of lexicology, which, however, has nothing to do with it. We are not going to analyse the lexical meanings of individual words, which are treated in lexicology, but the function of a word or word group within a sentence expressing a certain thought;

---

[20] See H. Paul, *Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte,* 5. AufL, 1937. S. 124
[2] See А. И. Смирницкий, *Синтаксис английского языка,* С. 110.

their function, that is, in expressing either what is already assumed or what is new in the sentence uttered.

We would rather avoid all terms built on the principle of combining the already existing terms "subject" and "predicate" with some limiting epithets, and use a pair of terms which have not yet been used to express any other kind of notion.

The pair of terms best suited for this purpose would seem to be "theme" and "rheme", which came into use lately, particularly in the works of several Czech linguists, who have specially studied the problem, notably with reference to the English language, both from the modern and from the historic viewpoint. Among the Czech scholars who have widely used these terms we should first of all mention Jan Firbas, who has developed a theory of his own on the historical development of the English language in this sphere.[22]

The terms "theme" and "rheme" are both derived from Greek, and are parallel to each other. The term "theme" comes from the Greek root *the-* 'to set', or 'establish', and means 'that which is set or established'. The term "rheme" is derived from the root *rhe-* 'to say', or 'tell', and means 'that which is said or told' (about that which was set or established beforehand). These terms are also convenient because adjectives are easily derived from them: "thematic" and "rhematic", respectively.

What, then, are the grammatical means in Modern English which can be used to characterize a word or word group as thematic, or as rhematic? We should note in passing, however, that it will hardly be possible to completely isolate the grammatical from the lexical means, and we shall have to discuss some phenomena which belong to lexicology rather than grammar, pointing out in each case that we are doing so.

The means of expressing a thematic or a rhematic quality of a word or phrase in a sentence to a great extent depend on the grammatical structure of the given language and must differ considerably, according to that structure.

Thus, in a language with a widely developed morphological system and free word order, word order can be extensively used to show the difference between theme and rheme. For instance, word order plays an important part from this viewpoint in Russian. Without going into particulars, we may merely point out the difference between two such sentences as Старик вошел and Вошел старик. In each case the word (or the part of the sentence) which comes last corresponds to the rheme, and the rest of the sentence to the theme. It is quite clear that no such variation would be possible in a corresponding English sentence. For instance we could not, in the sentence *The old man came in,* change the order of words so as to make the words *the old man* (the subject of the sentence) correspond to the rheme instead of to the theme. Such a word

---

[22] See J. Firbas, *Some Thoughts on the Function of Word-Order in Old English and Modern English.* Sbornik prací filosofické fakulty brnenské university, 1959.

order would be impossible and we cannot make the words *old man* express the rheme without introducing further changes into the structure of the sentence.

In Modern English there are several ways of showing that a word or phrase corresponds either to the rheme or to the theme. We will consider the rheme first.

A method characteristically analytical and finding its parallel in French is the construction *it is ... that* (also *it is . . . who* and it is... *which)* with the word or phrase representing the rheme enclosed between the words *it is* and the word *that (who, which}*. Here are some examples of the construction: *For it is the emotion that matters.* (HUXLEY) *Emotion* is in this way shown to represent the rheme of the sentence. *But it was sister Janet's house that he considered his home.* (LINKLATER) *Sister Janet's house* represents the rheme.

In the following sentence the adverbial modifier of place, *here,* is thus made the rheme, and the sentence is further complicated by the addition of a concessive *though*-clause. *It was here, though the place was shadeless and one breathed hot, dry perfume instead of air — it was here that Mr Scogan elected to sit.* (HUXLEY) Without this special method of pointing out the rheme, it would be hardly possible to show that the emphasis should lie on the word *here.* In the variant *Mr Scogan liked to sit here, though the place was shadeless and one breathed hot, dry perfume instead of air* the emphasis would rather lie on the word *liked:* he liked it, though it was shadeless, etc.

Could it be, he mused, that the reliable witness he had prayed for when kneeling before the crippled saint, the mirror able to retain what it reflected like the one with the dark, gilded eagle spread above it before him now, were at fault in so far as they recorded all the facts when it was, after all, possibly something at another level that more crucially mattered? (BUECHNER) The phrase emphasized by means of the *it is ... that* construction is, of course, *something at another level.* The peculiarity of this example is that two parentheses, *after all* and *possibly,* come in within the frame of *it is ... that.*

In the following example a phrase consisting of no less than eleven words is made into the rheme by means of the *it is ... that* construction. *It was his use of the highly colloquial or simply the ungrammatical expression that fascinated her in particular, for in neither case, clearly, did he speak in such a manner out of ignorance of the more elegant expression but, rather, by some design.* (BUECHNER) As the *that* is far away from the *is,* it seems essential that nothing should intervene between them to confuse the construction, and, more especially, no other *that* should appear there.

The question of the grammatical characteristic of such sentences will be dealt with in Chapter XXXV (p. 276) and Chapter XXXVII (p. 302).

Another means of pointing out the rheme in a sentence is a particle *(only, even,* etc.) accompanying the word or phrase in question. Indeed a particle of this kind seems an almost infallible sign of the word or phrase being representative of the rheme, as in the sentence: *Only the children, of whom there*

were not many, appeared aware and truly to belong to their surroundings, for the over-excited games they played, dashing in and out among the legs of their elders, trying to run up the escalator that moved only down, and the like, were after all special games that could be played nowhere but in the station by people who remembered that it was in the station they were. (BUECHNER) The particle *only,* belonging as it does to the subject of the sentence, *the children,* singles it out and shows it to represent the rheme of the sentence.

It goes without saying that every particle has its own lexical meaning, and, besides pointing out the rheme, also expresses a particular shade of meaning in the sentence. Thus, the sentences *Only he came* and *Even he came* are certainly not synonymous, though in both cases the subject *he* is shown to represent the rheme by a particle referring to it.

Another means of indicating the rheme of a sentence may sometimes be the indefinite article. Whether this is a grammatical or lexical means is open to discussion. The answer will depend on the general view we take of the articles, a problem we have been considering in Chapter IV. Treating the article here in connection with functional sentence perspective is justified, as it does play a certain part in establishing the relations between the grammatical structure of a sentence and its functional perspective.

Owing to its basic meaning of "indefiniteness" the indefinite article will of course tend to signalize the new element in the sentence, that which represents the rheme. By opposition, the definite article will, in general, tend to point out that which is already known, that is, the theme. We will make our point clear by taking an example with the indefinite article, and putting the definite article in its place to see what consequence that change will produce in the functional sentence perspective.

Let us take this sentence: *Suddenly the door opened and a little birdlike elderly woman in a neat grey skirt and coat seemed almost to hop into the room.* (A. WILSON) The indefinite article before *little birdlike elderly woman* shows that this phrase is the centre of the sentence: we are told that when the door opened the person who appeared was a little birdlike elderly woman. This meaning is further strengthened by the second indefinite article, the one before *neat grey skirt and coat.* Since the woman herself is represented as a new element in the situation, obviously the same must be true of her clothes.

Now let us replace the first indefinite article by the definite. The text then will be *Suddenly the door opened and the little birdlike elderly woman in a neat grey skirt and coat seemed almost to hop into the room.* This would mean that the woman had been familiar in advance, and the news communicated in the sentence would be, that she almost hopped into the room. The indefinite article before *neat grey skirt and coat* would show that the information about her clothes is new, i.e. that she had not always been wearing that particular skirt and coat. This would still be a new bit of information but it would not be the centre of the sentence, because the predicate group *seemed almost to hop into the room*

would still be more prominent than the group *in a neat grey skirt and coat.* Finally, if we replace the second indefinite article by the definite, too, we get the text *Suddenly the door opened and the little birdlike elderly woman in the neat grey skirt and coat seemed almost to hop into the room.* This would imply that both the elderly little woman with her birdlike look and her grey skirt and coat had been familiar before: she must have been wearing that skirt and coat always, or at least often enough for the people in the story and the reader to remember it. In this way the whole group *the little birdlike elderly woman in the neat grey skirt and coat* would be completely separated from the rheme-part of the sentence.

This experiment, which might of course be repeated with a number of other sentences, should be sufficient to show the relation between the indefinite article and the rheme, that is, functional sentence perspective.

There are also some means of showing that a word or phrase represents the theme in a sentence. Sometimes, as we have just seen, this may be achieved by using the definite article. Indeed the contrast between the two articles can be used for that purpose.

But there are other means of pointing out the theme as well. One of them, which includes both grammatical and lexical elements, is a loose parenthesis introduced by the prepositional phrase *as for* (or *as to),* while in the main body of the sentence there is bound to be a personal pronoun representing the noun which is the centre of the parenthetical *as-for*-phrase. This personal pronoun may perform different syntactical functions in the sentence but more often than not it will be the subject. A typical example of this sort of construction, is the following sentence: *As for the others, great numbers of them moved past slowly or rapidly, singly or in groups, carrying bags and parcels, asking for directions, perusing timetables, searching for something familiar like the face of a friend or the name of a particular town cranked up in red and gold...* (BUECHNER) After the theme of the sentence has been stated in the prepositional phrase *as for the others,* the subject of the sentence, *great numbers of them,* specifies the theme (pointing out the quantitative aspect of *the others}* and the rest of the sentence, long as it is, represents the rheme, telling, in some detail, whatever the others were busy doing at the time.

Sometimes a word or phrase may be placed in the same position, without *as for: The manuscript so wonderfully found, so wonderfully accomplishing the morning's prediction, how was it to be accounted for?* (J. AUSTEN) Here the first half of the sentence, from the beginning and up to the word *prediction,* represents the theme of the sentence, while the rest of it represents its rheme. The pronoun *it* of course replaces the long phrase representing the theme.

Here are a few more examples of the word or phrase representing the theme placed at the beginning of the sentence as a loose part of it, no matter what their syntactical function would have been if they had stood at their proper place within the sentence. *That laughter — how well he knew it!* (HUXLEY)

There are two possible ways of interpreting the grammatical structure of this sentence. First let us take it as a simple sentence, which seems on the whole preferable. Then the phrase *that laughter* must be said to represent the theme of the sentence: it announces what the sentence is going to be about. In the body of the sentence itself it is replaced by the pronoun *it,* which of course is the object. Another possible view is that the sentence is an asyndetic composite one. In that case the phrase *that laughter* is a one-member exclamatory clause, and the rest of the sentence is another clause.

A somewhat similar case is the following, from the same author: *His weaknesses, his absurdities — no one knew them better than he did.* Just as in the preceding example, it seems preferable to view the sentence as a simple one, with the words *his weaknesses, his absurdities* representing the theme.

There are two more points to make concerning functional sentence perspective:

(1) The theme need not necessarily be something known in advance. In many sentences it is, in fact, something already familiar, as in some of our examples, especially with the definite article. However, that need not always be the case. There are sentences in which the theme, too, is something mentioned for the first time and yet it is not the centre of the predication. It is something about which a statement is to be made. The theme is here the starting point of the sentence, not its conclusion. This will be found to be the case, for example, in the following sentence: *Jennie leaned forward and touched him on the knee* (A. WILSON) which is the opening sentence of a short story. Nothing in this sentence can be already familiar, as nothing has preceded and the reader does not know either who Jennie is or who "he" is. What are we, then, to say about the theme and the rheme in this sentence? Apparently, there are two ways of dealing with this question. Either we will say that *Jennie* represents the theme and the rest of the sentence, *leaned forward and touched him on the knee* its rheme. Or else we will say that there is no theme at all here, that the whole of the sentence represents the rheme, or perhaps that the whole division into theme and rheme cannot be applied here. Though both views are plausible the first seems preferable. We will prefer to say that *Jennie* represents the theme/and emphasize that the theme in this case is not something already familiar but the starting point of the sentence.

The same may be said of most sentences opening a text. Let us for instance consider the opening sentence of E. M. Forster's "A Passage to India": *Except for the Malabar Caves — and they are twenty miles off — the city of Chandrapore presents nothing extraordinary.* Leaving aside the prepositional phrase *except for the Malabar Caves* and the parenthetical clause *and they are twenty miles off,* the main body of the sentence may be taken either as containing a theme: *the city of Chandrapore,* and a rheme — *presents nothing extraordinary,* or it might be taken as a unit not admitting of a division into theme and rheme. The first view seems preferable, as it was in the preceding

example. Similar observations might of course be made when analysing actual everyday speech.

(2) Many questions concerning functional sentence perspective have not been solved yet and further investigation is required. It is by no means certain that every sentence can be divided into two clear-cut parts representing the theme and the rheme respectively. In many cases there are probably intermediate elements, not belonging unequivocally to this or that part, though perhaps tending rather one way or another. J. Firbas in his analysis of English functional sentence perspective has very subtly pointed out these intermediate elements and described their function from this viewpoint.[23]

The problem of functional sentence perspective, which appears to be one of the essential problems of modern linguistic study, requires further careful investigation before a complete theory of all phenomena belonging to this sphere can be worked out. The main principles and starting points have, however, been clarified to a degree sufficient to make such future studies fruitful and promising.

<div align="center">QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS</div>

1. Dwell on the history of FSP.
2. What is the essence of the notions 'theme' and 'rheme'?
3. Enumerate different linguistic means of signalling FSP.
4. What problems of FSP have not been solved yet?

Text 6 M.Y.Blokh: A Course in Theoretical English Grammar. M., 2000, p. 236-243

<div align="center">

Chapter XXII
ACTUAL DIVISION OF THE SENTENCE

</div>

§ 1. The notional parts of the sentence referring to the basic elements of the reflected situation form, taken together, the nominative meaning of the sentence. For the sake of terminological consistency, the division of the sentence into notional parts can be just so called - the "nominative division" (its existing names are the "grammatical division" and the "syntactic division"). The discrimination of the nominative division of the sentence is traditional; it is this type of division that can conveniently be shown by a syntagmatic model, in particular, by a model of immediate constituents based on the traditional syntactic analysis (see Ch. XXIV).

Alongside the nominative division of the sentence, the idea of the so-called "actual division" of the sentence has been put forward in theoretical

---

[23] See J. Firbas, ibid.

linguistics. The purpose of the actual division of the sentence, called also the "functional sentence perspective", is to reveal the correlative significance of the sentence parts from the point of view of their actual informative role in an utterance, i.e. from the point of view of the immediate semantic contribution they make to the total information conveyed by the sentence in the context of connected speech. In other words, the actual division of the sentence in fact exposes its informative perspective.

The main components of the actual division of the sentence are the *theme* and the *rheme*. The theme expresses the starting point of the communication, i.e. it denotes an object or a phenomenon about which something is reported. The rheme expresses the basic informative part of the communication, its contextually relevant centre. Between the theme and the rheme are positioned intermediary, transitional parts of the actual division of various degrees of informative value (these parts are sometimes called "transition").

The theme of the actual division of the sentence may or may not coincide with the subject of the sentence. The rheme of the actual division, in its turn, may or may not coincide with the predicate of the sentence - either with the whole predicate group or its part, such as the predicative, the object, the adverbial.

Thus, in the following sentences of various emotional character the theme is expressed by the subject, while the rheme is expressed by the predicate:

Max bounded forward. Again Charlie is being too clever! Her advice can't be of any help to us.

In the first of the above sentences the rheme coincides with the whole predicate group. In the second sentence the adverbial introducer *again* can be characterized as a transitional element, i.e. an element informationally intermediary between the theme and the rheme, the latter being expressed by the rest of the predicate group. The main part of the rheme - the "peak" of informative perspective - is rendered in this sentence by the intensified predicative *too clever*. In the third sentence the addressee object *to us* is more or less transitional, while the informative peak, as in the previous example, is expressed by the predicative *of any help*.

In the following sentences the correlation between the nominative and actual divisions is the reverse: the theme is expressed by the predicate or its part, while the rheme is rendered by the subject:

Through the open window came the purr of an approaching motor car. Who is coming late but John! There is a difference of opinion between the parties.

Historically, the theory of actual division of the sentence is connected with the logical analysis of the proposition. The principal parts of the proposition, as is known, are the logical subject and the logical predicate. These, like the theme and the rheme, may or may not coincide, respectively, with the subject and the predicate of the sentence. The logical categories of subject and

predicate are prototypes of the linguistic categories of theme and rheme. However, if logic analyses its categories of subject and predicate as the meaningful components of certain forms of thinking, linguistics analyses the categories of theme and rheme as the corresponding means of expression used by the speaker for the sake of rendering the informative content of his communications.

§ 2. The actual division of the sentence finds its full expression only in a concrete context of speech, therefore it is sometimes referred to as the "contextual" division of the sentence. This can be illustrated by the following example:

Mary is fond of poetry.

In the cited sentence, if we approach it as a stylistically neutral construction devoid of any specific connotations, the theme is expressed by the subject, and the rheme, by the predicate. This kind of actual division is "direct". On the other hand, a certain context may be built around the given sentence in the conditions of which the order of actual division will be changed into the reverse: the subject will turn into the exposer of the rheme, while the predicate, accordingly, into the exposer of the theme. *Cf.*:

"Isn't it surprising that Tim is so fond of poetry?" – "But you are wrong. Mary is fond of poetry, not Tim."

The actual division in which the rheme is expressed by the subject is to be referred to as "inverted".

§ 3. The close connection of the actual division of the sentence with the context in the conditions of which it is possible to divide the informative parts of the communication into those "already known" by the listener and those "not yet known" by him, gave cause to the recognized founder of the linguistic theory of actual division J. Mathesius to consider this kind of sentence division as a purely semantic factor sharply opposed to the "formally grammatical" or "purely syntactic" division of the sentence (in our terminology called its "nominative" division).

One will agree that the actual division of the sentence will really lose all connection with syntax if its components are to be identified solely on the principle of their being "known" or "unknown" to the listener. However, we must bear in mind that the informative value of developing speech consists not only in introducing new words that denote things and phenomena not mentioned before; the informative value of communications lies also in their disclosing various new relations between the elements of reflected events, though the elements themselves may be quite familiar to the listener. The expression of a certain aspect of these relations, namely, the correlation of the said elements from the point of view of their immediate significance in a given utterance produced as a predicative item of a continual speech, does enter the structural plane of language. This expression becomes part and parcel of the structural

system of language by the mere fact that the correlative informative significance of utterance components are rendered by quite definite, generalized and standardized lingual constructions. The functional purpose of such constructions is to reveal the meaningful centre of the utterance (i.e. its rheme) in distinction to the starting point of its content (i.e. its theme).

These constructions do not present any "absolutely formal", "purely differential" objects of language which are filled with semantic content only in the act of speech communication. On the contrary, they are bilateral signemic units in exactly the same sense as other meaningful constructions of language, i.e. they are distinguished both by their material form and their semantics. It follows from this that the constructional, or immediately systemic side of the phenomenon which is called the "actual division of the sentence" belongs to no other sphere of language than syntax. And the crucial syntactic destination of the whole aspect of the actual division is its rheme-identifying function, since an utterance is produced just for the sake of conveying the meaningful content expressed by its central informative part, i.e. by the rheme.

§ 4. Among the formal means of expressing the distinction between the theme and the rheme investigators name such structural elements of language as word-order patterns, intonation contours, constructions with introducers, syntactic patterns of contrastive complexes, constructions with articles and other determiners, constructions with intensifying particles.

The difference between the actual division of sentences signalled by the difference in their word-order patterns can be most graphically illustrated by the simplest type of transformations. *Cf.*:

The winner of the competition stood on the platform in the middle of the hall. → On the platform in the middle of the hall stood the winner of the competition. Fred didn't notice the flying balloon. → The one who didn't notice the flying balloon was Fred. Helen should be the first to receive her diploma. → The first to receive her diploma should be Helen.

In all the cited examples, i.e. both base sentences and their transforms, the rheme (expressed either by the subject or by an element of the predicate group) is placed towards the end of the sentence, while the theme is positioned at the beginning of it. This kind of positioning the components of the actual division corresponds to the natural development of thought from the starting point of communication to its semantic centre, or, in common parlance, from the "known data" to the "unknown (new) data". Still, in other contextual conditions, the reversed order of positioning the actual division components is used, which can be shown by the following illustrative transformations:

It was unbelievable to all of them. → Utterly unbelievable it was to all of them. Now you are speaking magic words, Nancy. → Magic words you are speaking now, Nancy. You look so well! → How well you look!

It is easily seen from the given examples that the reversed order of the actual division, i.e. the positioning of the rheme at the beginning of the sentence, is connected with emphatic speech.

Among constructions with introducers, the *there*-pattern provides for the rhematic identification of the subject without emotive connotations. *Cf.*:

Tall birches surrounded the lake. → *There were tall birches surrounding the lake. A loud hoot came from the railroad.* → *There came a loud hoot from the railroad.*

Emphatic discrimination of the rheme expressed by various parts of the sentence is achieved by constructions with the anticipatory *it. Cf.*:

Grandma gave them *a moments' deep consideration*. → It was a moment's deep consideration that Grandma gave them. She had just escaped *something simply awful*. → It was something simply awful that she had just escaped. At that moment *Laura* joined them. → It was *Laura* who joined them at that moment.

Syntactic patterns of contrastive complexes arc used to expose the rheme of the utterance in cases when special accuracy of distinction is needed. This is explained by the fact that the actual division as such is always based on some sort of antithesis or "contraposition" (see further), which in an ordinary speech remains implicit. Thus, a syntactic contrastive complex is employed to make explicative the inner contrast inherent in the actual division by virtue of its functional nature. This can be shown on pairs of nominatively cognate examples of antithetic constructions where each member-construction will expose its own contrastively presented element, *Cf.*:

The costume is meant *not for your cousin, but for you.- -The costume, not the frock*, is meant for you, my dear. The strain told *not so much on my visitor as on myself.- - The strain of the situation, not the relaxation of it,* was what surprised me.

Determiners, among them the articles, used as means of forming certain patterns of actual division, divide their functions so that the definite determiners serve as identifiers of the theme while the indefinite determiners serve as identifiers of the rheme. *Cf.*:

The *man* walked up and down the platform. - - *A man* walked up and down the platform. *The whole book* was devoted to the description of a tiny island on the Pacific.- - A whole book is needed to describe that tiny island on the Pacific. I'm sure *Nora's knitting needles* will suit you. - -I'm sure *any knitting needles* will suit you.

Intensifying particles identify the rheme, commonly imparting emotional colouring to the whole of the utterance. *Cf.*:

Mr. Stores had a part in the general debate. → *Even Mr. Stores* had a part in the general debate. Then he sat down in one of the armchairs. → *Only then* did he sit down in one of the armchairs. We were impressed by what we heard and saw. → We were *so impressed* by what we heard and saw.

As for intonation as a means of realizing the actual division, it might appear that its sphere is relatively limited, being confined to oral speech only. On closer consideration, however, this view of rheme-identifying role of intonation proves inadequate. To appreciate the true status of intonation in the actual division of the sentence, one should abstract oneself from "paper syntax" (description of written texts) and remember that it is phonetical speech, i.e. articulately pronounced utterances that form the basis of human language as a whole. As soon as the phonetical nature of language is duly taken account of, intonation with its accent-patterns presents itself not as a limited, but as a universal and indisputable means of expressing the actual division in all types and varieties of lingual contexts. This universal rheme-identifying function of intonation has been described in treatises on logic, as well as in traditional philological literature, in terms of "logical accent". The "logical accent", which amounts linguistically to the "rhematic accent", is inseparable from the other rheme-identifying means described above, especially from the word-order patterns. Moreover, all such means in written texts in fact represent the logical accent, i.e. they indicate its position either directly or indirectly. This can be seen on all the examples hitherto cited in the present chapter.

§ 5. While recognizing the logical accent as a means of effecting the actual division, we must strictly distinguish between the elements immediately placed under the phonetical, "technical" stress, and the sentence segments which are identified as the informative centre of communication, in the true sense of the term.

Technically, not only notional, but functional units as well can be phrasally stressed in an utterance, which in modern printed texts is shown by special graphical ways of identification, such as italics, bold type, etc. *Cf.*:

"I can't bring along someone who isn't invited." – "But I *am* invited! said Miss Casement (I. Murdoch). Moreover, being a highly intelligent young woman, she'd be careful *not* to be the only one affected (A. Christie).

However, it would be utterly incorrect to think that in such instances only those word-units are logically, i.e. rhematically, marked out as are stressed phonetically. As a matter of fact, functional elements cannot express any self-dependent nomination; they do not exist by themselves, but make up units of nomination together with the notional elements of utterances whose meanings they specify. Thus, the phrasal phonetical stress, technically making prominent some functional clement, thereby identifies as rhematic the corresponding notional part ("knot") of the utterance as a whole. It is such notional parts that are real members of the opposition "theme – rheme", not their functional constituents taken separately. As for the said functional constituents themselves, these only set up specific semantic bases on which the relevant rhematic antitheses are built up.

§ 6. The actual division, since it is effected upon the already produced nominative sentence base providing for its contextually relevant manifestation,

enters the predicative aspect of the sentence. It makes up part of syntactic predication, because it strictly meets the functional purpose of predication as such, which is to relate the nominative content of the sentence to reality (see Ch. XXI). This predicative role of the actual division shows that its contextual relevance is not reduced to that of a passive, concomitant factor of expression. On the contrary, the actual division is an active means of expressing functional meanings, and, being organically connected with the context, it is not so much context-governed as it is context-governing: in fact, it does build up concrete contexts out of constructional sentence-models chosen to reflect different situations and events.

One of the most important manifestations of the immediate contextual relevance of the actual division is the regular deletion (ellipsis) of the thematic parts of utterances in dialogue speech. By this syntactic process, the rheme of the utterance or its most informative part (peak of informative perspective) is placed in isolation, thereby being graphically presented to the listener. *Cf*.:

"You've got the letters?"-"*In my bag*" (G.W. Target). "How did you receive him?" – "*Coldly*" (J. Galsworthy).

In other words, the thematic reduction of sentences in the context, resulting in a constructional economy of speech, performs an informative function in parallel with the logical accent: it serves to accurately identify the rheme of the utterance.

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

1. What is the connection of actual division of the sentence with the logical analysis of the proposition?
2. Comment on the connection of the actual division of the sentence with the context.

Text 7 B.Ilyish: The Structure of Modern English, L., 1971, p.351-354

REPRESENTATION AND SUBSTITUTION

It will often be found in Modern Enlgish, as in other languages, that some element of a sentence apparently necessary to its meaning is not actually there and its function is taken up by some other element. We will first illustrate this general statement by two examples which will at the same time show two different ways of expressing the function of an element which is not there: (1) *I could not find him, though I wanted to.* (2) *He works more than you do.* The full text of these sentences would evidently run like this: (1) *I could not find him, though I wanted to find him.* (2) *He works more than you work.* What we have to

discuss is, in what way the meaning of the words *find him* and *work* respectively is suggested without their being actually used in the sentence. In the first of the two sentences, *I could not find him, though I wanted to,* the meaning of the missing infinitive *to find* with the adhering pronoun *him* is suggested by merely using the infinitival particle *to* (after *wanted)* which, as it were, does duty for the infinitive and the pronoun (or it might be a noun, or indeed any phrase denoting the object of the verb *find).* No extra word is used here, that is, no word that would not stand in the full text of the sentence as we have reconstructed it. The particle *to* may be said to represent the infinitive and the noun or pronoun denoting the object of the action.

This way of suggesting the meaning of words not actually used may be termed "representation".

In our other example, *He works more than you do,* things are somewhat different. If we compare the text as it stands with the full version: *He works more than you work,* we see that there is in our text a word that is not found in the full version, namely the verb *do.* It is quite obvious that the verb *do* in such cases may replace any verb except the auxiliaries *be, have,* etc., and the modal verbs *can, may,* etc. It should also be noted that the verb *do* in this function need not necessarily be in the same tense, or mood, as the verb which it replaces.

This case differs from the one considered above in that a word appears which would not have been used in a full version of the sentence. This way may be termed "substitution", as distinct from representation.

Having established the main facts concerning representation and substitution, we can now proceed to point out some typical phenomena of both kinds in Modern English.

There are some cases of representation highly characteristic of the English language. Among these we must mention, in the first place, representation by an auxiliary verb of an analytical verb form of which it is a part. The auxiliary verbs capable of performing this function are, *be, have, shall, will, should, would,* e. g. "*Oh, shes fainted again,*" "*No I havnt.*" (SHAW) The auxiliary always represents the analytical verb form which was last used in the sentence. This indeed appears to be the only natural and idiomatic way of expressing the ideas in question: if the speaker had used the full form, this would in every case sound strikingly awkward and inappropriate, no matter what the stylistic sphere of the text may be. Compare also: "*Which of us was the better fencer?*" "*I was.*" "*Of course you were*" (Idem)

This kind of representation is found within the limits of one sentence, as in the example already quoted: *She didn't count with Stella, never had, and never would* (WOODHILL) and also in short answers in dialogue, as in the following extracts: "*I have a frightful feeling that I shall let myself be married because it is the world's will that you should have a husband*" "*I daresay I shall, someday*" (SHAW) "*Do you intend to tell him what you have been telling me to-night?*" "*I hadn't meant to. I had rather not*" (R. MAGAULAY)

Auxiliary and modal verbs, and the infinitival particle *to* are the chief means of representation in Modern English.

The other way of suggesting the meaning of a word that is not actually used in the sentence is substitution. Instead of repeating a word that has already been used in the sentence, or in the preceding one, another word is used, whose own lexical meaning is irrelevant and which serves as a means of "hinting" at the meaning of the word that is not repeated.

The two main words used in this function are the verb *do* and the pronoun *one,* each in its own sphere, of course. The verb *do* can substitute any verb except those enumerated on page 351, in fact it can substitute all the verbs with which it is used to form their interrogative and negative forms. For instance, it can substitute the verb *appreciate,* as in the sentence *Nobody can appreciate it more than I do* (SHAW), just as it is used in its interrogative and negative forms: *Do you appreciate it? He does not appreciate it,* etc. But it cannot be used to substitute, for instance, the verb *must,* just as it is not used to derive interrogative and negative forms of that verb.

It will be readily seen that in the sphere of verbs representation and substitution complete each other: in some verbal forms (present indefinite and past indefinite) substitution by *do* is used, whereas in all other forms (the analytical ones) representation is the method used.

Occasionally the verb *do* in this function can even precede the verb which it replaces. This is the case in the following sentence: *As he was accustomed to doing, Harry closed the sale and had the signed contract in his pocket within fifteen minutes.* (E. CALDWELL) It may even be said that the verb *do* here replaces the whole phrase *closed… fifteen minutes.*

As to the other substitution word, the pronoun *one,* it is of course used to substitute nouns. It is important to note that its use is limited. The noun to be substituted should be in its indefinite variety, that is, it should be accompanied by the indefinite article: otherwise its substitution by the pronoun *one* is not possible. Compare the two following bits of dialogue: (1) "*Have you found an English teacher?" "Yes, I have found one,"* but (2) "*Have you found the English teacher?" "Yes, I have found him* (or *her),"* not "*one".* Or again: "*Do you know a foreign language?" "Yes, I know one,"* but "*Do you know the English language?" "Yes, I know it."*

So the meaning of indefiniteness adheres to the pronoun *one* as it does to the indefinite article, whose doublet it actually is. However, the pronoun *one* differs from the indefinite article in that it has a plural form *(ones),* which the indefinite article of course has not.

On the other hand, however, the pronoun *one* can also be used with reference to a definite object, and in that case it is preceded by the definite article and some limiting attribute must come either before it (i. e. between the definite article and the pronoun) or after it, in the shape of an attributive clause with or without a relative pronoun. Hence the following types of groups are

possible:(1) *the green one, the larger one,* (2) *the one which you mentioned the one he bought,* etc. or in the plural, (1) *the green ones, the ones you mentioned,* (2) *the ones which you mentioned, the ones he bought,* etc.

Though the pronoun *one* is thus a very common substitute for a noun not repeated in the sentence, it by no means follows that the pronoun must be used wherever such repetition is avoided. Sentences are numerous enough in which the pronoun *one* is not used: we may say that in these cases it is the preceding attribute (which is usually, if not always, an adjective) that represents the omitted noun which is to be understood from a former part of the sentence, or from a preceding sentence. Here is a characteristic example from the beginning of a sketch by Jerome K. Jerome: "*Now, which would you advise, dear? You see, with the red I shan't be able to wear my magenta hat." "Well, then, why not have the grey?" "Yes, yes, I think the grey will be more useful" "It's a good material." "Yes, and it's a pretty grey. You know what I mean, dear; not a common grey. Of course grey is always an uninteresting colour." "It's quiet." "And then again, what I feel about the red is that it is so warm-looking. Red makes you feel warm even when you're not warm. You know what I mean, dear." "Well, then, why not have the red? It suits you – red"*

In the whole of this extract the noun *material*, to which the words *red* and *grey* refer, has only been used once. It appears, too, that the adjectives *red* and *grey* tend to be substantivized, as is seen from the use of the phrases *a pretty grey* and *a common grey.*

Speaking of substitution in a wider sense, we might include personal pronouns of the third person, which more often than not perform this function. But this lies beyond that specific sphere or representation and substitution which we are considering here, and besides in this use of personal pronouns English does not appear to differ in any way from other languages.

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

1. Give the definition of representation, comment on representation in noun and verb phrases.
2. Give the definition of substitution, comment on cases of substitution in noun and verb phrases.
3. Can we regard representation and substitution as cases of ellipsis?

III. Immediate Constituents

Text 1 D.Crystal: Linguistics, Lnd., 1990, p.200-203.

And it is certainly true that the techniques of IC analysis which were developed, and the detailed elaborations of some of Bloomfield's followers (such as Zellig Harris) were both illuminating and precise. A great deal of new information was accumulated in a systematic way, particularly about the way in which small sentences could be expanded to apparently infinite lengths following certain procedures, as in

Buns taste nice.
Those delightful buns you bought taste nice.
Not quite all those delightful currant buns you bought
the other day from that shop on the corner taste nice.
                                                        etc.

The same kind of diagram as above could be used to display many of the structural relationships which exist between the words and morphemes of these complex sentences, as in the figure below. Not surprisingly, however, it was recognized in due course that there were many problems involved in IC analysis, and it is important for understanding subsequent developments to be fully aware what these were. They fell into two categories. On the one hand, it was sometimes difficult to use IC analysis in a completely consistent way; on the other, there seemed to be a number of important insights into grammar, which IC analysis was missing. And while techniques based on IC analysis are still used by most linguists, they are now viewed as a very small part of what a grammar has to do.

The large currant buns   in   the window taste very   nice

Example of unlabelled IC analysis

It is easy to illustrate these problems, and no more than a brief illustration is required to make the point. It is not always clear, for instance, where the break (or 'cut') between constituents is to come. Normally it is possible to decide intuitively, on the basis of the way in which the meaning of a sentence is organized, or, more explicitly, in terms of the way in which the parts of the

sentence distribute themselves and function, where to draw the dividing line between constituents. No one in their right mind would divide our earlier sentence into *Poor* and *John ran away,* for instance. But sometimes two linguists, both in their right minds, will not agree about the place of a cut. Consider the problems raised by the kind of structure discussed in the Interlude above (p. 126 ff.). *That nice, efficient, old-fashioned secretary is here.* After the first cut, which causes no problem (between *secretary* and *is),* what should we do? Should the noun phrase be divided into *that* and *nice, efficient, old-fashioned secretary,* or into *that nice, efficient, old-fashioned* and *secretary,* or should we somehow try to take out *that* and *secretary* together (producing a 'discontinuous' constituent), thus leaving the adjectives? Or, considering adjectives separately, should we make our first cut between *nice* and *efficient, old-fashioned,* or between *nice, efficient* and *old-fashioned?* Or should we drop the normal IC principle of cutting two at a time (as the above diagrams show), and allow a simultaneous threefold cutting process to take place here, as follows?

S

That   Adjective   secretary

Nice   efficient   old-fashioned

If we also adopt this analysis, then we have to give reasons for using a 'binary' splitting method some of the time in IC analysis (as with *Poor John ran away,* which can hardly be split into three), and a 'ternary' one at other times - and such reasons are not very easy to think up. The existence of so many alternative analyses, then, constitutes a major problem.

Such difficulties might of course be overcome, given time and ingenuity. What makes one not want to bother trying to overcome them is the realization that IC analysis is not worth it. It is not the key to the understanding of grammatical structure in language. It is a technique - an extremely useful technique, at times - which can organize our data in certain ways and provide a first insight into its structure. But there is too, much of importance in grammar which IC analysis by its very nature, cannot handle, to allow it to be any more than a preliminary tool for sorting and classifying. In what main ways, then, is it inadequate?

It does not take much thought to see that there are many important grammatical relationships which could never be brought to light by IC techniques, or which are taken for granted by them. The kinds and degrees of relationship which exist between sentences, for example, are obscured. There is no way of finding out about such intuitively obvious correlations as the relationship between active and passive sentences, for instance. Part of the reason is that IC analysis proceeds one sentence at a time. It can suggest one

analysis for *That man saw John's mother,* it can suggest another for *John's mother was seen by that man.* But how does IC analysis tell us that these two sentences are closely related, that one sentence is 'the active of' the other - that in this case they both mean the same thing? It cannot provide this information. All the analysis tells us about is the structure of the two sentences, seen as isolates. And yet, it can be argued (and all linguists would argue) it is important for a grammar to tell us about their relationships as well. Knowing a language means, amongst other things, knowing when there are two ways of expressing the same thing grammatically. It means being able to manipulate the rules of the language, so that we do not have to learn the structure of every new sentence we wish to use from scratch, but rather apply an already-learned rule to fresh material. Once I have 'learned' that two such sentences as the above are structurally related, I can apply my knowledge and produce fresh pairs of sentences. Given the sentence *Seventeen elephants trampled on my country house the other day,* I 'know' that it is possible to say *My country house was trampled on by seventeen elephants the other day.* And the only way in which we can explain how I know this is by postulating that I have learned a rule which tells me how to form passive sentences from active ones, and vice versa. This rule, then, is a feature of the language's structure which any grammatical analysis should make explicit. IC analysis, however, does not make it explicit. It tacitly assumes that any such information would be supplied, in an informal way, by the intuition of the native speaker.

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

1. What problems are involved in IC analysis?
2. Why does D.Cristal think that IC analysis is 'an extremely useful technique'?
3. Is it always clear where to put cuts between constituents?
4. Comment on the role of intuition of the native speaker in IC analysis.

Text 2 D.Crystal: Linguistics, Lnd., 1990, p.204-209

I have already talked in earlier sections about the view of language as a functional system. IC analysis takes very limited account of this, emphasizing almost wholly a concern to identify and classify constituents of sentences, and paying next to no attention to the *functions* of any given constituent, or class of constituents - or indeed of the sentences as wholes. And it is this emphasis which is perhaps the dominant feature of the post-Bloomfieldian grammatical scene - up until the mid fifties. It was felt (as Chapter 3 has pointed out, p. 121) that linguistics was essentially a means of providing procedures for segmenting and classifying utterances, on the basis of identifying partial formal similarities between them, and for plotting the distribution of these similarities in terms of

structural sequences of various kinds. To establish the 'structure' of different types of utterance in this way, using the procedures of IC analysis, was considered an adequate goal for linguistics. The whole tenor of argument in the late 1950s was to show that this is not so; but from Bloomfield until Chomsky these ideas were on the whole unquestioned. The other major feature of the post-Bloomfieldian period in linguistics arises out of the use of the term 'formal' above: there was no theoretical reliance on the idea of 'meaning' in making or formulating a grammatical analysis. Utterances were analysed and items classified on the basis of their formal properties - their physical shape, their observed distribution and structure. The meanings of the utterances, or of their component parts, were not given a systematic place in the investigation. This attitude had a very clear origin in the markedly behaviourist principles of Bloomfield in his book *Language,* where there was fairly inflexible adherence to the demands of empirical scientific method; he placed no reliance at all on the intuitions of the analyst or native speaker, and avoided like the plague any suggestion that the constructs of linguistic analysis had a psychological status. Meaning was felt to be an 'internal' phenomenon, a mental residue not susceptible to direct investigation - and only approached in terms of distinctive configurations of behavioural stimuli and responses. The lack of any precise tools for identifying, defining, classifying and interrelating meanings added to the avoidance of meaning in grammatical study. As a result, linguists of this period attempted to carry out their descriptions without any reference to the meaning of the utterances being described. Some tried to eliminate all mention of meaning from their accounts, considering it 'extra-linguistic' in character. Others, including Bloomfield himself, recognized and emphasized that one could never really exclude meaning from questions of linguistic analysis, but considered statements about meaning to be a later task of the linguist, dependent on the prior study of the formal characteristics of language in their own terms. In any case (it was argued), syntax was already complex enough to analyse properly without letting meanings in as well. It is this kind of reasoning which underlay many of the criticisms of traditional grammar (cf. p. 73), and which led scholars to set up noun (etc.) classes by defining them formally, in terms of their position in a sentence, their morphological characteristics, and so on, and leaving questions of their meaning (either as a class, or individually) until a later, and unspecified, stage of investigation.

Whatever else language is, it is *meaningful* activity. What distinguishes the sounds issuing from our mouths as language from mere noise is whether they 'carry a meaning' or not. To communicate meaning successfully is the main end of linguistic behaviour. To talk about linguistic analysis without reference to meaning, would be like describing the construction of ships without any reference to the sea. Even nouns and sentences (cf. p. 73) might usefully be defined on semantic as well as formal grounds, if the terms of the semantic definition could be made precise. And we have already seen how impossible it is

to rule considerations of meaning out of even the most elementary of formal notions: how we group sounds into phonemes, or where we make the cut in IC analysis, and the whole basis of morphemic analysis presupposes the importance of meaning. It would seem both stubborn and naive not to introduce it systematically into any analysis right from the beginning, therefore.

Now we are constantly 'disambiguating' (as it is sometimes massively put) sentences all the time when we use and listen to language; so much so that any grammatical theory must have as one of its primary goals the means of accounting for this facility. Meaning and grammatical analysis, on this account, turn out to be two sides of the same coin.

In IC analysis, however, such disambiguation was impossible: an IC diagram either presented one meaning of a sentence only, and ignored the others; or it left us with a sentence analysis which was still ambiguous. Another of Chomsky's famous examples illustrates this last point more clearly. He takes the two sentences *John is eager to please* and *John is easy to please,* and points out that in traditional constituent terms, both sentences would get the same analysis. '0n the surface' (to introduce the metaphor most widely used in this connection) they have the same structure. But 'under-neath' we all know, if we think about it for a moment, that the word *John* has two very different roles to play in the two sentences. In the first sentence *he* is the person who is doing the pleasing; in the second sentence, *he* is the person who is being pleased. Putting it in grammatical terms, *John* is the underlying 'subject' of the first sentence, and the underlying 'object' of the second. Here too, then, we can see how a traditional linguistic account of the 'surface grammar', in terms of the classification and distribution of morphemes in the sentence, would get nowhere near explaining a fundamental distinction of this kind. A concept of 'deep grammar' has to be invoked. For this reason, if none other, structuralist accounts of language would have to be drastically revised.

QUESTIONS

1. What is the structuralist approach to meaning?
2. Does IC analysis solve the problem of ambignity of syntactic structures?
3. Why, in the opinion of D.Crystal, structuralist accounts of language would have to be drastically revised?

Text 3 Ch. Hockett: A Course in Modern Linguistics, USA, 1960, p.154-156

17.5. Multiple ICs. In all our diagrams so far, composite forms have been shown as consisting of just two ICs. Bipartite composite forms are extremely common, but there is no universal restriction to two ICs. English has a few cases

of composite forms with three ICs; for example, *foot-pound-second* or *centimeter-gram-second.* Figure 17.7 shows the way of diagramming them.

Eng-	-land	use-	-s	the	foot	pound	second	system

FIGURE 17.7

17.6. Discontinuous ICs. Our examples so far have had another property which is common but not universal: forms which belong together as ICs of a larger form have been next to each other in linear sequence. But *discontinuous* constituents are not at all uncommon. For example, in the English sentence *Is John going with you?,* setting intonation aside, one IC is *John* and the other is the discontinuous sequence *Is . . . going with you.*

Figures 17.8A and B show two graphic devices for handling this. In Figure 17.8A, the form *John* is entered at the beginning to render diagramming easy, but is parenthesized to indicate that it is not actually spoken there; the empty parentheses after *is* indicate the position it actually occupies in the sequence. In Figure 17.8B we avoid the duplication, but place a heavy line below the entry *John,* and mark with a dotted arrow the connection between *John* and the larger form of which it is one IC.

17.7. Simultaneous ICs. An intonation morpheme is probably always to be interpreted as one IC of the macrosegment which includes it, the remainder of the macrosegment, no matter how complex, constituting the other IC. In order

(John)	I-	-s	( )	go-	-ing	with	You	?

A

I-	-s	John	go-	-ing	with	you	?

B

FIGURE 17.8

2	3 1				
He	i-	-s	not	here	↓

FIGURE 17.9

to show this diagrammatically we have to introduce another special device, illustrated in Figure 17.9. It is necessary to mark the positions of the PLs and TC correctly, since any alternation in their position might yield a different sentence (e.g., [2]*He is* [3]*not here*[1]↓).

Diagramming is not an end in itself, but a convenient means of revealing hierarchical structure. For this, it is useful to have diagrammatic conventions. But where the structure is unusual, diagramming may become excessively complex. In such instances, we shall avoid diagrams and resort to verbal description.

QUESTIONS

1. Can ambignity of syntactic structures be eliminated with the help of the IC analysis?
2. What sentence elements are called markers (structural markers) or signals by Ch.Hockett?
3. What are multiple constituents and how are they diagrammed in the ICs analysis?
4. Comment on the notion of discontinuous ICs. What is the way to diagram them?
5. What is characteristic of simultaneous ICs?

Text 4 F.Palmer: Grammar, Lnd., 1971, p.124-133

3.2 1C analysis

It is reported that one American linguist of the 1950s remarked that syntax was that part of linguistics that everyone hoped the other fellow would do. For although they had, apparently, succeeded in establishing the smallest

unit of grammar, the linguists had little to offer towards the total analysis of the sentence. What other grammatical units are there and how are they all combined?

The structuralists' answer was in part to start dividing the sentence up into its 'Immediate Constituents' - or ICs for short.

This is quite simply illustrated by the sentence *A young man with a paper followed the girl with a blue dress.* We can show the order of the segmentation by using one upright line for the first cut, two upright lines for the second and so on (reasons for choice of division are given below), and so arrive at:

A ||| **young** |||| **man** || **with** ||| a |||| **paper** | **follow-** |||
ed || **the** |||| **girl** ||| **with** |||| a ||||| **blue** |||||| **dress.**

Another, now more common, name for this kind of analysis is 'bracketing'; we use brackets as in algebra. This is, however, more difficult to read unless we actually number the brackets, though in fact it is unambiguous:

(((A) ((young) (man))) ((with) ((a) (paper))))
(((follow) (ed)) (((the) (girl)) ((with) ((a)
((blue) (dress))))))).

Quite the best method of display is to use the principle of the family tree, with the main branching showing the main division and so on. In fact, the terms 'tree diagram' and 'branching' have become technical terms in this kind of analysis. For our sentence the tree would be:

A young man   with a paper   followed   the girl   with a blue dress

How do we know where to make the cuts ? The answer lies in the notion of 'expansion'. This is a technical term and is not to be taken in a literal sense. A sequence of morphemes that patterns like another sequence is said to be an expansion of it. The definition of expansion is, that is to say, in terms of similarity of pattern. We can test for this similarity by substituting one sequence for another, since to say that the sequence patterns are alike is to say that they will appear in the same kind of environment.

For IC analysis we are particularly interested in the substitution of longer sequences for shorter ones, and in particular for single morphemes. (It would

seem that the term expansion is a little nearer its literal sense if one or two morphemes are 'expanded' into a larger number.)

In the sentence we have just been considering, the first ICs are *A young man with a paper* and *followed the girl with a blue dress.* But why is this cut chosen rather than segmentation into *A young man with a paper followed* and *the girl with a blue dress?* The reasoning is as follows. First we can establish that *A young man with a paper* is an expansion of, say, *John.* That is to say, it patterns like *John* and can be substituted for *John.* We can see this from the fact that we can say *John followed the girl with a blue dress* or that we can say both *A young man with a paper came in* and *John came in.* Similarly, we can establish that *followed the girl with a blue dress* is an expansion of, say, *worked* since we can again substitute; we can say *A young man with a paper worked* or both *The boy followed the girl with a blue dress* and *The boy worked.* The second stage of the argument is to look at the sentence *John worked* and to argue that the obvious ICs are *John* and *worked* (the only other possible segmentation is into *John work-,* and *-ed* since we have only three morphemes *John, work-,* and *–ed*). If we cut *John worked* into *John* and *worked,* it follows that because they are expansions *of John* and *worked* the ICs of our other sentence are *A young man with a paper* and *followed the girl with a blue dress.* We cannot segment into *A young man with a paper followed* and *the girl with a blue dress* because the first of these, at least, is not an expansion of any obvious smaller sequence (and in particular not of a single morpheme such as *John).*

Similar principles allow us to carry out IC analysis further. We can argue that *A young man* is an expansion of *children* and that *with a paper* is an expansion of *asleep* since they pattern in much the same way; comparison with *children asleep,* which has the IC analysis *children* and *asleep,* yields the ICs *A young man* and *with a paper.* To establish the division into *followed and the girl with a blue dress* we may take *hated* and *women* and the sequence *hated women.*

Expansion in this sense is not literally expansion; it is the technical name for the substitution of one sequence of morphemes for another. But there are examples in which we can think of expansion in terms of starting with one item and then successively adding items to it:

Children
American children
three American children
those three American children
those three American children with a dog

Though this is expansion in a more literal sense it is still expansion in the technical sense, for the last of these, *those three American children with a dog,* can be substituted for *children* in plenty of environments, e.g. *... like ice cream.*

It is obvious that in itself dividing a sentence into ICs does not provide much information. Nevertheless it can sometimes prove illuminating. It can sometimes account for ambiguities and distinguish them. A famous example is

old men and women. Obviously we can see the ambiguity by paraphrasing; it is either *old men and women of all ages* or *old men and old women.* The principle of expansion here allows us two interpretations. Either *old men* is an expansion of a single morpheme (e.g. *men* or *boys)* or *men and women* is an expansion of a single morpheme (e.g. *people* or *men).* This would allow us to recognize two different IC analyses, as shown by the trees:

old   men   and   women   old   men   and   women

Similarly, we can make *Egyptian cotton shirt* unambiguous by having the first cut either after *Egyptian* (cotton shirt made in Egypt) or after *cotton* (shirt made of Egyptian cotton). Slightly more difficult is *He said he was coming today.* If *today* 'belongs' with *said* the first cut is presumably after *coming:* if it 'belongs' with *coming* we shall make the first cut after *said:*

He said he was coming / today.
He said / he was coming today.

In the first place the cutting was supposed to precede any attempt to identify and classify, any attempt, that is, to label the ICs as subjects, objects, noun phrases, etc. This would be an essential part of the 'scientific' procedures of structuralism. In actual fact a great deal of IC cutting can be seen to be dependent upon prior assumptions about the grammatical status of the elements. The subsequent identification and classification, the 'labelling', thus involved circularity of argument. For instance, even when we start with a sentence such as *John worked* as the model for the analysis of *All the little children ran up the hill* we are assuming that both can be analysed in terms of the traditional categories of subject and predicate. This is implicit in the treatment of *All the little children* as an expansion of *John* and *ran up the hill* as an expansion of *worked.*

A second difficulty is that a piece of language often cannot be cut into two because elements that belong together are separated in the sequence. This phenomenon is known as 'discontinuity'. For instance if we consider *the best team in the world* it is fairly obvious that *best* and *in the world* belong closely together and that the ICs (ignoring for this purpose the article *the)* are *team* and *best in the world.* But we cannot make a single cut to indicate this because one IC is already in two parts that are separated by the other. A very familiar type of discontinuity is provided by the so-called phrasal verbs, *make up, put down, take in,* etc., in for example:

She made the whole story up.
The conjurer completely took the children in.
The general soon put the rebellion down.

With such verbs the adverb *up, in, down, etc.* may often follow the object, as in these examples, yet it clearly belongs with the verb as a single constituent. To take the first example we can first cut into *She* and *made the whole story up,* but what then? The only plausible solution is to recognize a division between *made... up* and *the whole story.* There are plenty of other examples of discontinuity; another is *such a lovely house* where presumably we must divide into *a* and *such ... lovely house.* **One** of the most important examples is provided by the question forms of the type *Is John coming ?* Here we must divide into *Is... coming* and *John.* We cannot possibly show these as ICs by using brackets or the upright lines. We can, if we wish, illustrate, by using the tree diagram, but ONLY if we allow the branches to cross one another:

An alternative way would be to use boxes of the kind:

We can again show the discontinuous elements by shaping the boxes:

However, even if it were possible to make all the IC cuts without reference to our grammatical knowledge, cutting alone would not take us very far. IC analysis, therefore, always involved not merely cutting but also the identification of the elements in grammatical terms. There was not merely bracketing but labelled bracketing. This of course makes IC analysis much more 'powerful' (this too has become a semi-technical term). It can say much more about the structure of the sentences than mere cutting can.

Again, this can be illustrated by considering examples of ambiguity. A good example is provided by the joke '"Time flies". "You can't; they fly too fast."' There is only one IC analysis - *Time | flies,* but two different structures. In the intended sense we should wish to say that *time* is a noun and *flies* a verb, but in the joke that *time* is a verb *and flies* a noun. We can justify this of course by comparing the sentence on the first interpretation *to John runs,* etc., but in the second to *run races,* etc. But in doing this we are not merely finding the constituents, we are giving labels to them. This kind of labelling can be used to differentiate the two possibilities in an example that is often quoted against IC-type analysis:

> *Flying planes can be dangerous.*

If we see that we have the contrast between

> *Flying planes is dangerous.*

and   *Flying planes are dangerous.*

it becomes clear that in the one case *flying* is the head of the noun phrase, while in the other the head is *planes.* In the first both *flying* and *planes* are nouns, in the second *planes* is a noun and *flying* an adjective. Another example of exactly the same type is:

> *Visiting relatives can be a nuisance.*

Often we find that there are ambiguous pairs that differ not only in the IC analysis but also in the labels. An excellent example is yet another well known linguistic pair, which however has to be said not written - *The sun's rays meet / The sons raise meat.* These are identical in speech, but the first ICs are either *The sun's rays / meet* or *The sons / raise meat.* Clearly also *rays/raise* is a noun in the first and a verb in the second, while *meet/meat* is a verb in the first and a noun in the second. Similar arguments hold for another example that has often been quoted - *What worries me is being ignored by everyone.* This can clearly mean either that 'I am worried by being ignored by everyone' or that 'everyone is ignoring the thing that worries me'. The crucial IC point is whether we analyse the last part of this sentence as *is being ignored / by everyone* or *is / being ignored by everyone,* and, in labelling terms, whether *being ignored* is part of the verbal constituent *is being ignored,* or the nominal constituent *being ignored by everyone.*

QUESTIONS

1. What is the principle of dividing the sentence into its constituent elements?
2. What is the essence of using cuts, putting brackets and drawing 'tree diagrams' in dividing sentences into their ICs? Illustrate it by some examples chosen from some works of fiction.
3. Define the notion of 'expansion' used in reference to sentence patterns. Give examples of expansion of noun phrases (e.g. the students), verb phrases (e.g. come in) and simple sentences (e.g. John arrived).

4. What is the difference between expansion and substitution?
5. When does dividing a sentence or a phrase into ICs prove illuminating?
6. Is IC cutting dependent upon prior assumptions about the grammatical status of the sentence elements?
7. What problems arise in connection with the IC analysis? How are these problems solved?

IV. Text Linguistics

Text 1 M.Y.Blokh: A Course in Theoretical English Grammar, M., 2000, p. 351-363

Chapter XXXI
SENTENCE IN THE TEXT

§ 1. We have repeatedly shown throughout the present work that sentences in continual speech are not used in isolation; they are interconnected both semantically-topically and syntactically.

Inter-sentential connections have come under linguistic investigation but recently. The highest lingual unit which was approached by traditional grammar as liable to syntactic study was the sentence; scholars even specially stressed that to surpass the boundaries of the sentence was equal to surpassing the boundaries of grammar.

In particular such an outstanding linguist as L.Bloomfield, while recognizing the general semantic connections between sentences in the composition of texts as linguistically relevant, at the same time pointed out that the sentence is the largest grammatically arranged linguistic form, i.e. it is not included into any other linguistic form by a grammatical arrangement.[24]

However, further studies in this field have demonstrated the inadequacy of the cited thesis. It has been shown that sentences in speech do come under broad grammatical arrangements, do combine with one another on strictly syntactic lines in the formation of larger stretches of both oral talk and written text.

It. should be quite clear that, supporting the principle of syntactic approach to arrangement of sentences into a continual text, we do not assert that any sequence of independent sentences forms a syntactic unity. Generally speaking, sentences in a stretch of uninterrupted talk may or may not build up a coherent sequence, wholly depending on the purpose of the speaker. *E.g.:*

BARBARA. Dolly: don't be insincere. Cholly: fetch your concertina and play something for us (B. Shaw).

---

[24] See: *Bloomfield L.* Language. N.Y., 1933, p. 170.

The cited sequence of two sentences does not form a unity in either syntactic or semantic sense, the sentences being addressed to different persons on different reasons. A disconnected sequence may also have one and the same communication addressee, as in the following case:

DUCHESS OF BERWIC… I like him so much. I am quite delighted he's gone! How sweet you're looking! Where do you get your gowns? And now I must tell you how sorry I am for you, dear Margaret (O. Wilde).

But disconnected sequences like these are rather an exception than the rule. Moreover, they do not contradict in the least the idea of a continual topical text as being formed by grammatically interconnected sentences. Indeed, successive, sentences in a disconnected sequence mark the corresponding transitions of thought, so each of them can potentially be expanded into a connected sequence bearing on one unifying topic. Characteristically, an utterance of a personage in a work of fiction marking a transition of thought (and breaking the syntactic connection of sentences in the sequence) is usually introduced by a special author's comment. *E.g.:*

"You know, L.S., you're rather a good sport." *Then his tone grew threatening again.* "It's a big risk I'm taking. It's the biggest risk I've ever had to take" (C.P. Snow).

As we see, the general idea of a sequence of sentences forming a text includes two different notions. On the one hand, it presupposes a succession of spoken or written utterances irrespective of their forming or not forming a coherent semantic complex. On the other hand, it implies a strictly topical stretch of talk, i.e. a continual succession of sentences centering on a common informative purpose. It is this latter understanding of the text that is syntactically relevant. It is in this latter sense that the text can be interpreted as a lingual entity with its two distinguishing features: first, *semantic (topical) unity;* second, *semantico-syntactic cohesion.*

§ **2**. The primary division of sentence sequences in speech should be based on the communicative direction of their component sentences. From this point of view monologue sequences and dialogue sequences are to be discriminated.

In a monologue, sentences connected in a continual sequence are directed from one speaker to his one or several listeners. Thus, the sequence of this type can be characterized as a one-direction sequence. *E.g.:*

We'll have a lovely garden. We'll have roses in it and daffodils and a lovely lawn with a swing for little Billy and little Barbara to play on. And we'll have our meals down by the lily pond in summer (K.Waterhouse and H. Hall).

The first scholars who identified a succession of such sentences as a special syntactic unit were the Russian linguists N.S.Pospelov and LA.Bulakhovsky. The former called the unit in question a 'complex syntactic unity", the latter, a "super-phrasal unity". From consistency considerations, the

corresponding English term used in this book is the "supra-sentential-construction" (see Ch. 1).

As different from this, sentences in a dialogue sequence are uttered by the speakers-interlocutors in turn, so that they are directed, as it were, to meet one another; the sequence of this type, then, should be characterized as a two-direction sequence. *E.g.:*

"Annette, what have you done?" – "I've done what I had to do" (S.Maugham).

It must be noted that two-direction sequences can in principle be used within the framework of a monologue text, by way of an "inner dialogue" (i.e. a dialogue of the speaker with himself). *E.g.:*

What were they jabbering about now in Parliament? *Some two-penny-ha'penny tax!* (J. Galsworthy).

On the other band, one-direction sequences can be used in a dialogue, when a response utterance forms not a rejoinder, but a continuation of the stimulating utterance addressed to the same third party, or to both speakers themselves as a collective-self-addressee, or having an indefinite addressee. *E.g.:*

ST. ERTH. All the money goes to fellows who don't know a horse from a haystack. - **CANYNGE** *(profoundly)*. And care less. Yes! We want men racing to whom a horse means something (J. Galsworthy). **ELYOT**. I'm glad we didn't go out tonight. **AMANDA**. Or last night. **ELYOT**. Or the night before. **AMANDA**. There's no reason to, really, when we're cosy here (N. Coward).

Thus, the direction of communication should be looked upon as a deeper characteristic of the sentence-sequence than its outer, purely formal presentation as either a monologue (one man's speech) or a dialogue (a conversation between two parties). In order to underline these deep distinguishing features of the two types of sequences, we propose to name them by the types of sentence connection used. The formation of a one-direction sequence is based on syntactic cumulation of sentences, as different from syntactic composition of sentences making them into one composite sentence. Hence, the supra-sentential construction of one-direction communicative type can be called a cumulative sequence, or a "cumuleme". The formation of a two-direction sequence is based on its sentences being positioned to meet one another. Hence, we propose to call this type of sentence connection by the term "occursive", and the supra-sentential construction based on occursive connection, by the term "occurseme".

Furthermore, it is not difficult to see that from the hierarchical point of view the occurseme as an element of the system occupies a place above the cumuleme. Indeed if the cumuleme is constructed by two or more sentences joined by cumulation, the occurseme can be constructed by two or more cumulemes, since the utterances of the interlocutors can be formed not only by separate sentences, but by cumulative sequences as well. *E.g.:*

"Damn you, stop talking about my wife. If you mention her name again I swear I'll knock you down." – "Oh no, you won't. You're too great a gentleman to hit a feller smaller than yourself" (S. Maugham).

As we see, in formal terms of the segmental lingual hierarchy, the supra-proposemic level (identified in the first chapter of the book) can be divided into two sublevels: the lower one at which cumulemic connections of sentences are identified, and the higher one at which occursemic connections of sentences are identified. On the other hand a fundamental difference between the two units in question should be carefully noted lying beyond the hierarchy relation, since the occurseme, as different from the cumuleme, forms part of a conversation, i.e. is essentially produced not by one, but by two or several speakers, or, linguistically, not by one, but by two or several individual sub-lingual systems working in communicative contact.

As for the functional characteristic of the two higher segmental units of language, it is representative of the function of the text as a whole. The signemic essence of the text is exposed in its topic. The monologue text, or "discourse", is then a topical entity, the dialogue text, or "conversation", is an exchange-topical entity. The cumuleme and occurseme are component units of these two types of texts, which means that they form, respectively, subtopical and exchange-subtopical units as regards the embedding text as a whole. Within the framework of the system of language, however, since the text as such does not form any "unit" of it, the cumuleme and occurseme can simply be referred to as topical elements (correspondingly, topical and exchange-topical), without the "sub"-specification.

§ 3 Sentences in a cumulative sequence can be connected either "prospectively" or "retrospectively".

Prospective ("epiphoric", "cataphoric") cumulation is effected by connective elements that relate a given sentence to one that is to follow it. In other words, a prospective connector signals a continuation of speech: the sentence containing it is semantically incomplete. Very often prospective connectors are notional words that perform the cumulative function for the nonce. *E.g.:*

I tell you *one of two things* must happen. *Either* out of that darkness some new creation will come to supplant us as we have supplanted the animals, *or* the heavens will fall in thunder and destroy us (B.Shaw).

The prospective connection is especially characteristic of the texts of scientific and technical works. *E.g.:*

Let me add *a word of caution* here. The solvent vapour drain enclosure must be correctly engineered and constructed to avoid the possibility of a serious explosion (From a technical journal).

As different from prospective cumulation, retrospective (or "anaphoric") cumulation is effected by connective elements that relate a given sentence to the one that precedes it and is semantically complete by itself. Retrospective

cumulation is the more important type of sentence connection of the two; it is the basic type of cumulation in ordinary speech. *E.g.:*

What curious "class" sensation was *this?* Or was *it* merely fellow-feeling with the hunted, a tremor at the way things found one out? (J. Galsworthy).

§ 4. On the basis of the functional nature of connectors, cumulation is divided into two fundamental types: *conjunctive* cumulation and *correlative* cumulation.

Conjunctive cumulation is effected by conjunction-like connectors. To these belong, first, regular conjunctions, both coordinative and subordinative; second, adverbial and parenthetical sentence-connectors *(then, yet, however, consequently, hence, besides, moreover, nevertheless,* etc.). Adverbial and parenthetical sentence-connectors may be both specialized, i.e. functional and semi-functional words, and non-specialized units performing the connective functions for the nonce. *E.g.:*

There was an indescribable agony in his voice. *And* as if his own words of pain overcame the last barrier of his self-control, he broke down (S. Maugham). There was no train till nearly eleven, and she had to bear her impatience as best she could. *At last* it was time to start, and she put on her gloves (S. Maugham).

Correlative cumulation is effected by a pair of elements one of which, the "succeedent", refers to the other, the "antecedent", used in the foregoing sentence; by means of this reference the succeeding sentence is related to the preceding one, or else the preceding sentence is related to the succeeding one. As we see, by its direction correlative cumulation may be either retrospective, as different from conjunctive cumulation which is only retrospective.

Correlative cumulation, in its turn, is divided into substitutional connection and representative connection. Substitutional cumulation is based on the use of substitutes. *E.g.:*

Spolding woke me with the apparently noiseless efficiency of the trained housemaid. *She* drew the curtains, placed a can of hot water in my basin, covered it with the towel, and retired (E.J.Howard).

A substitute may have as its antecedent the whole of the preceding sentence or a clausal part of it. Furthermore, substitutes often go together with conjunctions, effecting cumulation of mixed type. *E.g.:*

And as I leaned over the rail me thought that all the little stars in the water were shaking with austere merriment. *But it* may have been only the ripple of the steamer, after all (R.Kipling).

Representative correlation is based on representative elements which refer to one another without the factor of replacement. *E.g.:*

She should be here soon. I must tell Phipps, I am not in to *any one else* (O.Wilde). I went home. Maria accepted *my departure* indifferently (E.J.Howard).

Representative correlation is achieved also by repetition, which may be complicated by different variations. *E.g.:*

Well, the night was beautiful, and the great thing not to be a pig. *Beauty and not being a pig!* Nothing much else to it (J.Galsworthy).

§ 5. A cumuleme (cumulative supra-sentential construction) is formed by two or more independent sentences making up a topical syntactic unity. The first of the sentences in a cumuleme is its "leading" sentence, the succeeding sentences are "sequential".

The cumuleme is delimited in the text by a finalizing intonation contour (cumuleme-contour) with a prolonged pause (cumuleme-pause); the relative duration of this pause equals two and a half moras ("mora" - the conventional duration of a short syllable), as different from the sentence-pause equalling only two moras.

The cumuleme, like a sentence, is a universal unit of language in so far as it is used in all the functional varieties of speech. For instance, the following cumuleme is part of the author's speech of a work of fiction:

The boy winced at this. It made him feel hot and uncomfortable all over. He knew well how careful he ought to be, and yet, do what he could, from time to time his forgetfulness of the part betrayed him into unreserve (S.Butler).

Compare a cumuleme in a typical newspaper article:

We have come a long way since then, of course. Unemployment insurance is an accepted fact. Only the most die-hard reactionaries,of the Goldwater type, dare to come out against it (from *Canadian Press).*

Here is a sample cumuleme of scientific-technical report prose:

To some engineers who apply to themselves the word "practical" as denoting the possession of a major virtue, applied research is classed with pure research as something highbrow they can do without. To some business men, applied research is something to have somewhere in the organisation to demonstrate modernity and enlightenment. And people engaged in applied research are usually so satisfied in the belief that what they are doing is of interest and value that they are not particularly concerned about the niceties of definition (from a technical journal).

Poetical text is formed by cumulemes, too:

She is not fair to outward view, | As many maidens be; | Her loveliness I never knew | Until she smiled on me. | Oh, then I saw her eye was bright, | A well of love, a spring of light (H.Coleridge).

But the most important factor showing the inalienable and universal status of the cumuleme in language is the indispensable use of cumulemes in colloquial speech (which is reflected in plays, as well as in conversational passages in works of various types of fiction).

The basic semantic types of cumulemes are "factual" (narrative and descriptive), "modal" (reasoning, perceptive, etc.), and mixed. Here is an example of a narrative cumuleme:

Three years later, when Jane was an Army driver, she was sent one night to pick up a party of officers who had been testing defences on the cliff. She

found the place, where the road ran between a cleft almost to the beach, switched off her engine and waited, hunched in her great-coat, half asleep, in the cold black silence. She waited for an hour and woke in a fright to a furious voice coming out of the night (M.Dickens).

Compare this with modal cumulemes of various topical standings:

She has not gone? I thought she gave a second performance at two? (S.Maugham) (A reasoning cumuleme of perceptional variety)

Are you kidding? Don't underrate your influence, Mr. O'Keefe. Dodo's in. Besides, I've lined up Sandra Straughan to work with her (A.Hailey). (A remonstrative cumuleme)

Don't worry. There will be a certain amount of unpleasantness but I will have some photographs taken that will be very useful at the inquest. There's the testimony of the gunbearers and the driver too. You're perfectly all right (E. Hemingway). (A reasoning cumuleme expressing reassurance) Etc.

§ 6. As we have stated above (see: Ch. I, §5) cumuleme (super-sentential construction) correlates with a separate sentence which is placed in the text in a topically significant position. In printed text this correlation leads to the formation of one-sentence paragraph that has the same topical function as a multi-sentence paragraph from the point of view of the communicative content of the text. *E.g.:*

The fascists may spread over the land, blasting their way with weight of metal brought from other countries. They may advance aided by traitors and by cowards. They may destroy cities and villages and try to hold the people in slavery. But you cannot hold any people in slavery.

The Spanish people will rise again as they have always risen before against tyranny (E. Hemingway).

In the cited passage the sentence-paragraph marks a transition from the general to the particular, and by its very isolation in the text expressively stresses the author's belief in the invincible will of the Spanish people who are certain to smash their fascist oppressors in the long run.

Thus, from the point of view of style, the regular function of the one-sentence paragraph is expressive emphasis.

And it is direct correlation between one-sentence paragraphs and multi-sentence paragraphs that enables us to identify the general elementary unit-segment of text as being built either by a cumuleme or by a single sentence. The communicative function of this unit is topical. We call this unit the "dicteme" (see p. 17).

It must be noted that though the dicteme in written (printed) text is normally represented by a paragraph, these two units are not identical.

In the first place, the paragraph is a stretch of written (printed) literary text delimited by a new (indented) line at the beginning and an incomplete line at the dose. As different from this, the dicteme, as we have just seen, is essentially a

feature of all the varieties of speech, both oral and written, both literary and colloquial.

In the second place, the paragraph is a polyfunctional unit of written speech and as such is used not only for the written representation of a dicteme, but also for the introduction of utterances of a dialogue (dividing an occurseme into parts), as well as for the introduction of separate points in various enumerations.

In the third place, the paragraph in a monologue speech can contain more than one dicteme. For instance, the following paragraph is divided into three parts, the first formed by a separate sentence (i.e. by a sentence-dicteme), the second and third ones presenting cumulemes. For the sake of clarity, we mark the borders between the parts by double strokes:

When he had left the house Victorina stood quite still, with hands pressed against her chest. // She had slept less than he. Still as a mouse, she had turned the thought: "Did I take him in? Did I?" And if not-what? // She took out the notes which had bought - or sold - their happiness, and counted them once more. And the sense of injustice burned within her (J.Galsworthy).

The shown division is sustained by the succession of the forms of the verbs, namely, the past indefinite and past perfect, precisely marking out the events described.

On the other hand, the dicteme cannot commonly be prolonged beyond the limits of the paragraph, since the paragraphal border-marks are the same as those of the dicteme, i.e. a characteristic finalizing tone, a pause of two and a half moras. Besides, we must bear in mind that both multidicteme paragraphs and one-sentence paragraphs are stylistically marked features of the monologue text. Thus, we return to our initial thesis that the paragraph, although it is a literary-compositional, not a purely syntactic unit of text, still as a rule represents a dicteme; the two units, if not identical, are closely correlative.

§ 7. The introduction of the notions of dicteme and cumuleme in linguistics helps specify and explain the two peculiar and rather important border-line phenomena between the sentence and the sentential sequence.

The first of these is known under the heading of "parcellalion". The parcellated construction ("parcellatum") presents two or more collocations ("parcellas") separated by a sentence tone but related to one another as pans of one and the same sentence. In writing the parts, i.e., respectively, the "leading parcella" and "sequential parcella", are delimited by a full stop (finality mark), *E.g.:*

There was a sort of community pride attached to it now. *Or shame at its unavoidability* (E.Stephens). Why be so insistent, Jim? *If he doesn't want to tell you* (J.O'Hara). ...I realized I didn't feel one way or another about him. *Then.* I do now (J.O'Hara).

Having recourse to the idea of transposition, we see that the parcellated construction is produced as a result of transposing a sentence into a cumuleme.

This kind of transposition adds topical significance to the sequential parcella. The emphasizing function of parcellation is well exposed by the transformation of de-transposition. This transformation clearly deprives the sequential parcella of its position of topical significance, changing it into an ordinary sentence-part. *Cf.*:

... → There was a sort of community pride attached to it now *or shame at its unavoidability.* ... → Why be so insistent, Jim, *if he doesn't want to tell you?* ... → I didn't feel one way or another about him *then.*

With some authors parcellation as the transposition of a sentence into a cumuleme can take the form of forced paragraph division, i.e. the change of a sentence into a supra-cumuleme. *E.g.:*

...It was she who seemed adolescent and overly concerned, while he sat there smiling fondly at her, quite self-possessed, even self-assured, and adult.

And naked. His nakedness became more intrusive by the second, until she half arose and said with urgency, "You have to go and right now, young man" (E.Stephens).

The second of the border-line phenomena in question is the opposite of parcellation, it consists in forcing two different sentences into one, i.e. in transposing a cumuleme into a sentence. The cumulcme-sentence construction is characteristic of uncareful and familiar speech; in a literary text it is used for the sake of giving a vivid verbal characteristic to a personage. *E.g.:*

I'm not going to disturb her *and that's flat, miss* (A.Christie). The air-hostess came down the aisle then to warn passengers they were about to land *and please would everyone fasten their safety belts* (B.Hedworth).

The transposition of a cumuleme into a sentence occurs also in literary passages dealing with reasoning and mental perceptions *E.g.:*

If there were moments when Soames felt cordial, they were such as these. He had nothing against the young man; *indeed,* he rather liked the look of him; *but* to see the last of almost anybody was in a sense a relief; *besides,* there was this question of what he had overheard, and to have him about the place without knowing would be a continual temptation to compromise with one's dignity and ask him what it was (J.Galsworthy).

As is seen from the example, one of the means of transposing a cumuleme into a sentence in literary speech is the use of half-finality punctuation marks (here, a semicolon).

§ 8. Neither dictemes-cumulemes, nor paragraphs form the upper limit of textual units of speech. Paragraphs are connected within the framework of larger elements of texts making up different paragraph groupings. Thus, above the process of cumulation as syntactic connection of separate sentences, supra-cumulation should be discriminated as connection of dictemes-cumulemes and paragraphs into larger textual unities of the correspondingly higher subtopical status *Cf.:*

... That first slip with my surname was just like him; and afterwards, particularly when he was annoyed, apprehensive, or guilty because of me, he frequently called me Ellis.

So, in the smell of Getliffe's tobacco, I listened to him as he produced case after case, sometimes incomprehensibly, because of his allusive slang, often inaccurately. He loved the law (C.P.Snow).

In the given example, the sentence beginning the second paragraph is cumulated (i.e. supra-cumulated) to the previous paragraph, thus making the two of them into a paragraph grouping.

Moreover, even larger stretches of text than primary paragraph groupings can be supra-cumulated to one another in the syntactic sense, such as chapters and other compositional divisions. For instance, compare the end of Chapter XXIII and the beginning of Chapter XXIV of J.Galsworthy's "Over the River":

Chapter XXIII. ... She went back to Condaford with her father by the morning train, repeating to her Aunt the formula: "I'm not going to be ill."

Chapter XXIV. *But* she was ill, and for a month in her conventional room at Condaford often wished she were dead and done with. She might, indeed quite easily have died…

Can, however, these phenomena signify that the sentence is simlpy a sub-unit in language system, and that "real" syntactic elements of this system are not sentences, but various types of dictemes or supra-dictemes? - In no wise.

Supra-sentential connections cannot be demonstrative of the would-be "secondary", "sub-level" role of the sentence as an element of syntax by the mere fact that all the cumulative and occursive relations in speech, as we have seen from the above analysis, are effected by no other unit than the sentence, and by no other structure than the inner structure of the sentence; the sentence remains the central structural-syntactic element in all the formations of topical significance. Thus, even in the course of a detailed study of various types of supra-sentential constructions, the linguist comes to the confirmation of the classical truth that the two basic units of language are the word and the sentence: the word as a unit of nomination, the sentence as a unit of predication. And it is through combining different sentence-predications that topical reflections of reality are achieved in all the numerous forms of lingual communication.

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

1. What is M.Blokh's interpretation of coherent and disconnected sentences in the text?
2. Comment on the distinction between one-direction and two-direction sequences distinguished by M.Blokh?
3. Define the difference between 'prospective' and 'retrospective' cumulation.
4. Enumerate the means of conjunctive and correlative cumulation.

5. Give your opinion on the distinction of 'factual' (narrative and descriptive) and 'modal' (reasoning, perceptive, etc.) cumulemes.
6. Do super-sentential syntactic units belong to basic units of language in the opinion of M.Y.Blokh?

Text 2 Sidney Greenbaum, Randolph Quirk: A Student's Grammar of the English Language, Longman, 1998, p.434-476

From sentence to text
General

19.1 We apply the term 'text' to a stretch of language which makes coherent sense in the context of its use. It may be spoken or written: it may be as long as a book or as short as a cry for help. Linguistic form is important but is not of itself sufficient to give a stretch of language the status of a text. For example, a road-sign reading

Dangerous Corner

is an adequate text though comprising only a short noun phrase. It is understood as an existential statement (18.30), paraphraseable as something like 'There is a dangerous corner near by', with such block language features (11.22) as zero article that are expected in notices of this kind. By contrast, a sign at the roadside with the same grammatical structure but reading

Critical Remark

is not an adequate text, because although we recognize the structure and understand the words, the phrase can communicate nothing to us as we drive by, and is thus meaningless.

In earlier chapters, as is normal in grammars, we have exemplified our statements by way of printed sentences which have made an implicit double demand on readers. First, we have assumed that the examples would be read as if they were *heard,* mentally given by each reader appropriate features of stress and intonation. Second, we have assumed that readers would imagine for each example an appropriate context in which it could have a plausible textual role.

19.2 In the present chapter, we take the formation of phrases, clauses, and sentences for granted, and we look at the way they are deployed in the formation of texts This is of course far from being a matter of grammar alone. It is primarily by the choice of vocabulary that language connects us with the world beyond language, as we saw in comparing the examples 'Dangerous Corner' and 'Critical Remark' in 19.1. Moreover, lexical choice is used constantly to shape the internal cohesion of texts. Note the use of the hypernymically related *family,children, parents* and *fruit, apple, Granny Smiths* in the following:

I like my family to eat lots of fruit, and Granny Smiths are especially popular because this apple has a juicy crispness much enjoyed by the children and their parents alike. Nonetheless, since this book is devoted to grammar, we must exclude all aspects of text construction other than grammatical features and their concomitant prosody and punctuation.

Parts of a text may cohere without formal linkage *(asyndetic* connection):

I'm in a state of shock. Jack's mother has just died.

Alternatively, conjunctions or other formal features may make the connection explicit:

Jack's mother has just died *and (so}* I'm in a state of shock.

Frequently the rheme of a clause (18.4*f*) is represented in what follows by a thematic pro-form, an example of such *thematic* connection:

I've just read *your new book. It's* very interesting.

But pro-forms can also be used to show *rhematic* connection:

I've just read *your new book.* Have you seen *mine?*

Place relators

19.4 Certain spatial relations are firmly linked to grammatical expressions which are heavily exploited in textual structure. Thus an opening question or statement will normally involve reference to location in space (as well as in time):

Where are you going tonight?   [1]

It's ages since I was *over there.*   [2]

On Tuesday evening, I was *at the front door* talking to a caller. Suddenly we heard a crash and two cars collided *just opposite.* We hurried *across* to see if we could help. One driver was scrambling *out,* bleeding profusely, and my visitor helped him *over* to the pavement. Then *along* came some people, running *up the street.* I dashed *back in* and phoned for help. When I went *out* again, the other driver was trying to move her car *down the road* a little and *in to the side.*   [3]

In all three examples, spatial reference is essential, as well as orientation to the participants' *here* (*cf* 19.3): *where* in [1] entails a *here* from which to set out, *over there* in [2] entails 'in contrast to here'. But let us look more closely at the part played by spatial reference in [3], both in respect to orientation and to the structure of the narrative.

Even totally out of context, the institutionalized phrase *at the front door* would be understood as referring to the main entrance of someone's home, whether this was a house or a small apartment. Likewise, *just opposite* is at once understood as *just opposite* to where the speaker and his visitor were standing. A road is implied by the car crash and in this context *across* means 'across the intervening space (of footpath and street)'. The *back in* signifies a return across this intervening space and *into* the speaker's home. The two instances of *out* are

of sharply different reference: the first refers implicitly to emergence from the car, the second to re-emergence from the speaker's home (thus correlating with the earlier *back in).* The contrasting phrases *up (the street)* and *down (the road)* are interesting in making spatial reference not necessary in terms of relative elevation (though this is not excluded). The immediate contrast is in terms of orientation again: *up* indicating an approach towards the speaker (and his home), *down* indicating the converse (*cf* 9.7). the cluster of spatial references provides a continuous set of coordinates in relation to a base (the speaker's home, though this is merely a pragmatic implication) as well as a coherent account of the movements involved in the narrative.

NOTE. In a text where it was known that a physical slope was involved, *up/down (street)* would be used with respect to this absolute and objective physical feature and it would outweigh personal orientation. The latter could then be expressed by alternative means: 'She *went (away)* up the street'; 'They *came* down the street. Contrast also: "They hurried *up* Fifth Avenue' (*ie* away from 'downtown Manhattan); 'They sauntered *down* Fifth Avenue' (*ie* towards downtown Manhattan); 'They walked *along* Fifth Avenue' (neutral as to direction).

Ellipses and pro-forms

19.5. Where place relators operate in text structure, ellipsis is often involved (12.19):

He examined the car. The *front* was slightly damaged.
The building was heavily guarded by police. The windows

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{on the } top\ storey \\ \text{at the } top \end{array} \right\} \text{ were covered with boards.}$$

The ellipted item in [1] and [2] are *of the car* and *of the building* respectively. Often the ellipted items are not in the previous context, but are understood from the situational context (either accompanying the communication or established by the communication):

The traffic lights eventually changed. She walked *across* quickly.

Across here implies *the road* or some similar noun phrase (*cf* 9.7, 19.4)

A few place adverbs do not involve ellipsis; *here, there, elsewhere,* relative *where,* and (in formal contexts) *hence, thence, hither,* and *thither. They are pro-forms.*

The school laboratory reeked of ammonia. *Here,* during the first week of the term, an unusual experiment had been conducted.

All my friends have been to Paris at least once. I am going *there* next summer for the first time.

Here in [4] is a substitute for *in the school laboratory* and *there* in [5] for *Paris.*

NOTE. In sentences like *Stand there* and *Here it is,* the pro-forms may refer directly to the situational contexts without any linguistic mention of location, but with orientation to the speaker:

I'm glad to welcome you *here*, especially since at the last meeting I could not be *there.*

19.6. Place relators often comprise two components. Most commonly these and a dimension or direction indicator plus a location indicator (*cf* 9.4). The latter is usually an open-class noun (or proper noun), but its locational use is often institutionalized, making the whole expression quasi-grammatical. Examples:

at the window	in town
on the ceiling	off work
in the air	on board
at the seaside	on the way

Another common type of pairing is a distance indicator plus a dimension indicator; for example:

$$
\left.\begin{array}{l}\text{(not) far}\\\text{further}\\\text{farther}\end{array}\right\} + \left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{in}\\\text{out}\\\text{off}\\\text{away}\\\text{from}\end{array}\right. \qquad \begin{array}{l}\text{nearer}\\\text{higher(er)}\\\text{low(er)}\\\text{close}\end{array} \begin{array}{l}+\\+\\+\\+\end{array} \begin{array}{l}\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{in}\\\text{to + noun phrase}\end{array}\right.\\\text{up}\\\text{down}\\\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{by}\\\text{to + noun phrase}\end{array}\right.\end{array}
$$

The partially antonymous *home* and *abroad, ashore* and *on board* are exceptional in combining the dimension and location factors:

After being *out* for a couple of hours, I'm now $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{going}\\\text{staying}\end{array}\right\}$ *home* for the evening, [reference to personal residence]. [1]

After $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{living}\\\text{being}\\\text{going}\end{array}\right\}$ *abroad,* I like to $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{come}\\\text{be}\end{array}\right\}$ *home* (='my own country') for a year or so. [2]

NOTE. Locational connections in relation to coherence are not merely a necessary feature of individual texts. It is customary in newspapers to group the otherwise separate news-item texts on a regional basis. So too in radio broadcasts, a place relator may serve to give some kind of coherence to otherwise unrelated stories. For example:

They are worried that another strike could break out in the United States similar to the one that affected Canada's economy so seriously two years ago.

IN CANADA news is coming in of a plane accident near Toronto. The aircraft, a privately owned four-seater ...

The textual justification for IN is that a main focus on *Canada* would be misleading since *Canada* is in some sense already 'given'.

Time relators

19.7. Like space, time has its lexically specific and labelled 'areas' and 'locations'. Along with open-class nouns, some of them - like places – are treated as proper nouns: *century, decade, year, 1989, January, week, day, Thursday, evening,* etc. Again like units of space, these nouns have an institutionalized and hence quasi-grammatical use. In addition to being elements in clause structure, they lend themselves to the connections and transitions of textual structure:

I've been working on this problem *all year* and I musl find a solution *before January* when I'm due to go abroad *for a month or so.*   [1]

Nouns of more general meaning are still more firmly harnessed for grammatical use:

I've been working *a long time.*   [2]
I'm going abroad *for a while.*   [3]
She hasn't visited me *for ages.*   [4]

In addition, therefore, to closed-class items like *afterwards.* we take account here of numerous open-class words which, though with clear lexical meaning, are largely used in the constant process of keeping track of the many and complex references that are necessary for coherent text. Since time passes irrespective of location (which need not change) temporal cues to periods, and to references *before, after, within,* and *during* these periods, are more inherently essential than locational cues.

Once a time reference has been established, certain temporal adjectives and adverbs may order subsequent information in relation to the time reference.

Temporal ordering

19.8. (i)Temporal ordering *previous* to a given time reference:

ADJECTIVES
        earlier, former, preceding, previous, prior
For example:

He handed in a good essay. His *previous* essays *(ie* 'those done *earlier')* were all poor.

ADVERBIALS

Already, as, yet, before, beforehand, earlier, first, formerly, hitherto (formal), *previously, so far, yet;* and phrases with pro-forms: *before that, before this, before now, before then, by now, by then, until now, until then, up to now, up to then.*

For example:

I shall explain to you what happened But *first* I must give you a cup of tea.

First is to be interpreted here as 'before I explain to you what happened'.

19.9 (ii) Temporal ordering *simultaneous* with a given time reference:

ADJECTIVES

coexisting <formal>, *coinciding* <formal>, *concurrent* <formal>, *contemporary, contemporaneous* <formal>, *simultaneous.*

For example:

The death of the President was reported this afternoon on Cairo radio. A *simultaneous* announcement was broadcast from Baghdad.

Here *simultaneous* means 'simultaneous with the report of the death of the President on Cairo radio'.

ADVERBIALS

at this point, concurrently <formal>, *contemporaneously* <formal>, *here, in the interim* <formal>, *meantime, meanwhile, in the meantime, in the meanwhile, now, presently, simultaneously, then, throughout*, and the relative *when*

For example:

Several of the conspirators have been arrested but their leader is as yet unknown. *Meanwhile* the police are continuing their investigation into the political sympathies of the group.

Here *meanwhile* means 'from the time of the arrests up to the present'.

NOTE   [a] The use of *presently* for time relationship (ii), with the meaning 'now', 'at present', is very common in AmE. In BrE, *presently* is more commonly synonymous with *soon.*

[b] An example of here as time indicator:

I've now been lecturing for over an hour. I'll stop *here* since you all look tired.

19.10 (iii) Temporal ordering subsequent to a given time reference:

ADJECTIVES

ensuing *<formal>,* following, later, next, subsequent *<formal>,* succeeding *<formal>,* supervening *<formal>.*

For example:

I left him at 10 p.m. and he was almost asleep. But at some *later* hour he must have lit a cigarette.

Here *later* might mean 11 p.m. but equally 4 a.m., a time otherwise called 'the *early* hours of the morning'.

ADVERBIALS

after, afterwards, (all) at once, finally, immediately, last, later, next, since, subsequently, <formal> *suddenly, then;* and the phrases *after that, after this, on the morrow* ['the day after']

For example:

The manager went to a board meeting this morning. He was *then* due to catch a train to London.

NOTE   The ordinals constitute a temporal series of adjectives *first, second, third* ... with *next* as a substitute for any of the middle terms when moving up the series, and *final* or *last* as a substitute for the term marking the end of the series. There is a corresponding series of conjuncts with *first* (also *at first* and, less commonly, *firstly*) as the beginning of the set; *secondly*, etc; *next, then, later, afterwards*, as interchangeable middle terms; and *finally, lastly*, or *eventually* as markers of the end of the set (*cf* general ordinals, 5.10).

Tense, aspect, and narrative structure

19.11.   As a further indication of the importance of time in language, all finite   clauses (and many nonfinite ones) carry a discrete indication of tense and aspect. Although the contrasts involved are severely limited in comparison with adverbial distinctions, they contribute to the textual cohesion and progression. Compare the different implications in the second part of what follows:

She told me all about the operation on her hip.

It seemed to have been a success.   [1]

It seems to have been a success.   [2]

In [I], in accordance with our expectations with respect to sequence of tenses and backshift (*cf* 14.18), the past ties the second part to the first, and thus, like this, derives its authority from the woman concerned: 'It seemed *to her* ...'; that is, '*She* was of the opinion that the operation had been successful'. The possibility of repudiation is therefore open: 'Unfortunately this is not so'. In, [2] by contrast, the present disjoins the second part and may imply an orientation to the 'I' narrator: 'It seems *to me*...,' '*I* am of the opinion...'

Alternation of past and present in this way is a regular mode of switching reference from the 'then' of the narrative reference to the 'now' of both the narrator and the hearer or reader (some items like parenthetic *you see* being confined to this 'now'):

As a child, I lived in Singapore. It's very hot there, you *know*, and I never owned an overcoat. I *remember* being puzzled at picture books showing European children wrapped up in heavy coats and scarves. I *believe* I thought it all as exotic as children here *think* about spacemen's clothing, you *see*.   [3]

Consider the instances of past tense in this text: *lived, owned, thought*. Not merely are these verbs morphologically identical: the text actually represents the past as being referentially identical. All the verbs refer back to a stretch of time during which these things were true.

19.12   But past tenses need refer neither to the same time nor to stretches of time. With verbs which connote discrete actions, a narrative string of past tenses will be interpreted as referring to a sequence of events iconically represented by the sequence of verbs. Consider for example:

Do you want to hear about my adventures last Thursday? I *got up* at six, *had* some coffee, *kissed* my wife goodbye, and *set off* for Rome. I *took* a taxi and then the underground, *arrived* at Heathrow, *started* to check in my *case, patted* my pocket and *found* - no ticket, no passport. *Picked up* my case, *caught* the underground, *got* another taxi, *arrived* at my front door, *rushed in,* and of course *gave* my poor wife the shock of her life.   [1]

NOTE   [a] While a sequence of past tenses implies sequential events if the lexical meaning of the verb makes this plausible as in [2], a sequence of past verbs with progressive aspect (*cf* 4.10) can imply simultaneity, as in [3]:

René raged with anger. Janet went out for the evening.   [2]
René was raging with anger. Janet was going out for the evening.   [3]

[b] Use of the past perfect (cf 4.9) can enable us to reverse the order of sentences in a text. Note the way in which 'Time One' [T_1] precedes T_2 in [4], where T_2 precedes T_1 in [5]:

John telephoned the police [T_2]. There had been a sudden violent noise outside [T_1].

Note also the use of present perfect with simple present, as illustrated in the latter part of 19.2.

Tense complexity in narrative

19.13 More usually, however, texts comprise much greater time-reference complexity than the examples in 19.11*f* show. They will have a mixture of state verbs and discrete-action verbs; the narrative will weave backwards and forwards, with a mixture of tenses and aspects, of finite and nonfinite clauses, enabling the narrator to depart from the linear sequence of

historical order so as both to vary the presentation and to achieve different (*e.g.* dramatic) effects:

I was reading Chaucer's *Troilus* the other night, and it

suddenly occurred to me to wonder what Chaucer $\left\{\begin{array}{l} \text{expects} \\ \text{expected} \end{array}\right\}$

us to make of the fact that Criseyde $\left\{\begin{array}{l} \text{has} \\ \text{had} \end{array}\right\}$ been widowed,

whereas Troilus $\left\{\begin{array}{l} \text{has} \\ \text{had} \end{array}\right\}$ never even been in love. Surely

this is significant, yet I had never thought of it before. [1]

Here we have the additional complication of a narrative about a narrative within a narrative. The account of the narrator's reading and reflection is itself of some complexity: within a period in the past, a durative activity (*reading*) is represented as being interrupted by a sudden thought. But the thought had significance not merely at the time of thinking it nor merely during the rest of the reading period; it is represented as being permanently significant. The appeal to the hearer ('Surely .') does not connote that *is* refers only to the *now* of the speaker and hearer; there is no room for some such adverbial as *at present*:

The narrator is here using the present tense of timeless reference (*cf* 4.3). It is the potentiality for such a use of the present that made us give the two possibilities, 'Chaucer expects' and 'Chaucer expected'. The latter takes the historical view: a comment on the poet as he wrote in the fourteenth century. The former treats the Chaucer canon as timeless, permanently existing.

An analogous choice exists in referring to the fictional narrative of Chaucer's poem. In Fig 19.13b. 'A' represents the (unknown) period during which Criseyde has been a widow before the poem begins: 'B' represents the longer period (in effect, Troilus's whole life) during which Troilus has never been in love. It will be noticed that in this commentary we have adopted the 'timeless' view of the fiction ('When the poem *begins,* Criseyde *has been* a widow for some time'). In the original example [1], the past variant was also given, implying a retelling of the story ('When Troilus first *saw* Criseyde, she *had been* a widow for some time').

NOTE   Narrative introductions like 'They tell me that. …' 'I hear/gather/understand that… impose no constraints upon the tenses to follow.

Special uses of present and past
19.14.   We have seen that the present tense can cooccur in textual structure with two distinct types of time references: ordinary 'state present' and universal 'state present' ('timeless'; *cf* 4.3):

I *think* she had undergone an operation before I met her.   [1]

Troilus *is* totally fancy-free until he *sees* Criseyde.   [2]

A third type of present, 'habitual' (*cf* 4.3), is common in ordinary narrative, and it can readily cooccur with past tenses:

I had forgotten that they *dine* very early and I arrived at an
awkward moment for both them and me.   [3]

But there is a further use of the present tense: the so-called historic present (*cf* 4.4). As well as occurring in rather mannered and formal prose of an old-fashioned tone, it is common in colloquial spoken narrative, especially at points of particular excitement. The time reference is unequivocally past. For example:

It was on the Merritt Parkway just south of New Haven. I was driving along, half asleep, my mind miles away, and suddenly there was a screeching of brakes and I catch sight of a car that had been overtaking me apparently. Well, he doesn't. He pulls in behind me instead, and it's then that I notice a police car parked on the side.[4]

NOTE   [a] In nonstandard speech, the reporting verb in narrative is often in the historic present:

'Where did you put my coat?' he says. 'I never touched it,' I says.
        [5]

[b] As well as being able to use the present tense to refer to the past, we can conversely use the past to refer to a narrator's 'now', exploiting that form of backshift that is referred to as free direct and indirect speech (*cf* 14.22). Textual cohesion and congruity of reference are maintained by careful consistency of tense and aspect usage, present replaced by past, past by past perfect, even in the prolonged absence of reminders to the hearer/reader in the form of reporting verbs ('He reflected ...', 'She said ...'). For example:

He was suddenly afraid. What on earth was he to do now? How could he have been so silly as not to tell Sheila he'd forgotten his keys?   [6]

Determiners, pro-forms, and ellipsis

19.15 Let us consider the following independent sentences:

An argument over unilateral disarmament broke out between them.   [1]

An argument over unilateral disarmament finally put an end to their friendship.   [2]

If we wished to make these sentences into a textual whole, there would be numerous possibilities, even keeping the first part unchanged:

...between them. { The / This / That } argument finally put an end to their friendship.   [3]

...between them. { The / This / That } { dispute / controversy } finally put   [4]

...between them. { The / This / That } { issue / matter / affair } finally put   [5]

> ...between them an argument that finally put ...   [6]
>
> …between them, which finally put .   [7]

Cataphoric examples:

> *This* should interest you, if you're still keen on boxing. The world heavyweight championship is going to be held in Chicago next June, so you should be able to watch it live.   [4]
>
> *Here* is the news. A diplomat was kidnapped last night in London ... [radio announcement]   [5]
>
> *It* never should have happened. He went out and left the baby unattended.   [6]
>
> My arguments are *as follows...*   [7]

In some instances, we can replace the reference signal by a corresponding *that*-clause. For example, *that* in [1] could be said to refer to a *that*-clause which corresponds to the immediately preceding clause:

> ... That the quarrel developed into a permanent rupture between them is why the two men ...   [la]

In [2], on the other hand, *it* could be said to stand for the whole of the two preceding sentences. In [5], here could refer forward to a following discourse of indeterminate length, and this is usual with cataphoric signals.

NOTE   [a] *Above* and *below* are used for discourse reference to refer to (written) units of varying length, but not necessarily to immediately neighbouring parts of the discourse:

> ... the arguments given *below* [perhaps referring to several sentences]
>
> … the question mentioned *above*
>
> *The above* but not *the below can be used as a noun phrase:
>
> *The above* illustrates what we mean by …

[b] The nonrestrictive relative clause, with a previous clause or sentence as the antecedent of introductory *which* (*cf* 17.12), is sometimes made into a separate orthographic sentence. *Which* is then an anaphoric signal equivalent to (*and*) *that:*

She's borrowed a history book. Which suggests her teacher is having some influence on her.

[c] In some (especially disapproving or ironic) contexts, *that* can be used cataphorically:

THAT'S what I like to SEE: a chap who enjoys his work.

Otherwise, *that* is used anaphorically.

[d] In informal spoken English, *what* can have cataphoric reference when it is the direct object of *know* in a question, or *guess* in a directive, or *tell* in a statement:

(Do you) Know WHAT?
Guess WHAT.
       } He won't pay up.

(I'll) Tell you WHAT: I've forgotten the keys!

...between them, and { this / that } finally put…   [8]

…between them, and it finally put…   [9]

…between them and finally put an end to their friendship.   [10]

All these versions have two things in common. They abbreviate the second part and they connect it with the first part.

In some ways the most straighforward is [6], where a simple and direct shortening of the first subject phrase is used appositively; *cf* 17.27. There is something similar in [3], where reduction retains the original head-word of the noun-phrase *argument,* but here the coreference with the preceding subject is indicated not by apposition but by the anaphoric determiners *the, this,* or *that; cf* 5.3*f.* In [4] and [5] coreference is again by deixis, but in [4] the original noun phrase is not merely abbreviated but its head-word is replaced by a semantic paraphrase. In [5], on the other hand, the head-word is replaced by a quasi-pronominal noun of very general meaning. In [8], anaphoric deixis again points to the coreference, as in [4] and [5], but this time with the head-word replaced by zero; the demonstrative *this* or *that* is used pronominally; *cf* 6.19*f.* In [9], the vaguest possible pronoun (*it*) is used, while in [7] a relative pronoun replaces the earlier noun-phrase subject (*cf* 17.11). Finally, in [1], there is total omission of the second subject (*cf* 13.19).

All eight of [3-10] provide satisfactory coherence of the two parts. It is perhaps closest in [10], but only at the cost of muting the separate significance of the second part – in contrast to [3] and [4],for example, which insist on our considering the *beginning* of the argument, on the one hand, as well as its *result* on the other hand.

Discourse reference: clausal

19.16.   Common signals for sentence or clause reference include:
anaphoric and cataphoric: *here, it, this*

anaphoric only: *that, the foregoing* <formal>

cataphoric only: *as follows, the following, thus* <formal>

Anaphoric examples:

> Many years ago their wives quarrelled over some trivial matter, now long forgotten. But one word led to another and the quarrel developed into a permanent rupture between them. *That* is why the two men never visit each other's houses. [1]

> Some students never improve. They get no advice and therefore they keep repeating the same mistakes. *It* is a terrible shame. [2]

> Students want to be shown connections between facts instead of spending their time memorizing dates and formulas. Reflecting *this,* the university is moving away from large survey courses and breaking down academic fences in order to show subjects relating to one another. [3]

[e] In legal English *the said, the (a) forementioned,* and *the aforesaid* are used for anaphoric reference, the last two both as a premodifier ('the aforementioned provisions') and as a noun phrase. In the latter function, they would normally refer to a previous noun phrase with personal reference.

Formulaic utterance

19.17 While deictic reference and ellipted matter must, from a grammatical viewpoint, be recoverable (*cf* 12.2), discourse permits a good deal of vagueness. This is especially common in informal conversation, not least in the semi-formulaic responses to expressions of thanks, apology, inquiry, and the like. Consider how difficult it would be to specify the precise references or the exact ellipses in the following responses:

A: Thank you very much.

B: Not at all.
Not a bit.
Don't mention it. [1]
You're welcome. <espAmE>

A: I'm terribly sorry.

B: Not at all.
Not a bit . [2]
It's nothing.

A: I wonder if you'd mind coming and taking some dictation?

B: Of course.
Surely. <esp AmE>
OK
RIGHT O   <esp BrE> <informal> , Mrs Stewart. [3]
WILL DO

A: Would you mind my asking if you've ever taken drugs,
Mr Hoover?

B: Absolutely NOT. [4]

A: You wouldn't know a fortune-teller around here,
I suppose?

B: { TRY me. [5]
    { Try ME. [6]

In [5] the implication is that B knows one ('Try asking if I know one'); in [6], B is saying that he himself can tell fortunes. In [4], only the context could clarify whether B is saying that he 'absolutely (does) not (mind)', or that it is 'absolutely not' true that he has taken drugs. In [3], the formulaic response *Will do'* is a conventional way of saying 'I *will do* as you request', and B has interpreted (correctly, of course) A's polite inquiry as a request. In [1] and [2], the reference of *it,* in *Don't mention it. It's nothing*, is doubtless anaphoric in some way. But in the first line of [7], *it* is cataphoric if almost equally vague in its reference: the initial imperative by B is little more than an informal attention-requesting signal, a more severe form of which includes a cataphoric *here*:

A: By the way, Cynthia. It's awful of me, I know. But would
you be able to look after my dog while I'm away next week?

B: (Now look) (Here), this is the third time you've left me
with your dog. [7]

Within sentence sequences that are strictly alike from a grammatical point of view, a discourse pronoun can have sharply different reference:

She hoped he would not mention her unfortunate marriage.

It   )   (COURTeous of him. [8]
Thus } would be very { COURTcous of him in a WAY,
That)   (of course. [8a]

In [8], the reference is to the predication including the negative ('His not mentioning the marriage would be courteous'). In [8a], the reference excludes the negative ('His mentioning the marriage would be courteous'). It is only the pragmatic implications of the hedging adverbial *in a way* and the concessive *of course* that leads us to this interpretation.

NOTE An interesting use of cataphoric *it* in textual structure is in the cleft sentence device (*cf* 18.18*ff*):

It was at 9.15 this morning that the government proclaimed a state
of emergency. [9]

It was on their way from the airport that Gillian dropped the
bombshell. In carefully casual tones, she asked him if he would
agree to a divorce. [10]

In [9], it is unlikely that the narrator wishes to highlight the time adjunct: rather, the textual device is pointing to the end of the sentence. In [10], the same applies, but with a double cataphora: *the bombshell* which ends the first sentence is climactically explained in the sentence that follows.

Discourse reference: noun phrases

19.18. Certain determiners are used to signal that a noun phrase is referentially equivalent to a previous noun phrase (*cf* 5.4*f*):

the   this-these   that-those

Such noun phrases may be discourse abstractions, and the heads may either be identical as in [1] or nominalizations (17.23) that add lexical variation as in [2]:

> She set up a hypothesis that chemotherapy destroyed the will to live as well as the unwanted cells. *This hypothesis* attracted the attention of ...   [1]
> Deconstructionism holds that knowledge about literature is strictly unattainable ... *This doctrine* is puzzling in several respects.   [2]

It is not always certain, however, when such a reference is to a previous noun phrase or is a nominalization of a wider, clausally expressed proposition. The text from which [2] is quoted is a case in point. As presented in the abbreviated form of [2], *doctrine* seems to refer back unambiguously to *deconstructionism* and be a lexical variant of it. But in the original, there are several lines where we have indicated the curtailment, and these include the following:

> We must therefore abandon the old-fashioned quest to discover what a given author was trying to communicate.   [2a]

The reference of *this doctrine* must therefore include, not merely the specific abstract *deconstructionism*, but the speculated consequence which the author went on to state. A fuller version might therefore read:

> This doctrine *of deconstructionism and the need to abandon the old-fashioned quest...* is puzzling in several respects.   [2b]

When *such* is used, the intention is often to indicate disapproval (which may be sympathetic):

> We visited the Browns yesterday and heard their complaints about the condition of the house they live in. I never heard such a sorry tale.   [3]
> ... such a rigmarole.   [3a]
> ... of such wretchedness.   [3b]

In [3] and [3a], the reference is primarily to the *complaints*, [3a] lexically indicating impatience rather than sympathy; in [3b] the reference is rather to the *condition*, with an implication of the speaker's sympathy.

NOTE   Use of *the former* and *the latter* is largely confined to (rather formal) noun-phrase reference:

They were full of resentment because no one came to visit them and also because their roof was leaking. I helped them over *the latter* [*ie* about the roof] and promised to let some friends know about *the former* [*ie* the complaint about neglect]

For broader reference, both phrases might be expanded to include a noun head:

I helped them over *the latter issue* and promised to let some friends know about *the former problem.*

19.19   So and *that* can have anaphoric reference when they are intensifiers premodifying an adjective (*that* so used is informal and often criticized):

There were two thousand people in the theatre. I didn't

expect it to be $\begin{Bmatrix} so \\ that \end{Bmatrix}$ full.   [1]

I had a terrible headache yesterday and had to take some

aspirin. I'm not feeling $\begin{Bmatrix} so \\ that \end{Bmatrix}$ bad today.   [2]

We took them to a circus, and then to a zoo, and gave them

lots of ice cream and chocolate. They haven't had $\begin{Bmatrix} so \\ that \end{Bmatrix}$

good a time for years.   [3]

Such is used more commonly than *so* or *that* when (as in [3]) the adjective accompanies a noun phrase, but *such* is followed by normal noun-phrase order:

... They haven't had *such a good time* for years.   [3a]

Note the different implications when *this, that*, and *so* are used as intensifiers; *this* has present orientation, *that* past orientation (both being informal), while *so* is neutral both temporarily and stylistically. Compare:

Did you expect $\begin{Bmatrix} this \\ that \\ so \end{Bmatrix}$ many people?

Personal pronouns

19.20 As explained in 6.10, *we* has several possible noun-phrase references. In discourse, we are concerned chiefly with the 'inclusive' *we* (as in the present sentence), and with the 'exclusive' *we* as in:

Will you stay here while *we* go for a policeman?   [1]

In formal writing, and frequently indeed in the present book, *we* 'inclusive' and *we* 'exclusive' can cooccur. The former accompanies verbs implying shared knowledge (*understand, see, appreciate*, etc), the latter verbs of communication (*say, state, write,* etc).It would be possible to use both in the same sentence, though this would usually be avoided:

We see now *we* expressed reservations earlier.   [2]

In [2], the second *we* is exclusive, the first inclusive or even (as often) indefinite and roughly equivalent to a more formal *one* or *the reader*.

The indefinite use of *you* and the *you* of direct 2nd person address (*cf* 6.12) can also cooccur. In [3], the first *you* is indefinite, the second makes direct address:

> In fourteenth-century England, *you* had a very poor chance of being
> taught to read, *you* see.   [3]

Unlike the two uses of *we*, however, *you* is rather rare in formal writing and the indefinite use is virtually excluded. The same applies to the indefinite use of *they*; in formal styles, *they* in [4] would refer only to the council authorities, where informally it is more plausible with indefinite reference:

> I intend to ask the council authorities why *they* are digging
> up the road again.   [4]

In place of the informal indefinite *you*, there is *one*, but it can be used only sparingly without making a piece of writing (or even more so a spoken utterance) sound intolerably pompous. This is perhaps especially constraining in BrE, which lacks in general the facility (now in any case frowned on for social reasons) of replacing *one* by *he* in second and subsequent use:

> *One* cannot control *one's* temper easily if *one* is discussing a
> matter over which *one* has feelings of guilt or great personal
> involvement. <esp BrE>   [5]

NOTE   In [5], we could have in AmE: *One... his... he... he...* Other indefinite pronouns such as *anyone, everybody* can be followed by *he* in both AmE and BrE, but this is vulnerable to the objection of seeming to have a male orientation, while the use of *they* to refer back to these indefinites is open to the objection of seeming ungrammatical in the switch from singular to plural. It is therefore largely confined to spoken (esp. informal) usage.

Comparison

19.21 Signals of comparison and contrast play a frequent part in providing textual coherence. Most can be regarded as involving ellipsis (*cf* 12.14*ff*).   The most obvious comparison signal is found in adjectives and adverbs, whether in the inflected forms or in the periphrastic forms with *more, most, as, less, least* (*cf* 7.39). If the basis of comparison (*cf* 15.36) is not made explicit in the clause, it must be inferred from the previous context:

> John took four hours to reach London. Bill, on the other
> hand, was driving *more slowly*.   [1]
> Mary used to listen to records most of the time. Sally was a
> *more serious* student.   [2]
> There were ten boys in the group. Bob was by far the *best*.   [3]
> Barbara dances beautifully. Jack dances *no less well*.   [4]
> Gwen always hands in a well-constructed and intelligent paper.
> I'm afraid Joan doesn't expend *as* much effort and time on

her papers. [5]

We can demonstrate the anaphoric reference by supplying the basis of comparison:

    ... more slowly *than John (drove)* [la]

    … a more serious student *than Mary (was).* [2a]

    ... the best (of the ten boys) (in the group). [3a]

    ... no less well *than Barbara (dances).* [4a]

    ... as much effort and time on her papers *as Gwen (expends on her papers).* [5a]

So too with expressions of similarity or difference these may involve the use of equative and antithetic conjuncts *(cf* 8.44). For example:

    Mrs White was the victim of a confidence trick. Bill was

    cheated { *very differently.* / *in the same way.* } [6]

    Tom gets ten dollars a week for pocket money. Bob receives a *similar* amount. [7]

NOTE Expressions involving *respeclive(ly), mutual(ly), converse(ly), opposite (-ly* is rare), etc, effect considerable neatness and economy in discourse:

    Brahms and Verdi wrote orchestral, and operatic music, *respectively.*

    The chairman and the guest speaker expressed their *mutual* admiration.

    Mary told Harry that she never wanted to see him again. He *reciprocated,* but with even greater bitterness.

    I thought that Oregon had a greater rainfall than British Columbia, but Caroline says *the opposite.*

QUESTIONS

1. What definition of the term "text" is given in the book?
2. Why should a road-sign reading "Dangerous Corner" be regarded as an adequate text and "Critical Remark" should not?
3. What are the ways in which parts of a text may cohere?
4. What place and time relators are often exploited in textual structures?
5. When are elipses and pro-forms involved in text structure?
6. Consider the role of tense-aspect forms in the narrative.
7. Comment on the use of deixis and reference in textual coherence.
8. What is the role of comparison and contrast in textual coherence?
9. Consider the textual role of adverbials.

Text 3 Halliday, M.A.C: An Introduction to Functional Grammar, LND., 1985, pp.288-313.

There are four ways by which cohesion is created in English: by reference, ellipsis, conjunction, and lexical organization. We can illustrate all of these from the following text.

> Little Boy Blue, come blow your horn!
> The sheep's in the meadow, the cow's in the corn.
> Where is the boy that looks after the sheep?
> He's under the haycock, fast asleep.
> Will you go wake him? No, not I!
> For if I do, he'll be sure to cry.

The use of *he ... him ... he* to refer back to 'the boy that looks after the sheep' is an instance of reference. The forms *no, not I* and *if I do* exemplify ellipsis; they have to be interpreted as *no, I (will) not (wake him)* and *if I (wake him)*. The word *for* expresses a conjunctive relationship between 'I will not' and 'if I do, he will cry'. The word *sheep* in line three reiterates *sheep* in line two; *cow* relates to *sheep*, *corn* to *meadow*, and *wake* and *asleep*; these are all examples of lexical cohesion. We will first summarize these, and then devote a section to each in turn.

(1) REFERENCE. A participant or circumstantial element introduced at one place in the text can be taken as a reference point for something that follows. In the simplest case this means that the same thing comes in again, like *the boy who looks after the sheep ... he ... him ... he* above. But it may also mean that it serves as a basis for comparison, like *Henry ... someone else* in *Henry, can't play today. We'll have to find someone else*, where *someone else* means 'someone other than Henry'.

(2) ELLIPSIS. A clause, or a part of a clause, or a part (usually including the lexical element) of a verbal or nominal group, may be presupposed at a subsequent place in the text by the device of positive omission - that is, by saying nothing, where something is required to make up the sense. Either the structure is simply left unfilled, as in *not I* for *I will not wake him,* which is ellipsis properly so called; or else a placeholding element is inserted to signal the gap, like the *do* in *for if I do*, which is referred to as SUBSTITUTION.

(3) CONJUNCTION. A clause or clause complex, or some longer stretch of text, may be related to what follows it by one or other of a specific set of semantic relations. These relations are basically of the same kind as those which obtain between clauses in an expanded clause complex, as described in Chapter 7 under the headings of elaboration, extension and enhancement. The most general categories are those of apposition and clarification, addition and

variation, and the temporal and causal-conditional: 'namely; and, or, yet; then; so, then'.

(4) LEXICAL COHESION. Continuity may be established in a text by the choice of words. This may take the form of word repetition; or the choice of a word that is related in some way to a previous one - either semantically, such that the two are in the broadest sense synonymous, or collocationally, such that the two have a more than ordinary tendency to co-occur. Lexical cohesion may be maintained over long passages by the presence of keywords, words having special significance for the meaning of the particular text.

These resources collectively meet the text-forming requirements referred to earlier. They make it possible to link items of any size, whether below or above the clause; and to link items at any distance, whether structurally related or not. Note, however, that they meet these requirements in different ways. Reference is a relationship between things, or facts; it may be established at varying distances, and although it usually serves to relate single elements that have a function within the clause (processes, participants, circumstances), it can give to any passage of text the status of a fact, and so turn it into a clause participant. For example *that* in the following passage:

"I'm just one hundred and one, five months and a day."
"I can't believe that!" said Alice.

Ellipsis (including substitution) is a relationship involving a particular form of wording, either a clause or some smaller item; it is usually confined to closely contiguous passages, and is particularly characteristic of question + answer or similar 'adjacency pairs' in dialogue. For example, *so* in Alice's reply:

"... if you've seen them so often, of course you know what they're like?"
"I believe so," Alice replied thoughtfully.

Conjunctive relations typically involve contiguous elements up to the size of paragraphs, or their equivalent in spoken language; conjunction (in this sense) is a way of setting up the logical relations that characterize clause complexes in the absence of the structural relationships by which such complexes are defined. For example *then* in the Gnat's answer:

"Supposing it couldn't find any?" she suggested.
"Then it would die, of course."

Finally reiteration and collocation are relations between lexical elements: most typically between single lexical items, either words or larger units, e.g. *locomotive* (word), *steam engine* (group), *in steam* (phrase), *steam up, get up steam* ('phrases' in the dictionary sense); but also involving wordings having more than one lexical item in them, such as *maintaining an express locomotive at full steam*. Lexical ties are independent of structure and may span long passages of intervening discourse; for example

[the little] voice was drowned by a shrill scream from the engine

where *engine* was separated from the latest previous occurrence of a related lexical item (*railway journey*) by thirty-six intervening clauses.

Many instances of cohesion involve two or three ties of different kinds occurring in combination with one another. For example:

"You don't know much," said the Duchess; "and that's a fact."

Alice did not at all like the tone of this remark, and thought it would be as well to introduce some other subject of conversation.

where the nominal group *this remark* consists of a reference item *this* and a lexical item *remark*, both related cohesively to what precedes. Similarly in *some other subject of conversation*, both *other* and *subject* relate cohesively to the preceding discussion, which was about whether or not cats could grin. Typically any clause complex in connected discourse will have from one up to about half a dozen cohesive ties with what has gone before it, as well as perhaps some purely internal ones like the *that* by which the Duchess refers back to the first part of her own remark.

Cohesion is, of course, a process, because discourse itself is a process. Text is something that happens, in the form of talking or writing, listening or reading. When we analyse it, we analyse the product of this process; and the term 'text' is usually taken as referring to the product - especially the product in its written form, since this is most clearly perceptible as an object (though now that we have tape recorders it has become easier for people to conceive of - spoken language also as text). So it is natural to talk about cohesion as a relation between entities, in the same way that we talk about grammatical structure, for example the structure of the clause. In the last resort, of course, a clause (or any other linguistic unit) is also a happening; but since a clause has a tight formal structure we do not seriously misrepresent it when we look at it as a static configuration. The organization of text is semantic rather than formal, and (at least as far as cohesion is concerned; we are not going into questions of register structure in this book) much looser than that of grammatical units. We shall represent cohesive relations simply by additions to the structural notation. But it is important to be able to think of text dynamically, as an ongoing process of meaning; and of textual cohesion as an aspect of this process, whereby the flow of meaning is channelled along the speaker's purposive courses instead of spilling out aimlessly in every possible direction.

9.2 Reference

(1) It seems quite likely that reference first evolved as an 'exophoric' relation: that is, as a means of linking 'outwards' to some person or object in the environment. So, for example, the concept of 'he' probably originated as 'that man over there'.

In other words we may postulate an imaginary stage in the evolution of language when the basic referential category of PERSON was DEICTIC in the strict

sense, 'to be interpreted by reference to the situation here and now'. Thus 'I' was 'the one speaking': 'you', 'the one(s) spoken to'; 'he, she, it, they' were the third party, 'the other(s) in the situation'.

The first and second persons 'I' and 'you' naturally retain this deictic sense; their meaning is defined in the act of speaking. The third person forms *he she it they* can be used deictically; but more often than not, in all languages as we know them, such items are *anaphoric*: that is, they point not 'outwards' to the environment but 'backwards' to the preceding text. The following is a typical example:

Peter, Peter, pumpkin eater,
Had a wife and couldn't keep her.
He put her in a pumpkin shell
And there he kept her very well.

Here *he* and *her* are anaphoric, 'pointing' respectively to Peter and to his wife.

An anaphoric relationship of this kind creates what we are calling cohesion. Presented with one of these words, the listener has to look elsewhere for its interpretation; and if he has to look back to something that has been said before, this has the effect of linking the two passages into a coherent unity. They become part of a single text.

(2) The second type of reference item is the DEMONSTRATIVE, *this / that, these / those*. Demonstratives may also be either exophoric or anaphoric; in origin they were probably the same as third person forms, but they retain a stronger deictic flavour than the personals, and have evolved certain distinct anaphoric functions of their own.

The basic sense of 'this' and 'that' is one of proximity; *this* refers to something as being 'near', *that* refers to something as being 'not near'. The word *the* is still really a demonstrative, although a demonstrative of a rather particular kind.

Consider the following examples:
(a) The sun was shining on the sea.
(b) This is the house that Jack built.
(c) Algy met a bear. The bear was bulgy. The bulge was Algy.

In (a) we know which 'sun' and which 'sea' are being referred to even if we are not standing on the beach with the sun above our heads; there is only one sun, and for practical purposes only one sea. There may be other seas in different parts of the globe, and even other suns in the heavens; but they are irrelevant. In (b) we know which 'house' is being referred to, because we are told - it is the one built by Jack; and notice that the information comes **after** the occurrence of the *the*. In (c) we know which bear - the one that Algy met; and we know which bulge - the one displayed by the bear; but in this case the

information had already been given **before** the *the* occurred. Only in (c), therefore, is *the* anaphoric.

Like the personals, and the other demonstratives, *the* has a specifying function; it signals 'you know which one(s) 1 mean'. But there is an important difference. The other items not only signal that the identity is known, or knowable; they state explicitly how the identity is to be established. So

my house = 'you know which: the one belonging to me'
this house = 'you know which: the one near me'
but

the house = 'you know which - the information is there somewhere if you look for it'

(g) "So here's a question for you. How old did you say you were?"

Alice made a short calculation, and said "Seven years and six months."

"Wrong!" Humpty Dumpty exclaimed triumphantly. "You never said a word like it."

The locative demonstratives *here* and *there* are also used as reference items; *here* may be cataphoric, as in (g) above, or anaphoric and 'near' as in (h);

there is anaphoric without the sense of 'near', as in (j):

(h) 'I think you ought to tell me who you are, first."

"Why?" said the Caterpillar.

Here was another puzzling question; ...

(j) "Suppose he never commits the crime?" said Alice.

"That would be all the better, wouldn't it?" the Queen said, ...

Alice felt there was no denying that. "Of course it would be all the better," she said: "but it wouldn't be all the better his being punished."

"You're wrong there, at any rate," said the Queen.

The temporal demonstratives *now* and *then* also function as cohesive items, but conjunctively rather than referentially (see Section 9.5 below).

(3) There is a third type of reference that contributes to textual cohesion, i.e. COMPARATIVE reference. Whereas personals and demonstratives, when used anaphorically, set up a relation of co-reference, whereby the same entity is referred to over again, comparatives set up a relation of contrast. In comparative reference, the reference item still signals 'you know which'; not because the same entity is being referred to over again but rather because there is a frame of reference - something by reference to which what 1 am now talking about is the same or different, like or unlike, equal or unequal, more or less.

Any expression such as *the same, another, similar, different, as big, bigger, less big*, and related adverbs such as *likewise, differently, equally*, presumes some standard of reference in the preceding text. For example, *such, another, more* in (a), (b) and (c):

(a) "Why did you call him tortoise, if he wasn't one?" Alice asked.

"We called him Tortoise because he taught us," said the Mock Turtle angrily: "really you are very dull!"

*"You ought to be ashamed of yourself for asking such a simple question,"
added the Gryphon.*
*(b) "At the end of two yards," she said, putting in a peg to mark the
distance, "I shall give you your directions - have another biscuit?"*
*(c) "I like the Walrus best," said Alice: "because, you see, he was a little
sorry for the poor oysters."*
"He ate more than the Carpenter, though," said Tweedledee.

Like personals and demonstratives, comparative reference items can also
be used cataphorically, within the nominal group; for example *much more
smoothly than a live horse*, where the reference point for the more lies in what
follows.

Sometimes an explicit indication may be given that something is omitted,
by the use of a substitute form; for example *one* in

I've lost my voice.

- Get a new one.

The substitute serves as a place-holding device, showing where something
has been omitted and what its grammatical function would be; thus *one*
functions as Head in the nominal group and replaces the Thing (with which the
Head is typically conflated). Ellipsis and substitution are variants of the same
type of cohesive relation. There are some grammatical environments in which
only ellipsis is possible, some in which only substitution is possible, and some,
such as *I preferred the other [one]*, which allow for either.

There are three main contexts for ellipsis and substitution in English.
These are (1) the clause, (2) the verbal group and (3) the nominal group. We
shall consider each of these in turn.

(1) The clause. Ellipsis in the clause is related to mood, and has been
illustrated already in Chapter 4. Specifically, it is related to the question-answer
process in dialogue; and this determines that there are two kinds: (a) yes / no
ellipsis, and (b) WH- ellipsis. Each of these also allows for substitution, though
not in all contexts. We will consider the yes / no type first.

(a) yes / no ellipsis: (i) the whole clause. In a yes / no question-answer
sequence the answer may involve ellipsis of the whole clause, e.g.

Can you row?

- Yes. [I can row]

Is that all?

- No. [that is not all]

The first clause in such a pair is not necessarily a question; it may have
any speech function, e.g.

Have another biscuit?

- No, thank you. [I won't have another biscuit]

You're growing too.

- Yes [I'm growing too], but I grow at a reasonable pace.

Corresponding in meaning to *yes* and *no* are the clause substitutes *so* and *not*. (Etymologically the word *yes* contains the substitute *so*; it is a fusion of (earlier forms of) *aye* and *so*.) In certain contexts these substitute forms are used: (i) following *if – if so, if not*, (ii) as a reported clause - *he said so, he said not*, (iii) in the context of modality - *perhaps so, perhaps not*. Examples (and cf. Chapter 7, Section 7.5.3 above):

> *"Are you to get in at all? That's the first question, you know." It was, no doubt; only Alice did not like to be told so.*
> *Does your watch tell you what year it is?*
> *- Of course not. [Of course my watch does not tell me ...]*
> *I dare say you never even spoke to Time!*
> *Perhaps not. [Perhaps 1 never even spoke to Time]*
> *If you've seen them so often, of course you know what they're like.*
> *- I believe so. [I believe I know what they're like]*
> *If I like being that person, I'll come up; if not [if I don't like being that person], I'll stay down here till I'm somebody else.*
> *But they should be five times as cold, by the same rule -*
> *- Just so. [They are five times as cold]*

The general principle is that a substitute is required if the clause is **projected**, as a report; with modality ('perhaps') and hypothesis ('if') being treated as kinds of projection, along the lines of:

> *he said so — 1 thought so — 1 think so — it may be so — perhaps so — let us say so — if so*

In addition, the substitute *not* is used when the answer is qualified by a negative in some way:

> *I shouldn't be hungry for it, you know.*
> *- Not at first [you wouldn't be hungry for it at first], but ...*

where a positive clause is simply presupposed by ellipsis:

> *Would you like to see a little of it?*
> *- Very much indeed. [I should very much indeed like to see a little of it]*

(a) Yes / no ellipsis: (ii) part of the clause. As an alternative to the ellipsis of the whole clause, there may be ellipsis of just one part of it, the Residue. For example:

> *Must a name mean something?*
> - Of course it must. [mean something]
> I can't believe that.
> - Can't you? [believe that]

"The horror of that moment," the King went on, "I shall never, *never* forget!".

"You will [forget the horror of that moment], though," the Queen said, "if you don't make a memorandum of it."

> Take pen and ink and write it down.
> - I will [take pen and ink and write it down], if I can remember it so long.

Hold your tongue!

- I won't! [hold my tongue]

With a declarative response, if there is a change of Subject only, we may have substitute *so, not* in initial position (= 'and so', 'and not') followed by the Mood element.

Of course you know your A B C ?

- To be sure I do. [know my A B C]

- So do I. [know my A B C]

I haven't the slightest idea.

- Nor have I. [the slightest idea]

The substitute *not* may appear in a WH- negative, as in *Don't look now. - Why not?* Substitution is less likely in the positive, except in the expressions *how so?, why so?*

(b) WH- ellipsis: (ii) part of the clause. Sometimes in a WH- clause, or its response, the Mood element is left in and only the Residue is ellipsed. For example, with WH- Subject:

They're at it again.

- Who are? [at it again]

Who can untie this knot?

- I can. [untie that knot]

Similarly if the WH- element is part of the Residue:

Don't look now.

- Why shouldn't I? [look now]

Thus clausal ellipsis and substitution occurs typically in a dialogue sequence where in a response turn everything is omitted except the information-bearing element. This may be:

(a) in a yes / no type environment:

(i) polarity only: *yes   no   so   not*

(ii) mood: *will you?   I will etc.*

(iii) mood + polarity: *so do I   nor do I   so he was* etc.

(b) in a WH- type environment:

(i) WH- only: *who?   where?   John   over there* etc.

(ii) WH- + polarity: *why not?   not me* etc.

(iii) WH- + mood: *why didn't they?   I could tomorrow* etc.

A clause consisting of Mood only, such as *I will*, could equally occur in either environment; typically, in a yes / no environment, the focus would be on *will*, which bears the polarity ('Will you ... ? - *I will*.), whereas in a WH-environment, the focus would be on *I*, which carries the information ('Who will ...?'- *I will*.).

The elliptical or substitute clause requires the listener to 'supply the missing words'; and since they are to be supplied from what has gone before, the effect is cohesive. It is always possible to 'reconstitute' the ellipsed item so that it becomes fully explicit. Since ellipsis is a lexicogrammatical resource,

what is taken over is the exact wording, subject only to the reversal of speaker-listener deixis (*I* for *you* and so on), and change of mood where appropriate.

(2) The verbal group. Since the verbal group consists of Finite plus Predicator, it follows automatically that any clausal ellipsis in which the Mood element is present but the Residue omitted will involve ellipsis within the verbal group. There is no need to repeat the discussion of this phenomenon.

Substitution in the verbal group is by means of the verb *do,* which can substitute for any verb provided it is active not passive; except *be* or, in some contexts, *have*. The verb *do* will appear in the appropriate non-finite form (*do, doing, done*). Examples:

Does it hurt?
- Not any more. It was doing last night.
Have the children gone to sleep?
- I think they must have done.

As we have seen, this *do* typically substitutes for the whole of the Residue (or, what amounts to the same thing, when the verb is substituted by *do*, the rest of the Residue is ellipsed).

Since there are no demonstrative verbs - we cannot say *he thatted, he whatted?* - this need is met by combining the verb substitute *do* with demonstratives *that, what*. For example:

A shower of little pebbles came in at the window, and some of them hit her in the face.
"You'd better not do that again!"
The next thing is, to get into that beautiful garden - how is that to be done, I wonder?
I shall sit here, on and off, for days and days.
- But what am I to do?

The form *do not* functions as a single reference item. (For the difference between reference and ellipsis-substitution, see the note at the end of the present section.)

(3) The nominal group. Ellipsis within the nominal group was referred to in Chapter 6, where it was shown that an element other than the Thing could function as Head; for example *any* in

Have some wine.
- I don't see any wine.
- There isn't any.

There is a nominal substitute *one*, plural *ones*, which functions as Head; it can substitute for any count noun (that is, any noun that is selecting for number, singular or plural); for example,

That's a joke. I wish you had made it.
- Why do you wish I had made it? It's a very bad one. [a very bad joke)

This here ought to have been a *red* rose-tree, and we put a white one [a white rose-tree] in by mistake.

Like *do* in the verbal group, the nominal substitute *one* is derived by extension from an item in the structure of the full, non-elliptical group - in this case the indefinite numeral *one*, via its function as Head in a group which is elliptical as in

I vote the young lady tells us a story.

- I'm afraid I don't know one.

In some instances the nominal substitute fuses with a Modifier, as in *yours, mine, none* in the following:

Take off your hat.

- It isn't mine. [my hat]

- Stolen!

- I keep them to sell. I've none [no hats] of my own.

These can be analysed as elliptical, the elements *my, your, no* etc. having a special form when functioning as Head.

We remarked earlier that ellipsis-substitution is a relationship at the lexicogrammatical level: one of 'go back and retrieve the missing words'. Hence the missing words must be grammatically appropriate; and they can be inserted in place. This is not the case with reference, where, since the relationship is a semantic one, there is no grammatical constraint (the class of the reference item need not match that of what it presupposes), and one cannot normally insert the presupposed element. Reference, for the same reason, can reach back a long way in the text and extend over a long passage, whereas ellipsis - substitution is largely limited to the immediately preceding clause.

9.5. Lexical cohesion

The remaining type of pattern by which a speaker or writer creates cohesion in discourse is his choice of lexical items.

Lexical cohesion comes about through the selection of items that are related in some way to those that have gone before.

(1) Repetition. The most direct form of lexical cohesion is the repetition of a lexical item; e.g. *bear* in

Algy met a bear. The bear was bulgy.

Here the second occurrence of *bear* harks back to the first.

In this instance, there is also the reference item *the*, signalling that the listener knows which bear is intended; and since there is nothing else to satisfy the *the*, we conclude that it is the same bear. But this referential link is not necessary to lexical cohesion; if we had *Algy met a bear. Bears are bulgy*, where *bears* means 'all bears', there would still be lexical cohesion of *bears* with *bear*. In this case, however, there would be only one tie; whereas in the example cited first there are two, one referential (*the*) and one lexical (*bear*).

As the last example shows, in order for a lexical item to be recognized as repeated it need not be in the same morphological shape. For example, *dine*,

dining, diner, dinner are all the same item, and an occurrence of any one constitutes a repetition of any of the others. Inflexional variants always belong together as one item; derivational variants usually do, when they are based on a living derivational process, although these are less predictable. (For example, *rational* and *rationalize* are probably still the same lexical item, though the relationship between them has become rather tenuous; but neither now goes with *ration - rational* is closer to *reason,* though not close enough to be considered the same item.)

In Landor's line
I strove with none, for none was worth my strife

there is a strongly felt cohesion between *strife* and *strove,* suggesting that *strive, strove* and *strife* are one and the same lexical item:

(2) Synonymy. In the second place, lexical cohesion results from the choice of a lexical item that is in some sense synonymous with a preceding one; for example *sound* with *noise, cavalry* with *horses* in

He was just wondering which road to take when he was startled by a noise from behind him. It was the noise of trotting horses. ... He dismounted and led his horse as quickly as he could along the right-hand road. The sound of the cavalry grew rapidly nearer ...

Here again the cohesion need not depend on identity of reference. But once we depart from straightforward repetition, and take account of cohesion between **related** items, it is useful to distinguish whether the reference is identical or not, because slightly different patterns appear.

(a) with identity of reference. Here the range of potentially cohesive items includes synonyms of the same or some higher level of generality: synonyms in the narrower sense, and *superordinates*. For example, in

Four-&-twenty blackbirds, baked in a pie.
When the pie was opened, the birds began to sing.

we have one instance of repetition (*pie ... pie*) and one of synonyms (*blackbirds ... birds*), *birds*, however, is at a higher level of generality than *blackbirds*; it is a superordinate term. In fact we might have (disregarding the scansion, of course) any of the following sequences:

four-&-twenty blackbirds ...   the blackbirds began to sing
          "   *the birds began to sing*
          "   *the creatures began to sing*
          "   *they began to sing*

the reference item *they* being simply the most general of all. Compare *python ... snake* in the verse quoted in Appendix 3 below (*... who bought a Python from a man ... the Snake is living yet*); and *pig ... creature* in the following passage from *Alice*:

This time there could be no mistake about it; it was neither more nor less than a pig, and she felt that it would be quite absurd for her to carry it any further. So she set the little creature down, and ...

Such instances are typically accompanied by the reference item *the*. This interaction between lexical cohesion and reference (*the pig ... the creature ... it*) is the principal means for tracking a participant through the discourse.

Related to these are examples such as the following, where there is still identity of reference, although not to a participant, and the synonym may not be in the same word class (*cheered ... applause; cried ... tears*):

Everyone cheered. The leader acknowledged the applause.

I wish I hadn't cried so much! I shall be punished for it, I suppose, by being drowned in my own tears!

(b) without necessary identity of reference. The occurrence of a synonym even where there is no particular referential relation is still cohesive; for example

There was a man of Thessaly
And he was wondrous wise.
He jumped into a hawthorn bush
And scratched out both his eyes.
And when he saw his eyes were out
With all his might and main
He jumped into a quickset hedge
And scratched them in again.

where the quickset hedge is not the same entity as the hawthorn bush but there is still cohesion between the synonyms *hedge* and *bush*.

In this type of cohesion we find other semantic relationships, particular variants of synonymy: hyponymy (specific - general) and metronymy (part - whole). Given a lexical set consisting of either hyponyms, where *x y* and *z* are all 'kinds of' *a*, or metronyms, where *p q* and *r* are all 'parts of' *b*, as in Figure 9-4: the occurrence of any pair of items within the set will be cohesive; for example

Elfrida had a beautiful little glass scent-bottle. She had used up all the scent long ago; but she often used to take the little stopper out ...

9.6. The creation of texture

We have identified the following features as those which combine to make up the 'textual' component in the grammar of English:

(A) structural
1 thematic structure: Theme & Rheme (Chapter 3)
2 information structure and focus: Given & New (Chapter 8)
(B) cohesive (Chapter 9)
1 reference
2 ellipsis and substitution
3 conjunction
4 lexical cohesion

QUESTIONS AND ASSIGNMENTS

1. In what meaning is the term 'cohesion' used by M.Halliday?
2. What are four ways by which cohesion is created in English?
3. Comment on the essence of (1) reference, (2) ellipsis, (3) conjunction and (4) lexical cohesion.
4. Speak on the role of personal and demonstrative pronouns as special reference items.
5. Comment on the difference between exophoric, anaphoric, cataphoric and homophoric reference.
6. What is the essence of comparative reference?
7. Discuss the role of ellipsis and substitution as means of cohesion. Give examples of ellipsis and substitution on the level of clauses, noun groups and verb groups.
8. Dwell on WH-ellipsis.
9. What types of conjuction (conjunctive words) are given by M.Halliday? In what way does he classify them semantically? Can M.Halliday's classification be enlarged, made more precise or be improved in any way?
10. Enumerate the means of lexical cohesion, comment on the essence of repetition, synonymy and collocation.
11. What is M Halliday's contribution to text linguistics?

V. Pragmatics

Jule, G: Pragmatics, Oxford, 2000, p. 91-114 (Texts 1-21).

Definitions and background

Text 1

GEORGIA GREEN: *Pragmatics and Natural Language Understanding*. Lawrence Erlbaum 1989, page 3

The broadest interpretation of pragmatics is that it is the study of understanding intentional human action. Thus, it involves the interpretation of acts assumed to be undertaken in order to accomplish some purpose. The central notions in pragmatics must then include belief, intention (or goal), plan, and act. Assuming that the means and/or the ends involve communication, pragmatics still encompasses all sorts of means of communication, including nonconventional, nonverbal, nonsymbolic ones as, for example, when a lifeguard throws a volleyball in the direction of a swimmer struggling in the ocean. The lifeguard believes that the swimmer wants assistance, and that the swimmer will understand that the volley ball thrown in his direction is intended (by the lifeguard) to be assistance, and that the swimmer will know how to take advantage of the volleyball's property of being lighter than water. That makes at

least three beliefs and one intention on the part of the lifeguard, including two beliefs about the swimmer's beliefs, and one about the swimmer's desires.

1. *From this description, it seems as if every act in life is part of pragmatics. Do you think that pragmatics is the study of all actions, or should it be limited to only certain actions? What kind of limitations would you propose?*

2. *What are the central notions in pragmatics?*

3. *The final sentence in this brief extract mentions 'beliefs about ... beliefs'. How can we know about a person's beliefs when we are analyzing their actions and utterances?*

4. *If the swimmer doesn't want assistance (in the example), how does that affect the analysis?*

Text 2

'Pragmatics: meaning and context.' File 70 in *Language Files:*
Materials for an Introduction to Linguistics, (6th edn.)
Ohio State University Press 1991, page 223

To fully understand the meaning of a sentence, we must also understand the context in which it was uttered. Consider the word *ball*. In a sentence such as *He kicked the ball into the net,* we may visualize a round, black and white soccer ball about nine inches in diameter. In a sentence such as *She dribbled the ball down the court and shot a basket,* we would visualize a basket ball. Given yet another sentence, *She putted the ball in from two feet away,* we would visualize another ball, a golf ball. In these examples, the word *ball* is understood in different ways depending on what type of action is associated with it. Whatever understood meaning is common to *ball* in all of these contexts will be part of the word's core meaning. If we think of enough types of balls, we can come up with an invariant core meaning of *ball* that will allow speakers to refer to any ball in any context. Nevertheless, even though we can discover n word's 'invariant core', we normally understand more than this. It is the CONTEXT that fills in the details and allows full understanding - such as the usual color of a soccer ball, the size of a basketball, or the weight of a golf ball. The study of the contribution of context to meaning is often called pragmatics.

1. *What do you think is the 'invariant core' meaning of the word 'ball', as proposed here? Can you think of any use of the word 'ball' that would not have that 'core' meaning? Can 'the context' cause a word not to have its 'core' meaning?*

2. *What does the term 'context' seem to refer to in this text? If you have a different concept of 'context', how would you revise this paragraph to illustrate it more clearly?*

3. *What is often called pragmatics?*

4. *Is pragmatics connected with word polisemy?*

5. *In what ways is the view of pragmatics in this text similar to or different from the way pragmatics is defined in Text I.*

Deixis and distance

Text3

CHARLES FILLMORE: *Santa Cruz Lectures on Deixis*.
Indiana University Linguistics Club 1975, p. 40-2

The most obvious place deictic terms in English are the adverbs 'here' and 'there' and the demonstratives 'this' and 'that', along with their plural forms; the most obvious time deictic words are adverbs like 'now' or 'today'. There are important distinctions in the uses of these and other deictic words which I would like us to be clear about right away. I will frequently need to point out whether a word or expression that I am referring to can be used in one or more of three different ways, and these I will call *gestural, symbolic*, and *anaphoric.* By the *gestural* use of a deictic expression I mean that use by which it can be properly interpreted only by somebody who is monitoring some physical aspect of the communication situation; by the *symbolic* use of a deictic expression I mean that use whose interpretation involves merely knowing certain aspects of the speech communication situation, whether this knowledge comes by current perception or not; and by the *anaphoric* use of an expression I mean that use which can be correctly interpreted by knowing what other portion of the same discourse the expression is *coreferential* with.

I can illustrate the distinction I'm talking about by taking the word 'there'. It has all three uses. Its gestural use can be seen in a sentence like, 'I want you to put it there'. You have to know where the speaker is pointing in order to know what place he is indicating. The symbolic use is exemplified in the telephoner's utterance, 'Is Johnny there?'. This time we understand the word 'there' as meaning 'in the place where you are'. An example of the anaphoric use of 'there' is a sentence like 'I drove the car to the parking lot and left it there'. In that case the word refers to a place which had been identified earlier in the discourse, namely the parking lot. Take another example, this time one showing just the distinction between the gestural and the symbolic use. If during my lecture you hear me use a phrase like 'this finger', the chances are fairly good that you will look up to see what it is that I want you to see; you will expect the word to be accompanied by a gesture or demonstration of some sort. On the other hand, if you hear me use the phrase 'this campus', you do not need to look up, because you know my meaning to be 'the campus in which I am now located', and you happen to know where I am. The former is the gestural use, the latter the symbolic use.

1. *Can you transfer this discussion to temporal deixis (as described in Chapter 2), considering 'then' (instead of 'there') in gestural, symbolic, and anaphoric uses?*

2. *Given the three categories described here, which category seems to fit the typical uses of deictic expressions such as 'yesterday' and 'tomorrow'?*

Place indications take part in the deictic system of a language by virtue of the fact that for many locating expressions, the location of one, or another, or both, of the speech act participants can serve as a spatial reference point. Sometimes all that means is that for an expression which in a nondeictic use requires mention of a reference object, in its deictic use the reference object, taken to be the speaker's body at the time of the speech act, simply goes unmentioned. Take, for example, the expression 'upstairs'. If I say, 'Johnny lives upstairs', you will understand me as meaning upstairs of the place where I am at the time I say the sentence, unless the immediately preceding discourse has provided some other reference point. If I say 'Harry lives nearby', the same can be said. You will understand that Harry lives near to the place where I am when I say the sentence, again, except for the case where a reference point has been identified in the immediately preceding discourse.

3. *Is the speaker's body always the unmentioned reference point, as Fillmore suggests here? Consider the uses of words like 'front', 'back', 'down (the street)', 'above', 'outside', and any others that seem to be similar to 'upstairs' and 'nearby' in the examples.*

Text 4

QUENTIN SMITH: 'The multiple uses of indexicals' in
Synthese 78, 1989, p. 182-3

'I am in last place' is often used to indicate that the speaker is in last place. But this sentence is also used on a number of occasions to indicate that somebody else is in last place. I am watching a race and the person upon whom I have bet, No. 10, drops to the last place. 'I am in last place!' I exclaim in anguish to my companion. My companion knows perfectly well what I mean - that *the person upon whom I have bet* is in last place. Indeed, she replies in kind, disagreeing with my statement. 'No you aren't! Look!' she exclaims, pointing at No. 10, 'You are passing No. 3!'

1. *Can you think of any other contexts where 'I' is not to be literally interpreted as 'the person who is speaking'?*

2. *Do examples such as these mean that we need a new definition of the meaning of the word 'I' in English? If yes, what would have to be in that definition? If no, how would you explain this type of 'extra' usage?*

Text 5

GEOFFREY NUNBERG: 'Indexicality and deixis' in *Linguistics and Philosophy* 16, 1993, p. 41

... you might point at a picture of John Ashberry to identify his most recent book, using the demonstrative that, with no restriction on the things you could say about it:

(94) That is in all the bookstores (on the top shelf, temporarily out of stock).

But while John Ashberry might easily say of himself 'I am in all the bookstores' it would be odd for him to say 'I am on the top shelf' or 'I am temporarily out of stock,' unless it could be supposed that the fact that an author's book was on the top shelf or was temporarily out of stock carried some noteworthy implications for him.

1. *Following on from these examples, could you point to an empty space on the bookshelf and and ask the owner of the bookstore, 'Is that out of stock?'? If yes, do we have to reformulate the definition of deixis (i.e. 'pointing via language') when there's nothing being pointed to?*

2. *Why do you think the idea of 'some noteworthy implications' is mentioned in this text? Does identifying the reference of deictic expressions depend on information about a person's thoughts and feelings? If yes, can you think of other examples (involving other deictic forms)?*

3. *How does the example with 'I' in this text fit in with your analysis of 'I' in Text 4?*

Reference and inference

Text 6

KEITH DONNELLAN: 'Reference and definite descriptions' in
Philosophical Review 75, 1966, p. 285-6

I will call the two uses of definite descriptions I have in mind the attributive use and the referential use. A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion, on the other hand, uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing. In the first case the definite description might be said to occur essentially, for the speaker wishes to assert something about whatever or whoever fits that description; but in the referential use the definite description is merely one tool for doing a certain job - calling attention to a person or thing - and in general any other device for doing the same job, another description or a name, would do as well. In the attributive use, the attribute of being the so-and-so is all important, while it is not in the referential use.

To illustrate this distinction, in the case of a single sentence, consider the sentence, 'Smith's murderer is insane.' Suppose first that we come upon poor Smith foully murdered. From the brutal manner of the killing and the fact that Smith was the most lovable person in the world, we might exclaim, 'Smith's murderer is insane.' I will assume, to make it a simpler case, that in a quite ordinary sense we do not know who murdered Smith (though this is not in the end essential to the case). This, I shall say, is an attributive use of the definite description.

The contrast with such a use of the sentence is one of those situations in which we expect and intend our audience to realize whom we have in mind

when we speak of Smith's murderer and, most importantly, to know that it is this person about whom we are going to say something.

1. *Before Donnellans proposal, many philosophers argued that if a description does not fit anything, then it fails to refer. What is Donnellan's perspective on this?*

2. *Using Donnellan's distinction (plus any additional distinctions you think are needed), how would you account for the use of a definite description that does not accurately fit the person or thing?*

3. *Can the attributive versus referential distinction be related to Fillmore's distinction (Text 3) between gestural, symbolic. and anaphoric uses of deictic expressions?*

Text 7

M.A.K.HALLIDAY and RUQAIYA HASAN: *Cohesion in English*. Longman 1976, page 31

There are certain items in every language which have the property of reference, in the specific sense in which we are using the term here; that is to say, instead of being interpreted semantically in their own right, they make reference to something else for their interpretation. In English these items are personals, demonstratives and comparatives.

We start with an example of each:
a. Three blind mice, three blind mice.
   See how they run! See how they run!
b. Doctor Foster went to Gloucester in a shower of rain.
 He stepped in a puddle right up to his middle and never went
   there again.
c. There were two wrens upon a tree.
   Another came, and there were three.

In (a), *they* refers to *three blind mice,* in (b) *there* refers to *Gloucester*; in (c) *another* refers to *wrens.*

These items are directives indicating that information is to be retrieved from elsewhere. So much they have in common with all cohesive elements. What characterizes this particular type of cohesion, that which we are calling REFERENCE, is the specific nature of the information that is signalled for retrieval. In the case of reference the information to be retrieved is the referential meaning, the identity of the particular thing or class of things that is being referred to; and the cohesion lies in the continuity of reference, whereby the same thing enters into the discourse a second time.

1. *In this analysis, the assumption is that certain words refer to other words. Do you think that this is a helpful or misleading assumption?*

2. *Do you agree with the final statement that 'the same thing enters into the discourse a second time'? How about example (c), where the analysis proposes that the word 'another' refers to 'wrens'?*

3. *If the word 'there' in (b) is an example of cohesion by reference, is the word 'there' in the second line of (c) the same? How do you decide?*
4. *Is Donnellan's distinction in Text 6 relevant to what these authors are saying?*

Presupposition and entailment

Text 8

ROBERT C.STALNAKER: 'Pragmatic presupposition' in
Milton Munitz and Peter Unger (eds.): *Semantics and
Philosophy*. New York University Press 1974, p. 199-200

Although it is normally inappropriate because unnecessary for me to assert something that each of us assumes the other already believes, my assertions will of course always have consequences which are part of the common background. For example, in a context where we both know that my neighbor is an adult male, I say 'My neighbor is a bachelor' which, let us suppose, entails that he is adult and male. I might just as well have said 'my neighbor is unmarried'. The same information would have been conveyed (although the nuances might not have been exactly the same). That is, *the increment of information,* or of content, conveyed by the first statement is the same as that conveyed by the second. If the asserted proposition were accepted, and added to the common background, the resulting situation would be the same as if the second assertion were accepted and added to the background.

This notion of common background belief is the first approximation to the notion of pragmatic presupposition that I want to use. A proposition *P* is a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in a given context just in case the speaker assumes or believes that *P,* assumes or believes that his addressee assumes or believes that *P,* and assumes or believes that his addressee recognizes that he is making these assumptions, or has these beliefs.

1. *Do you agree that the two utterances quoted in the first paragraph would add exactly the same information to the common background?*
2. *According to the definition presented in the second paragraph, would it be correct, or not, to say that a pragmatic presupposition is any belief of the speaker? (It may be helpful to look again at Chapter 4, pages 25-30.)*
3. *Can you think of circumstances where it is not inappropriate for someone 'to assert something that each of us assumes the other already believes'?*

Text 9
GERALD GAZDAR: *Pragmatics, Implicature, Presupposition,*
and Logical Form. Academic Press 1979, p. 106
> *(65) John got to safety before the boiler blew up.*
> *(66) John got to the safety handle before the boiler blew up.*

If we assume in (66) that John's getting to the safety handle prevented the boiler blowing up, then (66) does not, but (65) does, presuppose that the boiler blew up. If we treat *before* as being 'ambiguous', then we are again left with no principle for deciding whether or not the presupposition attaches to a particular sentence. Note also that, if all presupposing constructions are ambiguous, then the notion of 'infelicity' or 'unacceptability' is inapplicable, since we will always have an alternative reading with respect to which the sentence will be acceptable.

1. *How do you account for the fact that 'before' creates a presupposition in example (65), but not in (66)? Can you think of other examples where the use of 'before' does, or does not, lead to a presupposition?*
2. *Does 'after' work the same way? Should we define 'before' and 'after', not only as opposites, hut also as creating different presuppositions?*

Cooperation and implicature

Text 10
PAUL GRICE: 'Logic and conversation' in P.Cole and
J.L.Morgan (eds.): *Syntax and Semantics Volume 3: Speech Acts.*
Academic Press 1975, page 48

I would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE for us to follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon. For a time, I was attracted by the idea that observance of the CP [co-operative principle] and the maxims, in a talk exchange, could be thought of as a quasi-contractual matter, with parallels outside the realm of discourse. If you pass by when I am struggling with my stranded car, I no doubt have some degree of expectation that you will offer help, but once you join me in tinkering under the hood, my expectations become stronger and take more specific forms (in the absence of indications that you are merely an incompetent meddler); and talk exchanges seemed to me to exhibit, characteristically, certain features that jointly distinguish cooperative transactions:

1. The participants have some common immediate aim, like getting a car mended; their ultimate aims may, of course, be independent and even in conflict - each may want to get the car mended in order to drive off, leaving the other stranded. In characteristic talk exchanges, there is a common aim even if, as in an over-the-wall chat, it is a second order one, namely that each party should, for the time being, identify himself with the transitory conversational interests of the other.

2. The contributions of the participants should be dovetailed, mutually dependent.

3. There is some sort of understanding (which may be explicit but which is often tacit) that, other things being equal, the transaction should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it should terminate. You do not just shove off or start doing something else.

But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this may apply to some cases, there are too many types of exchange, like quarreling and letter writing, that it fails to fit comfortably.

1. *Can you spell out why 'quarreling and letter writing' do not fit comfortably with the conditions presented here?*

2. *What would you call the three 'features' listed here if you were to make them into maxims for cooperative transactions?*

3. *Grice emphasizes the word 'reasonable' as he describes his consideration of the cooperative principle and his maxims as a kind of contract. Would the cooperative principle, the maxims, and the three features listed here be treated as 'reasonable' in all societies and cultures?*

Text 11
J.L.MORGAN: '**Two types of convention in indirect speech acts' in P.Cole (ed.): *Syntax and Semantics Volume 9*: *Pragmatics*. Academic Press 1978, p. 277-8

Just above 1 presented cases involving particular expressions and the conventionalization of their use for certain implicatures, as in the case of *If you've seen one, you've seen them all*, or the original example, *Can you pass the salt?* I said in the latter case that it had become a convention of usage to use this expression, with its literal meaning, to convey an implicature of request. The question now arises, can there be this kind of conventionalization of rules of conversation? I think there can. For example, it is more or less conventional to challenge the wisdom of a suggested course of action by questioning the mental health of the suggestor, by ANY appropriate linguistic means, as in:

(37) *Are you crazy?*
(38) *Have you lost your mind?*
(39) *Are you out of your guard?*

and so on. Most Americans have two or three stock expressions usable as answers to obvious questions, as in:

(40) *Is the Pope Catholic?*
(41) *Do bagels wear bikinis?*

But for some speakers the convention does not specify a particular expression, and new ones are manufactured as they are needed. It seems that here a schema for implicature has been conventionalized: Answer an obvious yes/no question by replying with another question whose answer is very obvious and the same as the answer you intend to convey.

In a similar way, most speakers have a small number of expressions usable as replies to assertions, with the implicature that the assertion is transparently false - (42), for example:

(42) Yes, and I'm Marie the Queen of Romania,

But again, for some speakers the convention specifies only a general strategy, rather than a particular expression: To convey that an assertion is transparently false, reply with another assertion even more transparently false.

1. *Do you know any other 'stock expressions' for these types of occasions (request, challenge, answer to obvious questions, reply to a false assertion)? How would you explain (to someone learning English as a foreign language, for example) how to work out the communicated meaning from the literal meaning?*

2. *The author uses the term 'convention' in talking about the kinds of implicatures involved here. Do you think that the examples presented here can be analyzed in terms of conventional implicatures (as discussed in Chapter 5, pages 45-6)?*

3. *What do you think about the idea that an implicature may begin by being based on inference, but can become so conventionalized that no one has to make the inference any more? Is that the same process as we use in interpreting idioms?*

Speech acts and events

Text 12

JOHN SEARLE: *Speech Acts*. Cambridge University Press 1969, p. 58-9

One crucial distinction between promises on the one hand and threats on the other is that a promise is a pledge to do something for you, not to you; but a threat is a pledge to do something to you, not for you. A promise is defective if the thing promised is something the promisee does not want done; and it is further defective if the promisor does not believe the promisee wants it done, since a non-defective promise must be intended as a promise and not as a threat or warning. Furthermore, a promise, unlike an invitation, normally requires some sort of occasion or situation that calls for the promise. A crucial feature of such occasions or situations seems to be that the promisee wishes (needs, desires, etc.) that something be done, and the promisor is aware of this wish (need, desire, etc.). I think both halves of this double condition are necessary in order to avoid fairly obvious counter-examples.

1. *This paragraph lists several required features for a speech act to count as a promise. Do you agree that all these features are necessary? Are other crucial features not included here?*

One can, however, think of apparent counter-examples to this condition as stated. Suppose 1 say to a lazy student, 'If you don't hand in your paper on time I promise you I will give you a failing grade in the course'. Is this utterance a

promise? I am inclined to think not; we would more naturally describe it as a warning or possibly even a threat. But why, then, is it possible to use the locution 'I promise' in such a case? I think we use it here because 'I promise' and 'I hereby promise' are among the strongest illocutionary force indicating devices for *commitment* provided by the English language. For that reason we often use these expressions in the performance of speech acts which are not strictly speaking promises, but in which we wish to emphasize the degree of our commitment. To illustrate this, consider another apparent counter-example to the analysis along different lines. Sometimes one hears people say 'I promise' when making an emphatic assertion. Suppose, for example, I accuse you of having stolen the money. I say, 'You stole that money, didn't you?'. You reply, 'No, I didn't, I promise you I didn't'. Did you make a promise in this case? I find it very unnatural to describe your utterance as a promise. This utterance would be more aptly described as an emphatic denial, and we can explain the occurrence of the illocutionary force indicating device 'I promise' as derivative from genuine promises and serving here as an expression adding emphasis to your denial.

1. *Do you agree that having used the words 'I promise' you could later claim that 'strictly speaking' you did not make a promise because you meant something else?*
2. *What seem to be the conditions for an utterance containing the IFID 'I promise' to serve as an emphatic denial?*
3. *Is the recognition of speech act conditions related at all to the cooperative principle as discussed in Text 10 (It may be helpful to refer to the discussion of felicity conditions in Chapter 6, pages 50-1,)*

Text 13

GEOFFREY LEECH: *Principles of Pragmatics*. Longman 1983, p. 177-8

In referring to human conversational behavior, as to other areas of experience, our language provides us with categorical distinctions. But it is to commit a fundamental and obvious error to assume that the distinctions made by our vocabulary necessarily exist in reality. Language provides us with verbs like *order, request, beg, plead,* just as it provides us with nouns like *puddle, pond, lake, sea, ocean*. But we should no more assume that there are in pragmatic reality distinct categories such as orders and requests than that there are in geographical reality distinct categories such as puddles, ponds and lakes. Somehow, this assumption slips unnoticed into Searle's introduction to his taxonomy:

What are the criteria by which we can tell that of three actual utterances one is a report, one a prediction and one a promise? In order to develop higher order genera, we must first know how the species *promise, prediction, report,* etc. differ from one another.

(Searle, J. 1979.: *Expression and Meaning*. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, page 2.)

But it would be strikingly inappropriate if one were to begin a treatise on expanses of water, on the world's surface in this way:

What are the criteria by which we can tell that of three actual expanses of water, one is a puddle, one a pond, and one a lake? In order to develop higher order genera, we must first know, how the species *puddle, pond*, and *lake* differ from one another.

In defence of Searle it could be argued, first, that the comparison is unfair: if one had chosen monkeys and giraffes (say) instead of ponds and puddles, the example would have been less ridiculous. But my reply is (a) that one has no right *in advance* to assume that such categories exist in reality (although one might discover them by observation); and (b) that in actuality, when one *does* observe them, illocutions are in many respects more like puddles and ponds than like monkeys and giraffes: they are, that is to say, distinguished by continuous rather than by discrete characteristics.

1. *What exactly is the argument being presented here against the idea that we can identify a speech act as a prediction or not?*
2. *What would distinguish the definition of a puddle, in Leech's view, from the kind of definition of a promise presented in Text 12?*
3. *Do you think that Leech's argument is based on an important issue, or just a minor point? How do you think Searle would respond to this criticism from Leech?*

Politeness and interaction

Text 14
ROBIN LAKOFF: *Talking Power. The Politics of Language*.
Basic Books 1990, p. 34, 36, 38

Indirectness can function as a form of politeness. Politeness is a system of interpersonal relations designed to facilitate interaction by minimizing the potential for conflict and confrontation inherent in all human interchange. We like to think of conversation as conflict-free, with speakers normally being able to satisfy one another's needs and interests. But, in fact, we enter every conversation - indeed, every kind of discourse - with some personal desideratum in mind: perhaps as obvious as a favor or as subtle as the desire to be likeable. For some of these needs, participants can accede to each other, and both gain their desires; but with others, one must lose, however minimally, for the other to win. One person must tell another something that the other doesn't want to hear; one person must refuse another's request; one person must end a conversation before the other is quite willing to go. In such cases, there is the danger of insult and, consequently, the breakdown of communication. If societies did not devise ways to smooth over moments of conflict and confrontation, social relationships would be difficult to establish and continue, and essential cohesion would erode.

Politeness strategies are the means to preserve at least the semblance of harmony and cohesion. ...

1. *In what ways is this definition of politeness more or less specific than the general social meaning of politeness you are familiar with?*

Distancing cultures weave remoteness into their language. The attribution of responsibility represents an intrusion of the personal: it suggests that individuals with different interests are involved in the discussion. So grammatical devices that minimize a speaker's personal involvement are favored - for instance, passive verb forms and impersonal forms like *one*. Words that threaten to convey or evoke dangerous emotion are replaced with safer ones, which suggest that no emotion is involved. This formal language is the language of diplomacy, bureaucracy, and the professions. Diplomats speak of an *incident* when they mean that their countries are in a virtual state of war; bureaucrats talk of *revenue enhancement* when they renege on a promise of no new taxes; doctors discourse on *iatrogenesis* when they mean they did something that made the patient sick. These words provide a buffer between pure denotative meaning and its emotional wallop: the hearer, in all probability, knows perfectly well what the speaker intends; but the latter has chosen deliberately Latinate words from a sector of the vocabulary not rich in emotional connotations, so as to lessen the danger of collision.

2. *Can you think of other examples of distance politeness in language use?*

3. *Can you think of situations or special circumstances where the type of distance politeness, as defined here, is ignored?*

It is essential to realize that camaraderie can be conventional .... But ... someone unaccustomed to conventional camaraderie will take it as genuine, arising out of long acquaintance and the development of mutual liking and trust. Modern camaraderie probably began in California as an outgrowth of the human potential movement of the 1960s and 1970s. For a while it was a bane to visiting Easterners, who were confounded by the Californian's appearance of good fellowship and deep caring, the immediate first-naming, touching, looking deep into the eyes, and asking *truly caring* questions: 'Are you really happy with your life?' To the properly brought-up Easterner, such behavior was permissible only after years of earning it, and maybe not then. Easterners fell into one of several schools of thought about the character of Californians: either that they had the simplicity of children and should be patronized; or that they were rough frontier sorts, probably raised by wolves (and you know how wolves are); or that they were truly wonderful people who could get to know you as well after two seconds as would take most of us a lifetime. All of these attitudes assumed, of course, that the camaraderie was real rather than conventional.

4. *What examples of language use would you predict (or have you experienced) as representative of 'conventional camaraderie' in contrast to 'distance politeness'?*

Text 15

GABRIELE KASPER: 'Politeness' in R. E. Asher (ed.):
The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Volume 6.
Pergamon 1994, p. 3209

Some types of linguistic action are carried out more frequently in some cultures than in others. Hearer-beneficial acts such as complimenting and thanking occur more regularly in some Western contexts (e.g., the USA) than in some Asian cultures (e.g., mainland China), reflecting both the strong positive politeness orientation and reluctance to impose on others in mainstream American culture, on the one hand, and the assumption, in China, that participants act according to their social positions and associated roles and obligations, on the other. Also, hearer-costly acts such as refusals are perceived as being more socially offensive by Japanese and Chinese interlocutors and thus tend to be avoided, whereas it seems more consistent with American interlocutors' right to self-determination not to comply with another person's wishes.

1. *Can you think of other 'hearer-beneficial acts and other hearer-costly acts'? For example, what is an invitation or a complaint? Is it possible that the concepts of 'cost' and 'benefit' may be culturally determined?*

2. *There is a suggestion in this text that people in the USA are more concerned with their rights as individuals than with their social roles and obligations. What kind of evidence from language behavior would you look for in order to decide whether this suggestion is true or not?*

3. *Can you characterize the normal behavior of your own social group as having more 'hearer-beneficial' acts? What about 'hearer-costly' acts? Are there other social groups with whom you share the same language, but whose politeness strategies appear to be different?*

4. *Where does Lakoff's 'conventional camaraderie' (Text 14) fit into the distinction that Kasper is making here?*

Text 16

PENELOPE BROWN and STEPHEN LEVINSON: *Politeness.*
Cambridge University Press 1987, p. 281

In language the constraints are more on form than on content (or at least form provides a more feasible area of study). The ways in which messages are hedged, hinted, made deferential, and embedded in discourse structures then become crucial areas of study. But such areas are also the concern of pragmatics, the study of the systematic relation of a language to context. The special interest of sociolinguistics in our view is in the differential use of such pragmatic resources by different categories of speakers in different situations. It is in this way that we derive our slogan 'Sociolinguistics should be applied pragmatics.'

1. *Do you agree with the assumption that pragmatics comes first and then is 'applied' to the social use of language, or should it be the other way round?*
2. *Notice that the concepts of 'hedge' and 'hint' are used here. Recall the use of 'hedges' on implicatures in Chapter 5, pages 38-9 (which themselves may be termed 'hints'); would such phenomena in the use of language be better analyzed as aspects of politeness? Is pragmatics really just the study of linguistic politeness?*
3. *Does the 'slogan' at the end of this text provide a better (or worse) perspective on pragmatics than those offered in Texts 1 and 2 earlier?*

Conversation and preference structure

Text 17

HARVEY SACKS: *Lectures on Conversation*. Volume 1.
Blackwell 1992, p. 3-4
I'll start off by giving some quotations.

> (1) A: Hello.
> B:.Hello.
> (2) A: This is Mr Smith may I help you.
> B: Yes, this is Mr Brown.
> (3) A: This is Mr Smith may I help you.
> B: I can't hear you.
> A: This is Mr Smith.
> B: Smith.

These are some first exchanges in telephone conversations collected at an emergency psychiatric hospital. They are occurring between persons who haven't talked to each other before. One of them, A, is a staff member of this psychiatric hospital. B can be either somebody calling about themselves, that is to say in trouble in one way or another, or somebody calling about somebody else.

I have a large collection of these conversations, and I got started looking at these first exchanges as follows. A series of persons who called this place would not give their names. The hospital's concern was, can anything be done about it? One question I wanted to address was, where in the course of the conversation could you tell that somebody would not give their name? So I began to look at the materials. It was in fact on the basis of that question that I began to try to deal in detail with conversations.

I found something that struck me as fairly interesting quite early. And that was that if the staff member used 'This is Mr Smith may I help you' as their opening line, then overwhelmingly, any answer other than 'Yes, this is Mr Brown' (for example, 'I can't hear you,' 'I don't know,' 'How do you spell your name?') meant that you would have serious trouble getting the caller's name, if you got the name at all. ...

Looking at the first exchange compared to the second, we can be struck by two things. First of all, there seems to be a fit between what the first person who speaks uses as their greeting, and what the person who is given that greeting returns. So that if A says, 'Hello,' then B tends to say 'Hello.' If A says 'This is Mr Smith may I help you,' B tends to say 'Yes, this is Mr Brown.' We can say there's a procedural rule there, that a person who speaks first in a telephone conversation can choose their form of address, and in choosing their form of address they can thereby choose the form of address the other uses.

1. *Do you think that the 'procedural rule' presented here applies to all 'first exchanges' in telephone conversations?*
2. *What advantages and disadvantages do you think there are in using telephone data as the basis for analyzing how conversation works?*

Text 18

H.SACKS, E.SCHEGLOFF, and C.JEFFERSON: 'A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking in conversation' in *Language* 50, 1974, pages 700-1

To merit serious consideration, it seems to us, a model should be capable of accommodating (i.e., either be compatible with, or allow the derivation of) the following grossly apparent facts. In any conversation, we observe the following:

(1) Speaker-change recurs, or at least occurs.
(2) Overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time.
(3) Occurrences of more than one speaker at a time are common, but brief.
(4) Transitions (from one turn to a next) with no gap and no overlap are common. Together with transitions characterized by slight gap or slight overlap, they make up the vast majority of transitions.
(5) Turn order is not fixed, but varies.
(6) Turn size is not fixed, but varies.
(7) Length of conversation is not specified in advance.
(8) What parties say is not specified in advance.
(9) Relative distribution of turns is not specified in advance.
(10) Number of parties can vary.
(11) Talk can be continuous or discontinous.
(12) Turn-allocation techniques are obviously used. A current speaker may select a next speaker (as when he addresses a question to another party); or parties may self-select in starting to talk.
(13) Various 'turn-constructional units' are employed; e.g., turns can be projectedly 'one word long' or they can be sentential in length.
(14) Repair mechanisms exist for dealing, with turn-taking errors and violations; e.g., if two parties find themselves talking at the same time, one of them will stop prematurely, thus repairing the trouble.

1. *Can you divide these fourteen statements into two groups - one that applies to all conversations and one that applies to only some conversations in some contexts? What kinds of situations or people appear to create exceptions?*
2. *Should these statements be restricted to any conversation that is middle-class American and basically friendly? Can you think of different factors such as social class, culture, ethnicity, relationship, age - or any others that will have an effect on how turn-taking proceeds?*

Text 19

JACK BILMES: *Discourse and Behavior.* Plenum Press 1986, p. 166
Consider the following exchange:

> A [addressing B]: Where are you going?
> B [no response]
> A The hell with you.

This exchange makes sense. It is orderly, not random. We may characterize B's (non)response with an infinite variety of negatives. It is not a question, not a promise, not a lecture, and so forth. However, given that questions call for answers, it is *relevantly* not an answer.

1. *Why do you think the word 'relevantly' is emphasized in this text? Does this mean that every '(non)response' counts as relevantly not something in conversation?*
2. *Consider what speaker A says in reaction to the '(non)response', What kind of speech act is this? Does this utterance tell us anything about the relationship between the two speakers (i.e. strangers, acquaintances, or intimates)?*

Discourse and culture

Text 20

JOHN GUMPERZ and JENNY COOK-GUMPERZ:
'Introduction: language and the communication of social identity'
in J.Gumperz (ed.): *Language and Social Identity*,
Cambridge University Press 1982, p. 12

Although the pragmatic conditions of communicative tasks are theoretically taken to be universal, the realizations of these tasks as social practices are culturally variable. This variation can be analyzed from several different perspectives, all of which of course co-occur in the actual practices.

(1) Different cultural assumptions about the situation and about appropriate behavior and intentions within it.

(2) Different ways of structuring information or an argument in a conversation.

(3) Different ways of speaking: the use of a different set of unconscious linguistic conventions (such as tone of voice) to emphasize, to signal

local connections and to indicate the significance of what is being said in terms of overall meaning and attitudes.

By 'different cultural assumptions' we refer to the fact that, even though people in situations such as we study agree on the overall purpose of the interaction, there are often radical differences as to what expectations and rights are involved at any one time.

1. *There is a suggestion here that 'pragmatic conditions' can be treated as 'universal' (i.e. applicable everywhere). Can you suggest some examples of pragmatic universals? How about 'Be polite'? Any others?*

2. *Can you think of any examples that would support the idea that 'appropriate behavior' differs in different cultures (pragmatically speaking)?*

3. *Do you agree with these authors that there are different ways of 'structuring an argument'? How is an argument structured in English? How could it be structured any other way?*

Text 21

JENNY THOMAS: 'Cross-cultural pragmatic failure' in
Applied Linguistics 4/2, 1983, p. 105

'Free goods' are those which, in a given situation, anyone can use without seeking permission, for example, salt in a restaurant (providing, of course, that you are having a meal in that restaurant and have not simply wandered in from the street with a bag of fish and chips). Generally speaking, what an individual regards as 'free goods' varies according to relationships and situation. In one's own family or home, most things (food, drink, books, baths) are free goods. In a stranger's house they are not. Cross-culturally, too, perceptions of what constitutes 'free' or 'nearly free' goods differ. In Britain, matches are 'nearly free', so one would not use a particularly elaborate politeness strategy to request one, even of a total stranger. In the Soviet Union cigarettes are also virtually 'free' and a request for them demands an equally minimal degree of politeness, such as *Daite sigaretu [give (me) a cigarette]*. A Russian requesting a cigarette in this country and using a similar strategy would either have wrongly encoded the amount of politeness s/he intended (covert grammatical or pragmalinguistic failure) or seriously misjudged the size of imposition (sociopragmatic failure).

1. *The author is writing ('in this country') about Britain. Do you think her observation on salt in a restaurant is based on a universal component of a 'restaurant script'? In a family context, do you agree that 'most things ... are treated as free goods'? What about other cultures you are familiar with ?*

2. *The examples in this text are physical objects. There are also cultural differences in what kind of information is considered 'free goods'. What constraints are there, in cultures you are familiar with, on asking people about certain topics (for example, their political views, religion, marital status, income, cost of their possessions, bathroom behavior, sexual practices)?*

3. *What do you think the distinction is between the two kinds of 'failure' (pragmalinguistic and sociopragmatic) described here?*

REFERENCE BOOKS

1. Blokh M.Y. A Course in Theoretical English Grammar. M., 2000.
2. Crystal D. Linguistics. Lnd., 1990.
3. Halliday M.A.K. An Introduction to FunctionalGrammar. Lnd., 1985.
4. Halliday M.A.K., Hasan R. Cohesion in English, Longman, 1976.
5. Hockett Ch. A Course in Modern Linguistics. USA, 1960.
6. Green, Georgia. Pragmatics and Natural Language Understanding, Laurence Erlbaum, 1989.
7. Greenbaum S., R.Quirk. A Student's Grammar of the English language. Longman, England, 1998.
8. Grundy P. Doing Pragmatics. Lnd., 1999.
9. Ilyish B.A. The Structure of Modern English. L., 1971.
10. Jule G. Pragmatics, Oxford, 2000.
11. Language and Social Identity (ed. J.Gumperz). Cambridge University Press, 1982.
12. Palmer F. Grammar. Lnd., 1971.

Эмилия Николаевна Плеухина

**Очерки по синтаксису современного английского языка
(с хрестоматией и упражнениями)
Учебное пособие для студентов факультетов и
отделений английского языка**

Редакторы: А.О. Кузнецова
А.С. Паршаков
Д.В. Носикова